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Abstract
Robust, Resilient Networked Communication in Challenged Environments
by
Michael S. Nekrasov
In challenged environments, digital communication infrastructure may be difficult or
even impossible to access. This is especially true in rural and developing regions, as well
as in any region during a time of political or environmental crisis. We advance the state
of the art in wireless networking and security to design networks and applications that
rapidly assess changing networking conditions to restore communication and provide local
situational awareness.
This dissertation examines new systems for responding to current and emerging needs
for wireless networks. This work looks across the wireless ecosystem of widely deployed
standards. We develop new tools to improve network assessment and to provide robust
and reliable network communication. By incorporating new technological breakthroughs,
such as the wide commercial success of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), we introduce
novel methods and systems for existing wireless standards for these challenged networks.
We assess how existing technologies and standards function in difficult environments:
lacking end-end Internet connectivity, experiencing overload or other resource constraints,
and operating in three dimensional space. Through this lens, we demonstrate how to
optimize networks to serve marginalized communities outside of first world urban cities and
make our networks resilient to natural and political crisis that threaten communication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As of 2019, roughly 46% of the world’s population lacks Internet access [1]. The division
between those with the ability to access the Internet and those without is frequently
referred to as the “Digital Divide” [2, 3, 4]. Those without Internet access predominately
live in rural regions, especially in the developing world. The division in access is not a
distinct boundary between groups. While some go without Internet access due to lack of
infrastructure, others lack the financial means to pay for connectivity [5]. In other cases,
those with access may have service so poor that they find it difficult to use the Internet
for anything of value to their lives [6]. Two decades after the formulation of the digital
divide as a key social challenge for computer networks, the growth in Internet penetration
is stagnating [7, 8] and existing tools to assess network access are insufficient.
Wireless networks, especially in rural regions, are frequently used for “Last Mile
Network Access” [9, 10]. Wireless deployments are typically cheaper to deploy and
maintain then cable counterparts particularly over long distances and in difficult terrain.
In these cases fixed wired infrastructure is brought to the edge of a community, and
wireless technologies are used to disseminate access across individual households. In some
cases even terminating portions of this backhaul use point to point wireless links [11, 12].
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Cellular broadband technologies, such as Long-term evolution (LTE) as well as older
generation 3G and 2G networks, are frequently used to connect the edges of access
networks to the Internet. The assessment of such networks, both in terms of coverage and
performance, remains a significant challenge. Governments and corporations frequently
use generous propagation models to assess coverage, often overstating availability and not
accounting for quality and usability [8, 13, 14].
Inaccuracies in network assessment exist beyond public facing networks. In envi-
ronmental and agricultural domains, network connected Internet of things (IoT) sen-
sors are increasingly deployed to enable precise measurement and modeling of micro-
climates [15, 16, 17, 18]. The data from these sensors contribute to improving land use and
boosting crop yields, as well as preparing for and responding to natural disasters. As in
the case of public Internet use, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) deployed in rural regions
frequently encounter a deficit of backhaul connectivity. When end-end Internet connec-
tivity becomes impossible or impractical, Delay-tolerant network (DTN) approaches can
provide access [19]. One promising proposal deploys UASs to access remote WSNs, collect
data, and deliver that data back to Internet connected gateways [20, 21, 22]. As of 2020,
adaptations of this approach are in their infancy. While simulations of wireless networks
show capacity for DTNs of sensors utilizing UASs for wide scale data delivery [23], as we
explore in chapters 5 and 6, the reality is harsher than simulations project. As in the
case of cellular networks, real-world networks encounter a variety of constraints. To turn
theory into reality, new network assessment methods are needed.
Even if Internet connectivity is typically available in a region, networks sometimes
encounter disruptions. Natural disasters can damage otherwise well provisioned networks
when most needed. In addition to directly threatening human lives, natural disasters, such
as hurricanes, cripple communication infrastructure. During the 2017 Atlantic hurricane
season, three successive hurricanes inflicted significant communication disruptions, despite
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prior warning and preparations. After Hurricane Harvey, 4.1% of cell sites across the
coasts of Texas and Louisiana were inoperable [24]. Hurricane Irma disrupted 27% of
towers in affected areas of Florida [25] and downed 55% of Puerto Rico’s cellular towers
[26]. Hurricane Maria disabled 95% of cellular sites in Puerto Rico and 76% in the Virgin
Islands [27]. As a result, affected citizens were unable to request help or rescue in the
face of rising floodwaters.
The impact of these disasters sometimes last months or years. Infrastructure damage
to power and communication networks in Puerto Rico took more than 11 months to re-
store [28] and caused a temporary migration of half a million residents [29]. Unfortunately,
such disasters seem to be increasing in frequency and intensity [30, 31].
As evidenced in the case of the 2017 hurricanes, natural disasters drastically change
network topography. Previously well provisioned networks become fragmented or over-
loaded and quality of service (QoS) diminishes. Rapid assessment of the changing network
conditions is essential to disaster response and recovery. Mobile network operators (MNOs)
already use emerging technologies, such as UASs, to assess physical infrastructure damage
after a disaster. The work in this dissertation further expands capabilities, by proposing
systems of automated network quality assessment and systems for locating disconnected
wireless devices.
Natural disasters are not the only threat to access. For the last decade, civil freedoms
have declined across the world [32], especially journalistic freedoms, freedom of speech and
expression, and access to information. This trend likewise applies to Internet freedoms.
The last decade experienced a sharp rise in censorship, Internet surveillance, targeted
disinformation, and cyberbullying [33]. Political crises, such as the refugee dispute in
Bangladesh [34] or the dispute in Kashmir [35], entirely disabled local Internet use for
days or months. In other cases, governments limit Internet access for particular types of
content [36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. Policies and threats also lead to self censorship of content,
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as we cover in chapter 9. As in the case of environmental crises, political crises deprive
users of access to critical information and affect their ability to communicate.
1.1 Thesis Statement
This dissertation shows that:
In challenged environments, digital communication infrastructure may be
difficult or even impossible to access. This is especially true in rural and
developing regions, as well as in any region during a time of political or
environmental crisis. We advance the state of the art in wireless networking
and security to design networks and applications that rapidly assess changing
networking conditions to restore communication and provide local situational
awareness.
Figure 1.1: Thesis Outline.
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1.2 Dissertation Outline and Contributions
The structure of this dissertation is summarized in Figure 1.1 and is organized as
follows. The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first section explores new strategies
for rapid network planning and providing situational awareness. First, we develop new
methods for evaluating LTE cellular connectivity in rural areas and overloaded conditions.
Second, we assess IEEE 802.15.4 flying ubiquitous sensor networks (FUSNs) in order to
facilitate the use of aerial data collection practices for difficult to access networks, such
as after a disaster. Third, we present a novel wireless localization algorithm for UASs
using IEEE 802.11. The second part of the dissertation investigates challenges in online
communication during a political crisis. First, we categorize social challenges to free
speech. Then we present a novel tool that resolves some of these challenges.
1.2.1 Network and Situational Assessment
The first part of the dissertation deals with assessment of wireless networks and
provision of situational awareness. We investigate multiple wireless standards, including
LTE, IEEE 802.15.4, and IEEE 802.11 (WiFi). This section introduces new systems and
algorithms for evaluating network quality, detecting overloading, and locating devices. Our
work extends the abilities of network planners and evaluative bodies to assess challenged
networks, including rural networks and networks before and after a disaster.
Cellular LTE
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate passive methods of evaluating LTE cellular networks
without MNO co-operation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, accurate assessment
of cellular networks remains a critical challenge to bridging the digital divide. MNOs
lack incentive to construct and share accurate coverage maps or load levels. This work
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provides outside parties, such as affected communities and network researchers, the tools
to passively evaluate network performance.
Evaluating LTE Coverage and Quality from an UAS: Chapter 3 presents a novel
aerial system for evaluating LTE coverage and quality from an UAS. This work focuses on
rapid evaluation of large rural areas. Despite widespread LTE adoption and dependence,
rural areas lag behind in availability and quality of coverage. While the United States
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which regulates mobile broadband in the
United States, reports increases in LTE availability, the most recent FCC Broadband
Report was criticized for overstating coverage [41, 42]. Physical assessments of cellular
availability and quality are essential for evaluate and predict actual user experiences.
However, measurement campaigns can be resource, time, and labor intensive; more
scalable measurement strategies are urgently needed.
In this work, we first present several measurement solutions to capture LTE signal
strength measurements, and we compare their accuracy. Our findings reveal that simple,
lightweight spectrum sensing devices have comparable accuracy to expensive solutions and
can estimate quality within one gradation of accuracy when compared to user equipment.
We then show that these devices can be mounted on UAS to more rapidly and easily
measure coverage across wider geographic regions. Our results show that the low-cost
aerial measurement techniques have 72% accuracy relative to the ground readings of
user equipment, and fall within one quality gradation 98% of the time. This work was
published in the proceedings of the 16th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc
and Smart Systems (MASS) [43].
Packet-level Overload Estimation in LTE Networks: Chapter 4 examines exist-
ing cellular networks under load and presents a novel method of packet-level overload
estimation in LTE networks using passive measurements. Over 87% of US mobile wire-
6
Introduction Chapter 1
less subscriptions are currently held by LTE-capable devices [44]. However, prior work
demonstrates that connectivity may not equate to usable service. Even in well-provisioned
urban networks, unusually high usage (such as during public events or during a political
or environmental crisis) can lead to overload that makes the LTE service difficult, if not
impossible to use, even if the user is solidly within the coverage area. A typical approach
to detect and quantify overload on LTE networks secures the cooperation of the MNO for
access to internal metrics. An alternative approach deploys multiple mobile devices with
active subscriptions to each MNO.
As both approaches are resource and time intensive, in this work, we propose a
novel method to estimate overload in LTE networks using only passive measurements
and without requiring MNO cooperation. We use this method to analyze packet-level
traces for three commercial LTE MNOs, T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T, from several
locations during both typical levels of usage and during public events yielding large, dense
crowds. This study presents the first look at overload estimation through the analysis of
unencrypted broadcast messages. We show that an upsurge in broadcast reject and cell
barring messages can accurately detect an increase in network overload. This work was
published in the proceedings of the 2019 Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) [45].
IEEE 802.15.4
The need for Internet access extends beyond UEs. As discussed earlier in this chapter,
WSNs are increasingly used in environmental monitoring and precision agriculture to
monitor and model environmental changes. These models can be critical in predicting,
assessing and recovering from disasters. The potential of these systems stems from the
aggregation and analysis of multitudes of sensors. When missing an Internet backhaul,
as is often the case in a rural area or after a disaster, these systems need an alternative
method of access.
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The IEEE 802.15.4 standard, once envisioned for low-rate wireless personal area
networks (LR-WPANs), is the basis of a number of common standards, such as ZigBee
and WirelessHART and SNAP, for home and outdoor IoT WSNs [46]. These standards
take advantage of 802.15.4’s low power usage and flexible topology. Consumer 802.15.4
radios are widely available in compact form factors, making them ideal for application
in environmental and agricultural sensor networks. As we cover in chapters 2, 5 and 6,
UASs show promise in FUSNs employing DTN approaches for aerial content delivery.
Unfortunately, as we will see in chapter 2, three dimensional communication introduces
new challenges, such as high mobility, non-uniform signal radiation patterns and extreme
ranges. While ample ground based measurement studies of 802.15.4 exist, rigorous
evaluation of 802.15.4 in three dimensional aerial communication remains inadequate.
Optimizing 802.15.4 Outdoor Sensor Networks for Aerial Data Collection:
Chapter 5 investigates 802.15.4 network optimization for aerial data collection. Our work
is, to our knowledge, the first performance measurement study of 802.15.4 ground-air
data collection performance from an UAS. We analyze experimental measurements from
an outdoor aerial testbed, examining how factors, such as antenna orientation, altitude,
antenna placement, and obstruction affect signal strength and packet reception rate. This
work uses Digi WRL-15126 XBee3 transceiver using PCB antennae. These radios are
popular due to their compact form factor.
In our analysis, we model and predict the quality of services for aerial data collection,
based on these network configuration variables and contrast that with the received signal
strength indicator (RSSI) - a commonly used signal strength metric. We find that network
configuration plays a significant role in network quality, which RSSI, a mediator variable,
struggles to account for in the presence of high packet loss. Instead we propose that
packet reception rate (PRR) is a more appropriate network metric and that Zero-inflated
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negative binomial regression (ZINB) effectively models PRR. This work provides a first
look at optimizing outdoor 802.15.4 networks for aerial data collection. A portion of
this work was published in the proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Micro Aerial
Vehicle Networks, Systems, and Applications (DroNet) [47] and the full work in the MDPI
Journal Sensors [48].
Impact of 802.15.4 Radio Antenna Orientation on Aerial Data Collection:
While the work in chapter 5 investigated antenna orientation as a potential variable
for RSSI and PRR, we found that the coiled PCB antenna dampens effects, such as
toroidal radiation and signal polarization, exhibited by straight wire dipole antennas. In
chapter 6, we expand the work of chapter 5 and provide the first study of the difference
in performance between straight wire and PCB antenna for 802.15.4 outdoor wireless
networks.
We compare external antenna configurations to the commonly used embedded coiled
antenna modules. We investigate the impact of antenna type and orientation on PRR
and RSSI, again modeling our data using ZINB. For each hardware configuration and
orientation, we identify the optimal altitude to fly a UAS. Combined, these two works
serve as a comprehensive first look at how hypothetical aerial data collection strategies
for 802.15.4 networks would fare in real-world conditions. Our results show that choosing
antenna configuration (including type and orientation) for an IoT network comes with
trade-offs and an informed choice must consider the intended UAS collection flight plan.
IEEE 802.11
In addition to network quality, the physical locations of devices can be critical
for providing situational awareness and network planning. For an outdoor WSN for
example, the location of sensors provides valuable input for domain modeling and network
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performance. A further (and particularly critical) case of device localization arises during
a natural disasters.
During a disaster, first responders often locate survivors as a part of search and rescue
operations [49, 50]. Normally UEs, such as smartphones, self report their location via
GPS or other self-localization schemes. However, when disasters disrupt communication
infrastructure, UEs are no longer connected to a network. To restore connectivity, some
propose using LTE equipped UASs [51] to request location. While technologically feasible,
policies and user behaviors make this option difficult because LTE frequencies are licensed
and tightly regulated. Even in emergencies, actors other than licensed MNOs cannot
legally broadcast on these frequencies. Additionally, the physical infrastructure, LTE base
stations (eNodeBs), are expensive and power hungry and mounting them on UASs results
in brief flight times. The IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) standard provides a lower cost, lower power
alternative, but at much shorter ranges.
Another challenge to localizing devices lies in the process of querying the device for
the location. There is no universal system for querying devices for their location. Some
solutions exist, such as the Facebook disaster check-in program [52]. However, these
solutions are limited in scope and require active user participation. In the event that
partial connectivity is restored, without returning end-to-end network access, such systems
would not function.
An alternative solution involves captive portals, that force user devices to a web page
when connectivity is first established. Captive portals have already been successfully used
as communication platforms during emergencies [53, 54]. However, traditional captive
portals assume continuous connectivity to the wireless AP, which maintains state for the
duration of the session. This assumption does not hold for a captive portal hosted by
a moving drone, particularly in a disaster scenario with impacted connectivity. Instead,
we propose a captive portal that loads on a user device when connectivity with the
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drone is established, and which does not require Internet connectivity or connectivity
to a separate AP. To this end we developed a progressive web app (PWA), EmerGence,
designed to leverage opportunistic Internet connectivity to relay messages from individuals
trapped in disaster-hit areas. EmerGence works by bypassing the crippled communication
infrastructure to connect disaster victims with needed resources (both human and material)
through a combination of a new web development concept called the PWA and served by
an UAS. This work was presented at the International Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems and Applications (HotMobile) [55]. This work in turn led to coauthored work on
information retrieval from traditional sources, such as social media which is published in
the proceedings of The Web Conference (WWW) [56].
Real-Time Multilateral RSSI Localization from UASs for Disaster Response:
In a disaster, users may be unwilling or unable to engage with a system actively. In
chapter 7, we propose a system for passive real-time multilateral RSSI localization from
UASs using 802.11. We explore how an 802.11-equipped drone can be used to locate
an uncooperative device in three dimensional space, based on the RSSI. Even when not
connected to an access point, 802.11 devices broadcast packets called probe requests that
assist in connectivity [57]. These requests can be passively captured and used for localizing
devices.
We provide a novel algorithm using VBA for real-time UAS based multilateral lo-
calization. Using an aerial testbed, we perform extensive evaluations and compare our
solution with other standard approaches. We demonstrate that, in contrast to other
approaches, VBA uses fixed computation time and memory as the number of data points
increases, while still providing comparable error. Based on our results, we discuss how
a continuously updated geographic representation can be used for flight planning and
rescue operations post-natural disaster.
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In addition to UEs, this algorithm could be applied to IoT devices and WSNs. IoT
sensors frequently lack GPS or other localization technologies and tracking their location
post deployment can be troublesome [58, 59]. VBA may provide a low cost method of
rapidly mapping deployed IoT sensors from a UAS.
1.2.2 Facilitating Open Communication
As described earlier in this chapter, the digital divide goes beyond questions about
infrastructure. Even if infrastructure is present, capable of satisfying performance needs,
and undamaged by natural disaster, political crises can make the Internet unusable for
large demographics. Part II of this dissertation examines the issues surrounding access
availability that limits usability. As we will see in this section, while the Internet is a
critical tool for communication and knowledge acquisition in societies across the globe,
its use has become a battlefield for governments, corporations, and individuals to censor
speech and access to information. In order to understand the obstacles to free speech
on-line, we partner with social science and film and media studies to categorize the social
challenges through user surveys of vulnerable communities and ethnographic interviews.
Based on this research we build and evaluate a novel tool for facilitating discourse.
Categorizing Social Challenges
When we began research into facilitating open communication on-line, we eschewed
preconceived notions of technological solutions we thought would be useful to target
communities. Instead, we conducted interviews on the needs of these communities and
determined that our initial concepts did not align with the actual needs of vulnerable
populations. Therefore, before developing any tools, we first categorize the unmet social
challenges. To conduct these interviews, we sought out a diverse set of participants
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with independent and sometimes conflicting agendas. To understand the barriers they
encounter, we investigated the competing motivations, the adversaries, and the tools those
adversaries use to silence speech and block access.
Limits to Internet Freedoms: Chapter 9 presents research into the use of social
media for free speech based on ethnographic research conducted by our team in Lusaka,
Zambia; Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; and Istanbul, Turkey from 2014-2016. We reached out
to diverse sets of communities to investigate Internet freedoms and, in particular, their
relation to online social networks (OSNs). We use this research as the basis of discussion
into the limits, actors, and concerns in this space. We formally interviewed 110 people
and had informal conversations with dozens more individuals. While our work provides
only a small window into the broad set of limits that individuals encounter in on-line
access and speech, the diverse perspectives, cultures, and struggles serve as a platform for
understanding the limits to Internet freedoms in a global context. We conclude with a
discussion of how design and development choices for technology can affect marginalized
communities, as well as the ethical and technical considerations for developing tools and
applications that support Internet freedoms.
This work is a novel partnership between social and computing disciplines. The work
came at a particularly important time when Turkey experienced a steep change in freedoms,
including a massive protest in Gezi Park [60], an attempted coup [61], and subsequent
purging of academics [62]. This work included interviews with marginalized groups and
individuals directly targeted based on Internet activities. This work was published in the
proceedings of the 2017 Workshop on Computing Within Limits (LIMITS) [63].
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Facilitating Discourse
As can perhaps be expected, from our research in chapter 9, we found users often turn
to technological solutions to combat this threat to civil liberties. For example, popular
anonymity tools such as Tor [64] provide network level anonymity, while person to person
messaging tools such as Signal [65] and WhatsApp [66] allow private communication
using end-end encryption. Nevertheless, safe public communication remains a challenge.
Individuals conversing publicly on OSNs open themselves up to legal and physical dangers,
encouraging self censorship and stifling discourse. Reputation and trust are likewise
eroded. In an era of “fake news”, users struggle to identify what OSN accounts and
posted content can be trusted [67, 68]. Adversaries to open discourse deploy armies of
operatives masquerading as legitimate users to sow division [69, 70]. Even trusted news
outlets using OSNs can be hacked to spread mis-information [71, 72, 73]. From this work
we discovered that public group discourse while simultaneously maintaining anonymity
and preserving reputation on OSNs was a critical unmet need of Internet users.
A User-Driven Application for Anonymous and Verified Online, Public Group
Discourse: Chapter 10 is a culmination of our efforts in freedom of speech on-line. In
this work, we explore the design process of SecurePost, a novel tool allowing verified
group anonymity to those communicating publicly on OSNs. We ground our work in
the survey-based research and ethnographic interviews of communities vulnerable to
censorship. We explore needs and requirements of users, such as modes of censorship,
resistance to network disruption, and appropriate platform consideration. We outline our
technological solution and expand on how on-the-ground research of user communities
guides technological requirements. While our work focuses on specific communities, not
populations of countries as a whole, we believe examining the needs of communities
particularly vulnerable to censorship provides a lens through which to understand some
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challenges to overcoming censorship more broadly. Portions of this work was published in
the proceedings of the 7th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the
Internet (FOCI) [74] and the full work was published in the Journal of Internet Services
and Applications [75].
1.3 Discussion
Computer science research strives to design technology that tackles existing social
challenges and extrapolates into the future to develop solutions for emerging problems.
This dissertation investigates critical contemporary challenges for the use of wireless
networks. Rise in inequality with bidirectional links to the digital divide, natural disasters
fueled by anthropocentric climate change, and political crises - from human rights abuses,
war, government corruption, and religious conflict - are among the core problems of the
next century [76, 77].
This dissertation examines new systems for responding to current and emerging needs
for wireless networks. This work looks across the wireless ecosystem of widely deployed
standards. We develop new tools to improve network assessment and to provide robust
and reliable network communication. By incorporating new technological breakthroughs,
such as the wide commercial success of UASs, we introduce novel methods and systems
for existing wireless standards for these challenged networks.
We assess how existing technologies and standards function in difficult environments,
such as those lacking end-end Internet connectivity, overloaded, resource constrained,
and operating in three dimensional space. Through this lens, we can understand how
to optimize networks to serve marginalized communities, outside of first world urban
cities, and make our networks resilient to natural and political crisis that threaten
communication.
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Wireless Networks
Part I of this dissertation deals with the assessment of wireless networks and provision of
situational awareness in order to address concerns raised in chapter 1. We investigate
multiple wireless standards, including LTE, IEEE 802.15.4, and IEEE 802.11 (WiFi). We
introduce new systems and algorithms for evaluating network quality, detecting overload,
and locating devices. Our work extends the abilities of network planners and evaluative
bodies to assess challenged networks, including rural networks and networks before and
after a disaster.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, we provide an overview of emerging trends
in network assessment, including outstanding research problems. Second, we provide an
outline of our work in this field. Third, we conclude by highlighting key contributions to
the academic community and the broader impacts of our work.
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2.1 Background
2.1.1 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs)
Due to the recent commercial success of multi-copters, UASs, with capacities previously
unavailable in fixed wing systems, are now widely accessible. Multi-copters maneuver in
3 dimensions, hover in-place, and effortlessly take-off and land. New applications include
fields like precision agriculture [78, 79, 80, 15, 81], automated ground surveying [82],
structural assessment [83, 84, 85], environmental research [86, 87, 88, 89], and disaster
management [90, 91, 92, 93, 94]. Many applications rely on high-bandwidth low latency
network traffic, such as white light and infrared imagery.
In addition to communicating with users, UASs can communicate with each other
or bridge existing networks by supplementing cellular connectivity [95, 96] or interfacing
with one another to provide wider coverage [97, 98]. UASs can integrate into FUSNs,
providing DTN delivery to WSNs of IoT and radio-frequency identification (RFID) devices
[99, 23, 100, 101]. New wireless protocols, like TV white space (TVWS), allow for novel
UAS communication strategies, as well as UAS based spectrum mapping and policing
[102]. When mobility is unnecessary, UASs can perch for rapidly deployable infrastructure
[103, 104, 105]. In addition to data transfer, UASs have wireless capabilities suitable for
locating the UAS when GPS is not present (like in an indoor environment) or for locating
other devices [106, 57].
When networks fail to provide end-end Internet connectivity, either through lack of
infrastructure or due to damage, UASs can service disconnected networks. UASs can be
deployed as aerial network relay nodes [107, 21, 20, 108] or as data mules [22, 109]. In
the event of a disruption to an existing network, such as damage to relay towers during a
storm, UASs can mend network fragmentation [110, 111, 112], acting as temporary relays
or DTN nodes. UASs can likewise supplement existing communication infrastructure, in
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vehicular networks [113] for example, as well as in rural applications for environmental
monitoring [114, 115] and precision agriculture [116, 117]. To adequately utilize UASs
for these types of applications, network planners must understand how best to optimize
connectivity so that data is successfully delivered.
2.1.2 IEEE 802.11 (WiFi)
The IEEE 802.11 standard, also known as WiFi, is, perhaps, one of the most pervasive
communication technologies in use today, with over thirteen billion estimated WiFi
enabled devices in use [118]. WiFi enabled devices range from stationary computers,
mobile UEs, including smartphones, to new applications, such as UASs. As 802.11 was
originaly designed with two dimensional ground-based communication in mind, consumer
wireless network hardware and the 802.11 family of standards are not optimized for highly
mobile 3D settings. This can pose problems for the use of these protocols on UASs.
Consumer devices typically employ dipole antennas that radiate in a toroidal pattern
(doughnut-like shape perpendicular to the antenna). This signal is uniformly emitted at
the same orientation, resulting in polarization [119]. This creates a low signal zone above
the antenna tip. On the ground, particularly in indoor spaces, obstruction from walls
and ceilings cause signal reflection. This bounce leads to multi-path signal propagation
where portions of the signal reflect off surfaces and arrive at the receiver at different
orientations [120]. While introducing challenges, such as multi-path fading, this effect
reduces the relative significance of polarization and toroidal radiation for indoor networks.
Recent 802.11 standards (ac and ax ) use multi-path signal propagation to improve
bandwidth via the use of multi-user multiple-input and multiple-output (MU-MIMO) [121].
In contrast, outdoor three dimensional networks typically operate with comparatively
little obstruction. In 3D space, the toroidal radiation and signal polarization of dipole
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antennas used in consumer electronics negatively impact reception quality for aerial
networks [122, 123, 124, 125]. Additionally, when used with UASs, the rate adaptation
algorithms of 802.11 do not cope with unusually high mobility [126, 127]. Similarly, tech-
nologies that boost throughput via spacial diversity, such as MU-MIMO, do not translate
well in outdoor spaces with few sources of reflection [128]. As a result, measurements
collected from aerial devices are not directly comparable to terrestrial measurements [129]
and additional factors, including UAS altitude, affect performance [130].
2.1.3 IEEE 802.15.4
IoT devices and sensors proliferate across a wide domain of applications, ranging
from home automation to environmental monitoring. As of 2018, the number of active
IoT devices exceeded seven billion, with the largest growth expected for 802.15.4 LR-
WPAN devices [131]. The 802.15.4 standard, once envisioned for wearable networks, is
implemented by a number of common standards, such as ZigBee and WirelessHART
and SNAP, and has become a common communication standard for IoT devices [46].
Standards designed for complex computing devices do not fit the power and network
topology for many IoT applications, including WSNs. For example, the 802.11 standard
consumes excessive power and is ill-suited for periodic, low bandwidth communication
style typical of WSNs. In contrast, 802.15.4 is optimized for low power, low data rate
node-to-node connectivity inside a local sensor network [132]. However, remote WSNs
still require an Internet gateway for broader Internet access. In areas without Internet
access, due to lack of infrastructure or due to infrastructure damaged in events, such as
natural disasters, alternate Internet access technologies are necessary.
UASs are a promising technology for DTN data collection from outdoor WSNs [133].
Environmental and agricultural applications sometimes lack access to existing Internet
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backhauls for data delivery because low population densities in rural areas provide little
economic incentive for cellular providers to serve these remote areas. As these types of
applications may be in difficult or inaccessible terrain spanning large geographic areas,
manual “sneaker-net” data collection can be dangerous and labor intensive [134].
Work in 802.15.4 largely focuses on two-dimensional topography common to terrestrial
networks. For example, [135] examined 802.15.4 signal propagation, while [136] exam-
ined person-to-person communication over 802.15.4 and found mobility challenging in
an 802.15.4 network. Additionally, [137] examined enhancements to two dimensional
movement and stationary 802.15.4 roadside sensors. [138] evaluated 802.15.4 indoor and
outdoor performance in terms of error rate and RSSI. While measurement of 802.15.4
performance in three-dimensional space is limited, from the similarity of the physical
layer between 802.15.4 and 802.11 radios, we reasonably expect 802.15.4 to evince the
same affects of toroidal radiation of the omni-directional dipole antennae of IoT devices
in a three-dimensional environment.
Experimental research on 802.15.4 for UASs is sparse. [139] found that 802.15.4
devices are sensitive to antenna orientation; however, their measurements were collected
on sensors within 3m of each other and therefore do not scale well to FUSN scenarios
measuring distances in the hundreds of meters [133]. On the other hand, [99] investigates
the performance of FUSN in remote locations. In addition, [23] provides a simulation
of a WSN with hundreds of nodes, but real-world topography and obstruction was not
considered in their methods.
2.1.4 Cellular LTE Networks
With 3 billion users and growing, LTE is the leading mobile network technology
worldwide [140]. However, economic incentives often drive LTE and other broadband
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technology expansion, concentrating deployment in populated urban areas. Economically
marginalized and sparsely populated rural areas remain underserved [141]. In the United
States, for example, rural tribal regions suffer from the poorest LTE coverage [142]. Even
when cellular providers claim coverage, poor signal quality can limit achievable download
data rates far below the mobile broadband threshold, defined by the FCC as a median
speed of 10 Mbps [142].
For underserved regions in the United States, the FCC has instituted incentive
programs to offset provider infrastructure deployment costs [143, 144]. These programs
first determine the bounds of existing coverage and identify coverage deficiencies by
semi-annually collecting network connectivity reports from commercial network operators.
Every operator that owns cellular network facilities in the United States participates
in data collection by submitting a Form 477 [145]. The reported coverage area consists
of geo-polygons using operator-defined methodology. Based on this data, the FCC
allocates subsidies to incentivize commercial coverage in underserved regions and verifies
compliance.
The FCC publicly releases annual Broadband Deployment Reports (e.g. [142]), as
well as shapefiles for each operator indicating geographic coverage areas [145]. However,
researchers challenge their accuracy [146, 14, 147]; for example, [148, 149] examined a
public dataset of speed tests collected by the Measurement Lab and demonstrated that
broadband access in Pennsylvania is much lower than claimed in the report. This inaccu-
rate over-reporting can be attributed to the proprietary and often generous propagation
models used by network operators [13]. To validate the true state of mobile broadband
access, we need publicly controlled methods for measuring coverage areas and signal
quality, particularly in typically underserved regions.
To audit provider-reported coverage claims, third parties undertake independent
measurement efforts. While the concept of “coverage” remains imprecise [150], network
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parameters, such as reference signal received power (RSRP), are typically used to estimate
the extent of network availability. Popular public crowdsourcing platforms, such as
CellMapper [151] and OpenSignal [152], collect measurements from network users to
calculate cellular coverage and signal quality. Data from crowdsourced efforts provide
information over time and for a wide range of devices, but these data cluster around
major transportation arteries, potentially omitting communities outside of these areas. An
alternative collection strategy employs specialized equipment with dedicated users. For
example, wardriving typically involves physically navigating difficult terrain in remote areas
to record on-the-ground measurements [153]. This method enables greater control over
the measurement process and the geographic scope but scales poorly due to considerable
time investment and labor costs.
Because existing strategies suffer from the aforementioned drawbacks, alternative
solutions are needed for evaluating LTE coverage and signal quality. An ideal strategy
should enable quick assessment using measurements of the radio frequency (RF) landscape
throughout large areas (on the order of square miles), even if hard-to-access. In addition,
new strategies should provide scalability with respect to equipment and human resources.
Based on these criteria, off-the-shelf software defined radios (SDRs) offer viable solutions.
However, because SDRs can cost anywhere between tens of dollars to a few thousand
dollars, it is important to study the relationship between precision of readings and the
cost of the equipment, to determine whether more affordable equipment will suffice.
To reduce the human effort of LTE coverage analysis, UASs carry payloads while
maintaining appreciable flight times. The availability of low cost, programmable, highly
agile UASs has spurred interest in employing aerial RF sensing for cellular coverage
mapping [154, 155]. UASs enable coverage for large geographic areas, which may be
costly, difficult, or impossible to cover on foot or in land vehicles. MNOs already employ
UASs for visually inspecting equipment after natural disasters [156]. Extending UAS
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capabilities to include signal measurements is an active area of interest for a variety of
wireless applications [47, 48]. These extensions could further enable uses for scalable rural
cellular coverage mapping as well as post-disaster recovery efforts. Compact SDRs with
high sensitivity, such as the RTL2832U chipset software defined radio (RTL-SDR), prove
increasingly useful for LTE applications [157, 158, 159]. However, the high altitude of
UAS flight, relative to the ground, poses challenges to the efficacy of these approaches.
As antennas on LTE towers are provisioned for ground transmission, the RF radiation
pattern picked up at high altitudes may not reflect signal quality on the ground [160].
Even in well provisioned regions, abnormal events overload LTE. Sudden escalation in
traffic demands from UEs occur during large gatherings (e.g., street festivals, protests).
Similarly, after a disaster, damaged infrastructure and atypical volume of utilization
overwhelm previously well-provisioned network. Prior work demonstrates that, even in
areas cellular providers claim are well-covered, persistent over-usage due to insufficient
capacity can exist [161]. For example, in 2017, Hurricane Maria disabled 95% of cellular
sites in Puerto Rico [27]. As a result, affected citizens were unable to request help or
rescue in the face of rising floodwaters. In such disaster scenarios, even when cellular
towers remain functional, the call volume overloads capacity, causing base stations to
reject calls [162, 163, 164]. Those who do get through to emergency call centers likely
experience long wait times to speak with a 911 operator [165]. Unfortunately, cellular
providers have incentive to state that damaged cellular services have been returned to an
operational state. Indeed, after Hurricane Maria, statuspr.org soon reported that over
90% of cell towers were again operational; however, anecdotal evidence indicated such
statistics were grossly over-stated.
To remedy this disparity between reported coverage and actual usability, individual
users, watchdog groups, and government agencies need tools to verify whether a network
is adequately serving customers. After a disaster, the FCC typically receives outage
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reports from, for instance, telecoms [166], but the actual usability, due in part to overload,
on active towers is difficult to assess without access to the internal network. Ideally,
public entities should be able to assess the overload and operational status/usability for a
particular base station. Further, they should be able to accomplish this without relying
on the cooperation of a MNO.
RF Spectrum Sensing: We can use RF spectrum sensing to passively estimate the
coverage of LTE networks using SDRs. [167], for example, showed how low cost SDRs can
rapidly evaluate occupancy on TVWS frequencies. Previous studies involving wide-scale
cellular sensing include analysis of Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
pollution [168] and propagation model verification for LTE signals [169].
Considerable prior work focuses on identifying the application of UASs for cellular
networks. [154] studies the variation in LTE signal strength and signal to interference
plus noise ratio (SINR) for both an underserved rural area and an urban center. A UAS
connected to an existing LTE network monitored the LTE signals in a range of different
altitudes [155]. The authors found that at 60m to 100m above the ground, LTE coverage
probability climbs to 90% and the received power gains ∼18 dB with respect to the ground
level. This work, however, did not compare measurements taken from the aerial platform
to measurements taken from a ground-level UE.
[160] sheds light on the applicability and performance of mobile network connectivity to
low altitude UASs by analyzing downlink channel indicators, such as RSRP. [170] examined
the variation of RSRP, reference signal received quality (RSRQ), and signal to noise
ratio (SNR) throughout a drive-by style campaign in an urban university campus using a
passive monitoring device. But little prior work has explored the effective measurement
of received signal strength using SDRs accompanied by an adequate validation from UE
readings.
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Estimation of RSRP plays a vital role in many control plane operations, including
inter- and intra- eNodeB handovers as well as several diagnostic methods in LTE networks
[171, 172, 173, 174, 175]. For instance, [176] evaluates the performance of RSRP handovers
in LTE. The authors observe that a handover margin of 2dB to 6dB (RSRP) leads to
an optimal number of handovers without sacrificing much of uplink SINR (for a specific
range of user velocity). [177, 175] study the effect of RSRP measurement bandwidth on
the accuracy of handovers. From a telecom provider’s perspective, this suggests a need
for up-to-date, accurate RSRP space-maps for improving service quality.
Several prior works examine the relationships between RSRP, RSRQ and SINR [178,
179, 180, 181], but little work explores the correlation between passive monitoring of LTE
channels and ground UE readings. In [182], researchers examine the viability of deploying
LTE connectivity using UASs in a rural area. Their results indicate that the coverage
outage level increases from 4.2% at an altitude of 1.5 m to 51.7% at 120 m under full load
conditions. A related study analyzed a set of live network measurements conducted with
an LTE scanner attached to an airborne UAS [183]. The findings suggest improved radio
clearance as the UAS increases altitude. The increase in the average number of detected
cells, as altitude increases, corroborates these findings.
LTE Message Analysis: In addition to LTE coverage assessment via RF sensing, the
analysis of LTE messaging traffic provides insight into the operations of the network.
This type of analysis may be difficult. For example, messages transmitted after the LTE
connection establishment stage are invisible to a passive device. As a result, little prior
work leverages passive measurements to detect overload.
Previous work led to the development of several network analysis tools. xgoldmon [184],
for instance, can monitor control plane messages over 2G/3G but not LTE. SCAT [185]
detects problems in cellular networks but is limited to active monitoring on Qualcomm and
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Samsung basebands. QXDM [186] diagnoses network statistics but is limited to Qualcomm
baseband and requires a paid license. While [187, 188, 189] offer very similar feature
sets to the tools discussed above, they are not tailored to work with SDRs for passive
monitoring. [190] and [161], for example, provides a system for message analysis limited to
GSM networks, which relies on UE connected to the network. Given the variety of MNOs
simultaneously operating in an area, an approach using passive measurement devices,
such as SDRs, without a need for network access is preferable.
Several prior works investigated various congestion control algorithms in LTE net-
works [191, 192, 193, 194], but little work explores overload detection without involving
an active monitoring aspect. [195] used machine learning models to predict network
congestion. However, their approach requires considerable historical data and is not
suitable for urban sectors where eNodeBs are upgraded regularly to cater to increasing
user bases, nor can it be used to assess current overload levels. [196] introduced LoadSense,
which offers a measure of cellular load using channel sensing at the physical network layer
(PHY). Similarly, [197] allows a client to efficiently monitor the LTE basestation’s PHY
resource allocation to estimate available bandwidth. [198] propose Cellular Link Aware
Web loading (CLAW), which boosts mobile Web loading using a PHY informed transport
protocol. Although the aforementioned tools can estimate whether the radio resources
are fully allocated, they do not explicitly reveal whether the network is overloaded.
2.1.5 Outdoor Wireless Localization
When LTE networks overload or go offline, other networks, such as fixed broadband,
may be similarly affected. For example, during Hurricane Harvey, the Analysis of Network
Traffic (ANT) lab at USC/ISI, testing Internet reachability for certain IP blocks, found
home network outages as high as 40% in certain areas [199]. Those needing emergency
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assistance or rescue had no digital communication channels to fall back on. Lack of
technology-assisted communication forces rescuers to rely on sight and sound to locate
survivors. These challenges motivate research into new technologies for locating survivors
and establishing alternate emergency communication channels.
As with network assessment, UASs are a promising technology used in establishing
communication and providing situational awareness in an area immediately post-disaster.
First responders adopt UASs for awareness and localization using white-light and thermal
cameras [49, 200, 201, 202]. Using these systems, first responders locate and respond
to people in distress. In January 2018, for the first time, a piloted UAS performed a
real remote water-rescue, using cameras to locate swimmers and actuators to deploy an
inflatable raft [50].
The problem of localizing an object using wireless signals is well-researched in the
literature [203, 57, 204], particularly in WSNs where sensors self-locate based on reception
of beacons from a series of anchor nodes with known locations [205, 206, 207, 208]. In
these situations, anchor nodes are fixed, and the sensor uses received beacons to localize
its position. In contrast, our work explores the reverse situation, where UEs transmit, and
the mobile aerial device performs the localization. Because we target a disaster scenario
with a mobile UAS, there are time and computational constraints. For instance, the UAS
has payload weight limitations as well as limited battery lifetime. Further, given the
urgency of fast and accurate localization in these conditions, our localization algorithm
must meet the computational time constraints.
In the current literature, UAS based localization is typically performed to identify a
transmitter in 2D space. However, because the height at which a device is located (for
example, on the roof of a building) could be used by first responders in their rescue efforts,
our work explores full 3D localization. We utilize the RSSI from a transmitting device to
approximate distance to a receiver (UAS). Alternative time-based range approximations,
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such as time of arrival (TOA) and time difference of arrival (TDOA) [209, 210], are not
applicable. Time-based methods require either synchronization between transmitter and
receiver or multiple receivers. As we do not assume cooperation from the transmitter, we
have neither, making RSSI an appropriate choice.
There has been limited work in using UAS for 802.11 RSSI-based localization. [211]
successfully used RSSI to determine a 2D range for 802.11 devices within a 15 meter
average square from a quad-copter using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) performed
on a dedicated server (off-the drone). [212] used a fixed-wing UAS to locate device within
50m after 9 minutes and 18m after 15 minutes, relying only on probe requests and using
a Bayesian Optimization for 2D localization. [57] uses a quad-copter for 2D localization
using a random forest to determine which of six zones in a 120x80 meter search areas a
device is located in.
2.2 Part Outline
Our research explores open questions in the field of wireless networks for challenged
contexts. Through the utilization of advances in UASs and SDRs, we explore new methods
of communication and network assessment. We back our methods and systems with
experimental measurements in realistic conditions.
We begin part I by evaluating LTE networks. To tackle the need for low cost, rapid
cellular network assessment particularly in rural areas and/or after a disaster, we explore
how UASs equipped with low cost SDRs can be utilized for aerial assessment of LTE
deployments in chapter 3. This research was conducted in partnership with multiple
Native American tribal communities in California and New Mexico. We compare aerial
approaches to on-the-ground measurements in order to validate our system with the two
dimensional terrestrial user experiences.
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While chapter 3 examines LTE coverage, in chapter 4 we investigate network behavior
under significant load. As we discussed in the previous two chapters, LTE networks
sometimes become overloaded during natural disasters and political crises. Measurements
of network load are typically only available to MNOs. Outside agencies, such as federal
regulators, first responders, and local administrators have few resources to evaluate the
MNO reports. In chapter 4, we utilize passive measurements of control traffic by eNodeBs
for evaluating LTE network load.
In addition to connecting humans, wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.15.4,
connect large IoT sensor networks. In remote regions, these WSNs may lack end-to-end
Internet connectivity. While FUSN, using UASs for DTN data delivery, offer a promising
solution, the effect of three dimensional communication on the IEEE 802.15.4 family of
standards remains under evaluated.
Our research fills this gap by evaluating 802.15.4 2.4GHz network performance with
measurements from an outdoor wireless aerial testbed. In chapter 5, we analyze experi-
mental measurements from 802.15.4 transceivers utilizing PCB coiled antennae, commonly
used in sensor networks. In chapter 6, we expand this research by investigating the
difference between internal coiled antenna and straight-wire external antenna modules.
For both works, we examine how factors, such as antenna orientation, altitude, antenna
placement, and obstruction affect RSSI and PRR. This work is critical to the effective
planning of FUSN deployments.
We finish this section with a look at IEEE 802.11. Unlike LTE and 802.15.4, this
standard has a wide breadth of research for both terrestrial and aerial networks. In chapter
7, we explore how disconnected wireless devices can be used for disaster communication.
We use 802.11 transmissions to locate users, an application highly valuable to search
and rescue efforts. In contrast to other localization schemes, this research utilizes full
3D localization using VBA. VBA is a novel algorithm for passive localization, which
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is computationally fast and can run on UASs. Past work investigates computationally
expensive algorithms that do not scale well with increases in data size. We demonstrate
VBA runs in constant time relative to the size of the data. We verify our work in multiple
scenarios, varying factors like elevation, search pattern, number of packets per second
transmitted, as well as effect of obstruction, and we compare our algorithm to other
approaches.
2.3 Key Contributions
This research contributes to the understanding of three highly utilized wireless stan-
dards. It provides methods, systems, and algorithms, backed by experimental evaluation.
• For LTE coverage analysis, we show that low-cost SDRs equipped on UASs can
detect LTE availability to produce a coverage map, using RSRP measurements
comparable to ground-truth measurements from UEs. To the best of our knowledge,
our study is the first to capture high precision RSRP measurements with an UAS
using low-cost off-the-shelf SDRs.
• For LTE overload detection, we propose a novel method for capturing control plane
connection establishment messages via SDRs. Our approach is portable, scalable,
independent of any proprietary platform (e.g., Qualcomm, Samsung, etc.), and
compatible with any LTE MNO.
• For 802.15.4 networks, we find that network configuration plays a significant role in
network quality, which RSSI, a mediator variable, struggles to account for in the
presence of high packet loss. Instead, we propose that PRR is a more appropriate
network metric. We show that for this application, ZINB effectively models PRR.
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Our work is, to our knowledge, the first performance measurement study of 802.15.4
2.4GHz ground-air network from a UAS.
• For 802.11 networks, we deploy an UAS to locate an uncooperative device in three
dimensional space using RSSI. We provide a novel algorithm using voxel-based
approximation (VBA) for real-time on-the-drone multilateral localization. We
demonstrate that, in contrast to other approaches, VBA uses fixed computation
time and memory as the number of data points increases, while still providing
comparable error. Based on our results, we discuss how a continuously updated
geographic representation can be used for flight planning and rescue operations
post-natural disaster, and how this algorithm can be extended for other applications,
such as IoT sensor network mapping.
2.4 Broader Impacts
In addition to peer reviewed publications and presentations to academics, this work
was impactful to the larger community.
• We have partnered with multiple Native American communities to assist in the
mapping, evaluation, and deployment of LTE and TVWS technologies. We partnered
with Southern California Tribal Digital Village [213], New Mexico Santa Clara
Pueblo, and New Mexico Ohkay Owingeh tribe in order to develop technology in
line with the needs of these communities.
• We have provided outreach and training at Santa Clara Pueblo, Ohkay Owingeh,
and Northern New Mexico Community College, in addition to countless one-on-one
discussions of our work with partners and community members.
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• Aspects of our work were integrated into classes at the UCSB School for Scientific
Thought [214] as part of a five week high school enrichment program, as well as the
Curie-osity Project, which introduces girls in grades 4-6 to women scientists and
engineers.
• This work was instrumental in mentoring a new wave of scientists, including Ryan
Allen who graduated with a Masters degree based on this project and Max Ginier, an
undergraduate researcher. Students helped develop methodology, run experiments,
perform analysis, and summarize their work in academic publications.
• This work has already been well-received by industry including Google, Cisco, and
WeFi.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating LTE Coverage and
Quality from an Unmanned Aircraft
System
As we have discussed in chapters 1 and 2, there is a need for accurate public assessment
of LTE network coverage. While MNOs submit estimated coverage maps to regulators,
like the FCC, companies may either accidentally or maliciously overestimate coverage.
For rural and tribal areas, existing methods of network assessment can be difficult in time
and manpower due to physical area and difficulty of terrain. Similarly assessing coverage
after a disaster is valuable but may be difficult or dangerous for ground personnel.
New technologies like SDRs and UASs are promising tools for automating LTE
coverage evaluation. However, the highy mobile and three dimensional nature of UASs
results in signal characteristics that do not fully align with terrestrial counterparts. This
discrepancy between aerial and terrestrial systems necessitates extensive evaluation that
a proposed sensing system aligns with the on-the-ground experience of UEs.
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In this chapter, we assess the accuracy of a low-cost, small form-factor RTL-SDR for
sensing ENodeB signal strength over a wide area through integration with an off-the-
shelf quad-copter UAS. We first compare reading accuracy of this airborne sensor with
commonly used hardware for ground-based wardriving approaches (i.e a Spectrum analyzer
(SA) and a Universal software radio peripheral (USRP) ). Because no existing studies
systematically examine the effect of altitude on signal strength measurements, we fly the
UAS at varying altitudes across multiple locations and examine how aerial signal sensing
can be aligned to ground-level measures. Because minimal previous research compares
observed signal strength between measurements collected by UEs (i.e smartphones, tablets,
and hotspots) and UASs, we deployed four cellular devices on the ground, each collecting
measurements from different cellular networks, and compared these measurements over
the same geographic area to those collected by the RTL-SDR on the UAS. We look to the
UE measurements as “ground truth” because the UE readings capture examples of the
actual coverage and performance a user, in the given location, would experience with UE.
Our findings reveal that the simple RTL-SDR has comparable accuracy to expensive
solutions and can estimate quality within one gradation of accuracy when compared to
user equipment. Further, we show that these devices can be mounted on a UAS to more
rapidly measure coverage across wider geographic regions. Our results show that the
low-cost aerial measurement techniques have 72% accuracy relative to the ground readings
of user equipment, and fall within one quality gradation 98% of the time. Our findings,
taken together, offer a detailed look at the efficacy of low-cost, public controlled, aerial
coverage and quality sensing.
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(a) UE (b) Ground Measurement (c) UAS (d) Stationary box.
Figure 3.1: LTE Sensing Equipment.
3.1 System Overview and Methodology
We collected ground and air measurements in two regions in Rio Arriba county, New
Mexico over a period of five days, beginning May 28, 2019. For each region, we obtained
permission to drive through residential areas, as well as to fly a UAS with a SDR.
In this section, we describe the six unique RF sensing methodologies employed in our
analysis. Like all wardriving studies, our work is necessarily limited in scale. However,
these ground measurements are uniquely useful for contrasting the efficacy of each
measurement technique. In all cases, our methodology is generalizable. Figure 3.1 shows
images of many of our sensing set-ups.
3.1.1 Method 1: Ground-Driven UE Sensing
In our wardriving campaign, we record signal strength readings from four Motorola G7
Power (XT1955-5) phones, each running Android Pie (9.0.0). We collect measurements
using the Network Monitor application [215]. An external GlobalSat BU-353-S4 GPS
connected to an Ubuntu Lenovo ThinkPad laptop gathered geolocation measurements,
which we matched to the appropriate ground measurement by timestamp. We outfitted
each phone with a SIM card from one of the four top cellular providers in the region:
Verizon, T-Mobile, AT&T, and Sprint. The phones recorded signal strength every 10
seconds while we drove at speeds less than 10 miles per hour through the areas of study.
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3.1.2 Method 2: Ground-Driven Spectrum Analyzer
We gathered measurements on LTE channel center frequencies with a high-precision
Keysight N9340b SA using a ham radio antenna capable of sensing signals up to 3
GHz. The SA was transported inside the measurement vehicle while the antenna was
magnetically mounted to the roof.
3.1.3 Method 3: Ground-Driven USRP
We collected center frequency readings with a Ettus Research USRP B200, a versatile
SDR widely used for LTE and TV frequency experimentation and sensing. The USRP
measured the same set of LTE channel center frequencies as the SA through a ham radio
antenna placed beside the identical SA antenna.
3.1.4 Method 4: Ground-Driven RTL-SDR
We also collected center frequency readings with a NooElec RTL-SDR RTL2832U
and Elonics E4000 Tuner, an inexpensive software defined radio operating in the 55MHz-
1100MHz and 1500MHz-2300MHz ranges. The RTL-SDR measured LTE channel center
frequencies through a ham radio antenna placed beside the identical SA and USRP
antennas.
Unlike the USRP B200, which when inside a transportable case is bulkier and more
expensive, the RTL-SDR is low-cost and protected in a smaller form-factor. This specific
model of RTL-SDR covers most LTE frequencies and is simple to equip onto a UAS or
deploy at a stationary site for long-term monitoring. This ground-transported RTL-SDR
serves as a comparison point for the UAS and longitudinal sensing experiments described
subsequent subsections.
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3.1.5 Methods 5: Aerial Sensing Platform
Our UAS consisted of a DJI Matrice 100 quad-copter, as shown in Figure 3.1c. The
UAS collected signal strength readings via a NooElec RTL-SDR (the same model as used
for ground measurements) connected to a Raspberry Pi (RPi) 2—Model B on-board
computer via USB. The location of the UAS was recorded from the Matrice 100 on-board
GPS, sampling at a rate of 50 Hz and using a UART connection to the Raspberry Pi
(RPi).
Horizontal Coverage Mapping
In one set of experiments, we flew the UAS manually at varying speed and elevation
(in order to clear obstacles and keep the UAS in line of sight) to map coverage. We
attempted to cover the same areas as covered by the UE and ground measurements. For
each geographic area, UAS measurements occurred on the same day as the other data
collection, but sometimes several hours apart.
Vertical Experiments
To investigate the impact of elevation on signal strength measurements, we performed
four sets of vertical-only flights. Each set of flights was conducted in a different geographic
region of our measurement area. During each vertical flight, the UAS was raised by 10ft
increments approximately every 15 seconds to 100ft. It was then raised in 20ft increments
approximately every 15 seconds to 400ft (the maximum United States Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) non-exempt altitude limit).
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3.1.6 Method 6: Stationary Box
Because continuous monitoring in an area can be costly in terms of equipment and
manpower, coverage mapping is typically completed via sampling over a short time-frame.
For example, in our ground sensing driving campaign, we take all samples over a maximum
of one hour for each unique location. As part of our study, we seek to verify that this
one-shot sensing method is appropriate for estimating long-term spectrum availability.
We therefore measure spectrum occupation over time in a single location to monitor
changes. We enclosed a NooElec RTL-SDR (the same model as is utilized by the ground
measurements and UAS) run by a Raspberry Pi (RPi) 3 B+ in a weather-proof case with
the stock antenna on top the case, shown in Figure 3.1d. Over two days, the RTL-SDR
continuously iterated through a pre-programmed list of all 20 known LTE frequencies
for the four network providers in the area and recorded signal strength readings for each
frequency every three seconds.
This method monitors the stability of the RTL-SDR measurements over time and can
indicate the appropriate flight time necessary to generate a consistent measure of signal
quality in an area. While this data is not generalizable geographically, it provides insight
into the precision of signal strength reading from an RTL-SDR .
3.1.7 LTE Channel Selection by Provider
Before data collection, we compiled a list of LTE cellular frequencies in use by the
top providers in the area. This was needed for every sensing method other than the
UEs , which pulled the active frequencies automatically for their respective provider.
We compiled this list using two complementary processes. First, on each UE we ran
CellMapper [151], an Android application that allowed us to query the active frequencies
detected by the device for the corresponding LTE provider. We supplemented this list
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Table 3.1: Number of overlapping geographic bins by signal collection method.
Spectrum
UE UAS Analyzer USRP RTL-SDR
UE 1152 - - - -
UAS 305 812 - - -
Spectrum Analyzer 131 53 1199 - -
USRP 131 53 1199 1199 -
RTL-SDR 131 53 1199 1199 1199
with a scan using a spare Ettus Research USRP B200, equipped with a wideband LTE
dipole antenna [216], connected to a Lenovo ThinkPad laptop running srsLTE[217]. Using
srsLTE we performed a scan of all possible LTE frequencies operated in the United States
and appended to our list any frequencies not previously discovered. Since UEs choose the
strongest frequency to communicate with a nearby base station, this allowed us to locate
other frequencies available from nearby cells which the UEs would not use at our test
sites but could jump to intermittently. As we moved between regions, we added all newly
detected frequencies to the list scanned by all sensors.
The resulting list contained 22 frequencies in operation in the area, served by the
four providers. Because the NooElec RTL-SDR is limited to a frequency of 2300 MHz,
two of the detected frequencies (2628.8 MHz and 2648.6 MHz) were outside the range
frequencies we could sense on the Ground RTL-SDR, Stationary Box, or UAS and are
dropped from our analysis.
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3.2 Analysis
3.2.1 Accuracy of Data Collection Methods
Preparing data for geographical analysis
Because multiple devices and personnel participated in data collection, the data was
not sampled at the same exact timestamp or precise GPS location for all methods. For
example, both the ground sensors and the UAS passed over the same residential area
but may not have covered the same 1 meter GPS coordinate due to road availability.
To accurately compare data collected by different methods, we first aggregate data into
geographical bins of three decimal places of GPS accuracy, approximately 110 square
meters in area. Then, for each method and for each set of readings on different LTE
frequencies, we take the mean across all the signal strength values that fall into that
geographic bin.
The data collected by the UEs included only the network provider (AT&T, Sprint,
T-Mobile, and Verizon), and not the frequency on which the UE was operating. To
compare this to the other data collection methods, which report frequency instead of
network, we first map each frequency to the corresponding network provider using the
frequency list we describe in Section 3.1.7. For each network provider and geographic
bin, we then select the frequency with the strongest signal strength and set that as the
signal strength for the provider in that bin. This method resulted in 2,637 unique 110m2
geographic bins. Not every area was sampled by every method. The resulting overlap
between methods and geographic area is summarized in Table 3.1.
41
Evaluating LTE Coverage and Quality from an Unmanned Aircraft System Chapter 3
(a) Original data. (b) Transformed distributions.
Figure 3.2: Kernel density estimation of distributions by signal collection method.
Transforming Raw Signal Readings
The UEs , spectrum analyzer, RTL-SDR modules (including both the one mounted on
the UAS and in the stationary monitoring box), and the USRP all report signal strengths
on varying scales. We show the original distribution of the relative signal strengths for
each collection method in Figure 3.2a. As we can see, while the distributions have similar
normal-like peaks, the offsets and width of the distributions do not match.
While the spectrum analyzer outputs dBm, the other devices report relative signal
strengths. As we are interested in the experience of the end user, before comparing data
collection methods, we first need to transform the raw relative signal strength readings to
match the UEs .
To do so, we first perform a min/max normalization on each method, as shown in
Equation 3.1, where ~O is the original data, m ∈ {SA, USRP, RTL-SDR, UAS} is the
method and ~N is the normalized data.
~Nm =
~Om −min( ~Om)
max( ~Om)−min( ~Om)
(3.1)
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Next we offset and scale the other methods to align them with the signals received
by the UE. To do this we randomly selected 50% of our data as a training set. On this
training set for each method we find an offset xm and scaling factor am to minimize
Equation 3.2, where nm and nue are measures taken from the same geographic bin and
cellular network provider. If a method does not have a matching UE measurement, it is
omitted from the sum.
min
xm,am
( ∑
nm∈ ~Nm
[am(nm + xm)− nue]2
)
(3.2)
Finally we scale and offset all of our data for every method other than the UE by xm
and am, and scale back to the readings of the UE as expressed in Equation 3.3, where ~Tm
is the resulting transformed data for each method.
~Tm =
[
am
(
~Nm + xm
)](
max( ~Nue)−min( ~Nue
)
+ min( ~Nue) (3.3)
By transforming the data we can now compare signal strength readings to one another
and to the UE. The resulting transformed distributions are shown in Figure 3.2b. For the
rest of our analysis, we use this transformation when we report signal strength values in
dBm.
Signal Quality Range Color
Bad <120 dBm Black
Poor -120 to -111 dBm Red
Fair -111 to -105 dBm Orange
Good -105 to -90 dBm Green
Excellent >90 dBm Blue
Table 3.2: Categorization of signal strength into signal quality bins.
43
Evaluating LTE Coverage and Quality from an Unmanned Aircraft System Chapter 3
Figure 3.3: Accuracy of signal collection
methods as compared to the UE.
Figure 3.4: Distribution of deviation from
mean signal strength of all frequencies.
Estimating Signal Strength
We computed the Pearson correlation on each method pair and found only a weak
linear relationship between the collection methods and the readings from the UEs , even
after transforming the data. As signal strength can vary, even between different UE device
makes and models, we categorize the level of signal quality rather than predicting the
exact signal strength a UE would receive in an area by dividing the signal strength levels
into five groups, based on criteria in Table 3.2. While there is no standard for defining
what LTE signal strength corresponds to what quality, we model our criteria after those
suggested by SignalBooster [218].
Based on this categorization we compare how each method sorted the signal strength
readings across the geographical bins, using the UE as ground truth. We summarize
our results in Figure 3.3. The UAS was most closely aligned with the UE, matching
values exactly for 72% of the geographic bins. When allowing for one signal quality
of discrepancy (for instance, a method stating a signal was Fair when the UE labeled
it as Poor) all methods had over a 95% accuracy, with the UAS again leading with a
98% accuracy. A notable result was that error was skewed towards under-predicting the
received signal strength. Accounting for this bias when estimating UE reception would
improve accuracy further.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of signal strength
by frequency over period of observation,
averaged across one hour windows.
Figure 3.6: Signal strength over time by
provider gathered by stationary box. Night
hours are shaded in blue.
3.2.2 Longitudinal Analysis
From the stationary radio (introduced in Section 3.1.6) we received 684,096 readings
over a period of two days. To measure the relative stability of signal strength readings, for
each reading we calculated the deviation from the mean of the corresponding frequency.
To determine the stability across different time scales, we re-sampled the data over
multiple time scales (1 minute, 1 hour, 1 day), averaged the intermediate readings, and
re-computed the deviation of each sample. The resulting time-series is shown in Figure
3.4.
As expected, raw readings (with a sampling frequency of 3 Hz) fluctuated considerably,
with a total range of 80dBm and the majority of fluctuations < 7 dBm from the mean.
When comparing between minutes the majority of the reading were < 3 dbm from the
mean. When comparing hour to hour, the majority of signals deviate < 1 dBm from
the mean. Comparing between two days of data, across all frequencies, the majority of
signals did not deviate.
We analyzed the distribution of hour to hour signal strengths across the 20 monitored
LTE frequencies, as shown in Figure 3.5. The majority of readings across the two day
time span fell within 1 dBm of each other. The largest change of signal strengths between
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Figure 3.7: Deviation of signal strength
from mean.
Figure 3.8: Signal strength change by alti-
tude and network.
two hours was observed on 739.0 MHz (utilized by AT&T) and 1967.5 MHz (utilized by
Verizon) which exhibited 7dBm changes.
The end user is most impacted by the signal strength of the frequency chosen by
the UE. We also examine the hour by hour change of network signal strength. For
each operator, for every hour time window, we choose the frequency with the maximum
average signal strength. We present the results in Figure 3.6. While there is a slight
improvement in signal strength during night time hours, for each network the total hour
to hour fluctuations in signal strength are minimal.
46
Evaluating LTE Coverage and Quality from an Unmanned Aircraft System Chapter 3
3.2.3 Impact of Altitude
To analyze the impact of sampling altitude on signal strength we executed multiple
vertical flights in four different locations, as described in Section 3.1.5. In our analysis, we
keep the four locations separated and look at how signal strength at each LTE frequency
varies with altitude from the ground. To compare between frequencies, we calculate the
deviation of each signal strength measure from the mean of that frequency at each location.
We then group altitudes into 20 foot bins and examine the distributions of altitudes across
those bins at each of the four locations. We present the results in Figure 3.7.
Our results show that signal strength variation can be quite dependent on location.
The first and third locations, Flat Rural and Residential respectively, were located level
with a wide area of flat terrain surrounded by low hills. At these locations, the vertical
UAS flight showed an overall increase in signal strength as altitude increased across
LTE frequencies. This might suggest that in low lying terrain, away from strong cellular
readings, coverage mapping may be sensitive to flight altitude.
The second location, Urban, was located in a more urban area with better cellular
coverage. In this area, altitude did not alter the signal strength of frequencies sensed by
the UAS. The fourth location, the Hilltop, was located high on a hill approximately 400ft
above the Residential location. At this location, altitudes over 160ft showed a drop in
signal strength across most of the monitored LTE frequencies. One possible explanation
is that the aerial vehicle may have difficulty detecting coverage at altitudes significantly
higher than the provisioned coverage area.
In addition to examining frequency fluctuations, we examine the received signal
strength by cellular network provider. In Figure 3.8 we show the mean change in signal
strength across all frequencies with altitude for each network and location. The change is
signal is network dependant, and moreover the difference between networks depends on
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location. A probable explanation for the observed difference is that the ENodeBs serving
these networks are in disparate geographic locations, with different signal propagation
patterns.
3.3 Discussion
While we observe clear relationships between sensing methods, the relative signal
strength values output by the devices are weakly linearly correlated, particularly to
the UEs, even after transforming the data to a common reference frame. We believe
the problem stems from difficulty in aligning the various methodologies for comparison.
Because we were unable to capture the frequencies on which the UEs operated, we
compared the frequencies with the highest signal strength for a given method. This may
not always match the actual frequency used by the UE. Additionally, the wardriving
readings from the RTL-SDR, USRP, and SA are more difficult to collect due to the labor
involved. As a result, there are fewer points of geographic overlap than for the UE and
UAS measurements.
By categorizing individual signal strengths by quality, mirroring the “bars” of signal
strength that a user’s device might report, we were able to accurately match these
categorical measurements across measurement methods. As the most versatile collection
method, the UAS predicted quality within one gradation over 98% of the time. This
aerial signal sensing method demonstrates promise as an effective system for wide-scale
cellular coverage mapping.
Based on our experimental data, we generated a coverage map for each method and
provider. Figure 3.9 shows a portion of the map for Verizon. The readings from the UE
are shown in Figure 3.9a and those taken from the UAS on the same day are shown in
Figure 3.9b.
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(a) Map from UE readings. (b) Map from UAS readings.
Figure 3.9: Example of generated LTE signal coverage map. Colors and values
correspond to Table 3.2, with high RSRP in green and low in red.
Next, we evaluated how the design of our aerial data collection impacted the accuracy
and precision of UAS signal quality assessment. We considered: 1) how a sample taken at
a particular time compares to the overall LTE channel quality during a 24 hour period;
and 2) how different UAS altitudes impact this characterization.
Sensing over Time:: Consider the longitudinal analysis of the stationary sensing
equipment from Section 3.2.2. For most frequencies, a single flight is sufficient; most
readings fell within 3 dBm of each other. However, certain frequencies may be less stable.
For example, we found that two channels within the two-day deployment showed values
varying by up to 7 dBm, which is wide enough to bump a reading by two signal quality
levels (e.g. Good to Fair, or even Poor).
As observed in Figure 3.5, RTL-SDR signal strength measurements fluctuate between
readings. The average of multiple readings provides a more stable description of signal
quality in a geographic region. Because the UAS would need to take dozens of samples
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from a geographic region, the flight pattern and maximum flight speed would vary with the
desired granularity of the measurements. The UAS must fly at low speeds to achieve high
granularity (e.g. building level accuracy) and higher speeds to achieve greater coverage
but lower granularity (e.g. neighborhood level). Alternatively, the UAS can fly at higher
speeds following a flight plan that conducts repeated measurements at the same location
(e.g. through flight loops).
RF signals sometimes fluctuate based on moisture and other weather conditions. In
this study, we did not capture the sensitivity of RTL-SDR signal strength measurements
to weather fluctuations and seasonal changes. The stationary sensing equipment was
deployed during clear days with no rain, a daily temperature high of ≈ 72 and a low of
≈ 52. In future work, it would be informative to examine how signal readings from an
RTL-SDR vary over the course of much longer time spans. Such an assessment could
reveal whether the RTL-SDR equipped UAS requires calibration depending on current
weather. This type of study would also help with understanding how cellular network
quality measurements from our system may fluctuate during or after a natural disaster.
Choice of Altitude: To measure how altitude affects signal quality, we look to the
analysis in Section 3.2.3. The interaction between altitude and signal strength reception
by the UAS is complex. The local geographic topography seems to be the dominant
factor in received signal strength. When flying in low valleys, an increase in altitude
corresponded to an increase in mean received signal strength. Yet, when ascending from
a hilltop above the residential area, signal strength declined. Because the orientation
of cellular tower antennas by network providers is provisioned to optimize coverage at
elevations of residences and businesses [160], aerial collection at altitudes (in our case
approximately five hundred feet above the residential elevation) may see degradation in
signal strength.
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The effect of altitude on signal quality has implications for evaluating LTE coverage
and availability for the occupants of high rise buildings. In dense city centers, we could use
aerial systems to map signal strength in three dimensions. Such a measure of signal quality
across floors in skyscrapers would not be accounted for by conventional measurement
methodologies.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown that a UAS-mounted RTL-SDR is capable of providing
a granular reflection of LTE signal strength. Our low-cost solution enables accurate
coverage mapping and quality assessment in regions typically neglected by other forms of
assessment. Moreover, our system achieves this without requiring expensive specialized
equipment, extensive time commitments, or significant manpower. We hope that our work
will pave the way for future solutions that more accurately represent cellular coverage,
particularly in those regions that are likely under-served.
So far our evaluation has dealt with LTE coverage. However signal strength alone
does not guarantee a high QoS or quality of experience (QoE). In times of crisis, even
previously well provisioned LTE networks may become overloaded, degrading performance.
In the next chapter, we explore how SDRs can be used to passively detect overloading,
without MNO cooperation.
Acknowledgment
This work was done in collaboration with Vivek Adarsh, Udit Paul, Esther Showalter,
Ellen Zegura, Morgan Vigil-Hayes and Elizabeth Belding and the incredible support of
Jerrold Baca. This work was funded in part through NSF Smart & Connected Communities
award NSF-1831698.
51
Chapter 4
Packet-level Overload Estimation in
LTE Networks using Passive
Measurements
In the previous chapter, we explored how SDRs can be used by regulators and communities
to independently assess LTE coverage. However, as we concluded there is a difference
between coverage and usability. This is especially critical during and after a disaster. In
the United States for example, after a disaster, the FCC typically receives outage reports
from MNOs, for instance [166], but the actual usability, due in part to overload, on active
towers is difficult to assess without access to the internal network. Ideally, public entities
should be able to assess the overload and operational status/usability for a particular
base station. Further, they should be able to accomplish this without relying on the
cooperation of a cellular provider.
To address this critical need, in this chapter, we propose a novel solution to infer
overload in LTE networks based on messages broadcast by the eNodeB. Through the
analysis of multiple message types, we draw clear comparisons between instances of high
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network utilization and typical operating conditions for several eNodeBs. Our results
indicate that eNodeBs demonstrate measurable performance differences indicative of
overload conditions.
Importantly, our solution works without the cooperation of the cellular provider.
Using low-cost, readily usable off-the-shelf equipment, we demonstrate that unencrypted
broadcast messages sent by the eNodeB [219] on the broadcast channel can be passively
collected and analyzed to estimate local overload, and hence usability.
We quantify our results by computing two normalized metrics, which are proportional
to the number of connection reject messages and cell barring signals (cellBarred), respec-
tively (cell barring signals prohibit UEs from camping on a particular cell). In addition,
we evaluate the back-off timer (waitTime) encapsulated in each reject message. Note that
in LTE, a connection reject message does not contain a rejection case. Consequently, we
must use higher waitTime values, coupled with high rates of connection request denials,
to reveal possible overload.
To test the operation of our system, we perform multiple measurement campaigns:
two at events with unusually large crowd gatherings, and two at those same locations but
during times of typical usage. Through these measurement campaigns, we collect and
analyze over 3.2 million LTE frames. Our analysis indicates that overload on an eNodeB
can be identified through an increase in reject messages and mean back-off time. Moreover,
these events are often accompanied by a significant increase in cell barring signals. We
show that overloaded cell towers frequently deny larger percentages of connection requests
and issue higher waitTime as compared to typical utilization periods. Further, we observe
an unusual number of barring signals prohibiting UEs from camping on their desired
eNodeBs.
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4.1 Background
In our work we examine cellular transmissions using SDRs. While most of the
transmissions on LTE are encrypted between the eNodeB (LTE base station) and UE
(such as a cellphone) [220], connection establishment messages are sent in the clear. We
use these messages in order to determine overload, as described in the following sections.
4.1.1 Radio resource control (RRC)
The Radio resource control (RRC) protocol [221, 222] supports the transfer of common
Non-access stratum (NAS) [223] information (which is applicable to all UEs) as well as
dedicated NAS information (which is applicable only to a specific UE). Directed RRC
messages (unicast to a single UE) are transferred across Signalling radio bearers (SRBs),
which are mapped onto logical channels [224, 225] – either the Common Control CHannel
(CCCH) during connection establishment or a Dedicated Control CHannel (DCCH) if
the UE is in an active connection state. Similarly, System Information (SI) messages are
mapped to the Broadcast Control CHannel (BCCH). Since messages on DCCH are on a
private channel, they cannot be decoded by passive monitoring devices.
Common Control CHannel (CCCH): This channel is used to deliver control infor-
mation in both uplink and downlink directions when there is no confirmed association
between a UE and the eNodeB – i.e. during connection establishment. Messages on this
channel are transmitted in the clear, and can be passively decoded. We leverage this
knowledge to analyze signalling messages and estimate the overload level in an eNodeB.
Broadcast Control CHannel (BCCH): This is a downlink channel that is used to
broadcast System information (SI). It consists of the Master information block (MIB) and
a number of System information blocks (SIBs). The MIB and SIBs are broadcast through
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Figure 4.1: Flow diagram for LTE connection reject messaging.
RRC messages. SIB1 is carried by SystemInformationBlockType1 message. Though
there are other SI messages, we focus on SIB1 for the purpose of this study. SIB1 contains
the cell barring (cellBarred) status, which indicates whether or not a UE may choose
the cell. When cellBarred status is indicated, the UE is not permitted to select/reselect
this cell, not even for emergency calls [226]. In that case, the UE may connect to another
cell.
4.1.2 Signalling radio bearer (SRB)
A SRB [227] carries CCCH signalling data. An SRB is used during connection
establishment to establish the Radio access bearerss (RABs) and to deliver signalling
while on the connection (for instance, to perform a handover, reconfiguration or release).
There are three types of SRBs. SRB0 uses the CCCH channel with transparent mode Radio
link control (RLC) while SRB1 and SRB2 use the dedicated channel with acknowledged
mode RLC. In other words, SRB0 can be decoded by non-network equipment such as a
SDR in the vicinity, while SRB1 and SRB2 cannot. Table 4.1 shows various signalling
messages SRB0 carries.
For our study, we focus on RRCConnectionReject messages (solid arrow in Figure 4.1)
with corresponding waitTime (back-off time, before a UE can again initiate a connection)
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Table 4.1: Summary of Signalling Radio Bearer 0 (SRB0)
Channel Type RLC Mode
CCCH
Transparent
(Decodable from passive capture)
Direction RRC Message
Downlink
RRC Connection Setup
RRC Connection Reject
Uplink RRC Connection Request
values, Connectio- nRequest messages, and cellBarred signals (BCCH). We formulate
two normalized metrics based on the percentage of reject messages per request sent
and the ratio of cellBarred signals to the number of SIB1 messages transmitted over
thirty-second time bins.
4.1.3 Managing Overload
Overload management is invoked in order to unburden a cell to an acceptable level
when overload is detected, for instance if the cell load remains above a threshold for some
continuous period. An alternative strategy, such as that used by Wideband Code Division
Multiple Access (WCDMA), is to lower the bit rates of connected users until the load
returns to an acceptable level [228]. However, in a pure packet-based system such as LTE,
the user bit rate is maintained at the MAC scheduler [229], which already provides a
soft degradation of user throughput as the system load increases. Thus, if overload is
detected in a cell the system must remove a subset of the connected bearers until the load
is reduced to an acceptable level. Admission Control [230] is used to restrict the number
of UEs given access to the system, in order to provide acceptable QoS to admitted users.
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Listing 4.1: Decoded DL - CCCH message showing RRCConectionReject.
1 ” u s e r d l t ” : ”DLT: 147 , Payload : l t e−r r c . d l . ccch
2 (LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) pro to co l ) ” ,
3 ” l t e−r r c . DL CCCH Message element” : {
4 ”per . cho i c e i ndex ” : ”0” ,
5 ” l t e−r r c . message” : ”0” ,
6 ” l t e−r r c . mes sage t r ee ” : {
7 ”per . cho i c e i ndex ” : ”2” ,
8 ” l t e−r r c . c1” : ”2” ,
9 ” l t e−r r c . c1 t r e e ” : {
10 ”lte-rrc.rrcConnectionReject element” : {
11 ”per . cho i c e i ndex ” : ”0” ,
12 ” l t e−r r c . c r i t i c a l E x t e n s i o n s ” : ”0” ,
13 ” l t e−r r c . c r i t i c a l E x t e n s i o n s t r e e ” : {
14 ”per . cho i c e i ndex ” : ”0” ,
15 ” l t e−r r c . c1” : ”0” ,
16 ” l t e−r r c . c1 t r e e ” : {
17 ” l t e−r r c . r r cConnec t i onRe j e c t r 8 e lement ” : {
18 ”per . o p t i o n a l f i e l d b i t ” : ”1” ,
19 ”lte-rrc.waitTime”: ”6”
20 ” l t e−r r c . nonCr i t i ca lExtens i on e l ement ” : {
21 ”per . o p t i o n a l f i e l d b i t ” : ”1” ,
22 ”per . o p t i o n a l f i e l d b i t ” : ”1” ,
23 ”per . o c t e t s t r i n g l e n g t h ” : ”2048” ,
24 ” l t e−r r c . l a t eNonCr i t i c a lExt ens i on ” :
25 ”34 : 07 : 79 : f 0 : 2c : e7 : 90 : 00 : 28 : 07 : 63 : 48 : 31 : b7 : 90 : 00 :
26 38 : 07 : 04 : f 0 : 22 : 67 : 81 : 08 : 30 : 87 : 9e : 40 : 3 f : 37 : 60 : 70 :
27 20 : 27 : 82 : 00 : 21 : 17 : 4c : 88 : 36 : 47 : 80 : 00 : 20 : 07 : 15 : 00 :
28 2a : 97 : 90 : 00 : 28 : 17 : 95 : 30 : 2a : 97 : 99 : 30 : 2c : 87 : 82 : 00 :
29 21 : 07 : 4c : f 0 : 36 : 77 : 85 : b0 : 22 : d7 : 82 : 30 : 21 : 07 : 82 : 40 :
30 21 : 27 : 9 f : 80 : 2 f : d7 : 68 : 18 : 33 : f 7 : 84 : 00 : 32 : 07 : 23 : 80 :
31 21 : d7 : 76 : f 0 : 2b : 77 : 91 : 40 : 28 : a7 : 81 : 00 : 30 : 97 : 42 : 00 :
32 21 : 17 : 88 : 70 : 24 : 27 : 96 : 00 : 2b : 07 : 48 : 00 : 24 : 17 : 66 : 00 :
33 23 : d7 : 93 : c0 : 29 : f 7 : 94 : 00 : 3a : 07 : 50 : f 0 : 38 : 77 : 68 : 80 :
4.2 Implementation
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
In our experimental setup, our receiver is comprised of an Ettus Research USRP
B210 [231] SDRs attached to a MPantenna SUPER-M ULTRA Mobile Antenna with
a frequency range from 25MHz to 6GHz [232]. The USRP is connected to a Lenovo
ThinkPad W550s laptop for data collection and post-processing. We use the srsUE mode
in the open-source srsLTE software suite [217] to locate available cells in the vicinity by
scanning all frequency bands. On the day of the event, we capture broadcast messages in
the form of binary I/Q samples using srsLTE’s UE usrp capture utility.
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4.2.2 LTE Packet Decoding
We start with converting binary I/Q samples to hexdumps. To investigate the extent
of overload on eNodeBs, we then transform the hexdump into network traces using
Wireshark’s text2pcap command [233]. Next, we use lte rrc lua dissectors to decode LTE
RRC messages using tshark [234]. We employ lte − rrc.dl.ccch and lte − rrc.ul.ccch
protocols to decode RRC messages on the downlink and uplink common control channel,
respectively. Lastly, we use the lte−rrc.bcch.dl.sch protocol to decode downlink messages
on the broadcast control channel.
Listing 4.1 shows a snapshot of the decoded RRC message on the downlink CCCH.
We can see the RRCConnectionReject message tree along with additional options sent
by the eNodeB during the RRC connection establishment phase. Embedded in this
message is the waitT ime parameter. While reject messages provide an indication of
overload, we can use the value of the waitT ime metric as a measure of the severity
of overload. The value of waitT ime is an integer in the range of 1–16, which defines
how many seconds the UE should wait after reception of the RRCConnectionReject
until a new connection can be attempted. According to 3GPP TS 23.401 [235], when
rejecting an RRC connection request, the eNodeB indicates to the UE an appropriate
timer value that limits further requests, relative to the severity of overload; the more the
overload, the greater the waitT ime. Upon receiving the RRCConnectionReject message,
the UE starts timer T302 [221], with the timer value set to waitT ime. The UE is not
allowed to send another RRCConnectionRequest for mobile originating calls, signalling,
terminating access or circuit-switched fallback (CSFB) [236, 237] on the same cell until
the expiry of T302. Note that in LTE, the RRCConnectionReject message does not
contain a RejectionCause, therefore waitT ime, in conjunction with reject messages, is a
crucial parameter in assessing the level of overload.
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(a) SPD dataset. Balboa Park, San Diego, CA (b) CSR dataset. Downtown San Diego, CA
Figure 4.2: Google aerial map of experimental datasets.
4.2.3 Datasets
To test our proposed solution, we identify times and locations in which we anticipate
cellular overload, capture traces, and then compare network performance in those traces
with baselines captured in the same location during normal operating conditions (when
no network overload is likely to occur). We select spaces that are anticipated to have large
gatherings but that are unlikely to be provisioned for large crowds (i.e. city streets as
opposed to stadiums which typically have sufficient network capacity to handle crowds).
Our hypothesis is that during large crowds we will observe higher numbers of
RRCConnectionReject messages than in times of regular operation. Overall, our dataset
consists of over 3.2 million frames, with data collection that lasts for a cumulative duration
of about 5.2 hours. While it is not possible to compute the exact number of UEs in
the vicinity due to the lack of International mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) number
in broadcast messages for security reasons, measuring the number of temporary unique
UE IDs (uniqueUeID) in RRC Connection Requests allows us to estimate the number of
active UEs present nearby.
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St. Patrick’s Day (SPD)
We collect cellular traces during the 2019 St. Patrick’s Day parade adjacent to Balboa
Park in San Diego, CA [238]. The parade was held on Saturday March 16th, beginning
at 10:00AM and ending around noon, while the public fair lasted through 3:30PM. We
physically positioned our data collection devices within the crowd to better assess the
eNodeBs serving this particular region as shown in (Figure 4.2(a)). The total duration of
data collection is about 76 minutes, which resulted in over 1.1 million LTE frames. We
observe 27,349 uniqueUeIDs.
St. Patrick’s Day Baseline (SPD base)
As a point of comparison for the SPD dataset, we again gather LTE traces from the
same location, from 8pm to 9pm on Tuesday March 26th. Collection in the evening on a
weekday helped us to avoid unexpected large gatherings in the many venues of the park,
while still capturing activity of local nightlife. Compared to the SPD dataset we expect
this dataset to exhibit low levels of overload, acting as a baseline for the location. Indeed,
we see about 6,992 uniqueUeIDs. We collect a little over 275K frames in 65 minutes.
ShamROCK Concert (CSR)
We collect traces from the ShamROCK concert in the downtown area of San Diego [239]
on March 16th. The event started at 7:00 PM and lasted until midnight. We collect
113 minutes (˜1.7 million frames) of traces during this time perioe. This event/location
combination (as shown in Figure 4.2(b))100 was selected because we anticipated that
the amount of cellular traffic during the event would well-exceed the typical traffic load.
Because this location (city streets) does not typically have large crowds, we expect there
to be network overload during a large event. This dataset contains 42,433 uniqueUeIDs.
60
Packet-level Overload Estimation in LTE Networks using Passive Measurements Chapter 4
ShamROCK Concert Baseline (CSR base)
As a baseline to the CSR dataset, we capture additional traces (˜135K frames) in the
same location from 9:30pm to 10:30pm on March 26th, when the number of pedestrians
and amount of vehicular traffic was more representative of normal operating hours. We
detect only 3,338 uniqueUeIDs during this data capture.
4.3 Evaluation
We analyze five RRC elements: (a) RRCConnectionReject, (b) wait- Time, (c)
RRCConnectionRequest, (d) cellBarred signal and (e) number of SIB1s transmitted
(#SIB1). Collectively, we refer to this data as ”RRC metrics”. We plot the values
of these RRC metrics over thirty-second bins. We found that thirty-second bins were
appropriate for our analysis because smaller time bins had little to no relative variation
between the samples; however, we missed out on important data points when we used
sixty-second or larger bins. In our evaluation, we observe that the rate of transmitted
RRCConnectionReject messages is considerably higher in SPD and CSR than their
respective baselines, in accordance with our initial hypothesis. Further, we discover an
increase in cellBarred signals and waitT ime values in overloaded datasets (i.e., SPD and
CPR).
4.3.1 Rejects
According to [227], an eNodeB may send an RRCConnectionReject in response to
the UE’s RRCConnectionRequest for exactly one of the following three reasons: (i) the
eNodeB is overloaded (e.g., severe increase in requesting UEs that the eNodeB cannot
accommodate); (ii) the necessary radio resources for the connection setup cannot be
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(a) SPD (b) SPD base (c) CSR (d) CSR base
Figure 4.3: Number of RRCConnectionReject messages transmitted in thirty-second bins.
provided (for instance, damaged equipment on eNodeB that results in limited access
to the core network); or (iii) the Mobility management entity (MME) is overloaded.
The MME is the key control-node for the LTE access network, which serves several
eNodeBs. It is in charge of all the control plane functions related to subscriber and session
management. Once the MME detects overload, it transmits an overload start message
to the affected eNodeBs, signalling them to reject connection request messages that are
for non-emergency and non-high priority mobile originated services.
Analysis of the reject messages sent over a fixed time interval can quantify the level
of overload in the network. Figure 4.3 illustrates the average number of reject messages
transmitted in thirty-second bins. As predicted, we notice significantly more reject
messages in the SPD and CSR datasets. Figure 4.3(a) indicates that there are, on
average, eight times more reject messages during the SPD parade compared to the SPD
baseline (Figure 4.3(b)). Similarly, we observe a fifteen-fold increase in reject messages in
Figure 4.3(c) as compared to Figure 4.3(d). This significant increase in reject messages is
a clear indication of an increase in cellular network utilization.
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(a) SPD (b) SPD base (c) CSR (d) CSR base
Figure 4.4: Phi (Φ) measure in thirty-second bins.
4.3.2 Phi (Φ) Measure
To better understand how overload levels vary, we examine a normalized second-order
metric. We define the Phi (Φ) measure as the ratio of the number of RRCConnectionReject
messages to the number of RRCConnectionRequest messages. Once again, we choose a
bin size of 30 seconds. The Phi measure provides an indication of the severity of overload,
as it reflects the percentage of new users who were unable to connect to the network. In
future studies, we wish to examine the temporal variation in Phi (or the number of new
users that were rejected) in order to quantify the maximum acceptable load threshold in
eNodeBs.
As expected, there is a considerable difference between overloaded datasets (i.e., SPG
and CSR) and their respective baselines. Figure 4.4(a) shows that Phi is as much as three
times that in Figure 4.4(b). This difference is even more pronounced in Figure 4.4(c),
where Phi is more than seven times that in Figure 4.4(d). This trend is similar to what
we observed in Section 4.3.1. It is also indicative of the relationship between the number
of UEs (# uniqueUeIDs) to the tendency towards network overload, as is expected.
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4.3.3 Average waitTime
When we compare the average waitTime across datasets in Figure 4.5, we observe
that SPD and CSR have longer waitTimes than their baselines. We also see that AT&T
performs worse in SPD, closely followed by T-Mobile. In CSR, T-Mobile appears to
perform slightly worse than AT&T. Verizon, however, shows lower waitTime in all of the
datasets. Note that the sample sizes of these distributions are proportional to the number
of reject messages, as shown in Figure 4.3. Nevertheless, all of the telecom providers
transmit longer waitTimes during increases in traffic demand.
Longer waitTime in SPD and CSR is perhaps explained by the high proportion of
UEs (# uniqueUeIDs) in the given location. If the magnitude of UEs is great enough to
result in overload, eNodeBs start to curtail overload conditions by engaging proprietary
mitigation schemes, one of which is transmitting longer waitTime. The overall result is a
confirmation of our hypothesis that these messages and parameter values can be used
to infer overload. The comparison is noteworthy as it supports our earlier results where
we compute RRCConnectionReject messages. Average waitTime serves as an additional
indicator of overloaded eNodeBs.
4.3.4 Omega (Ω) Measure
In addition to the reject messages and their corresponding waitTime, cellBarred
status is a crucial parameter that can indicate overload in an eNodeB. The cellBarred
status transmitted within a SIB1 message indicates that the UE is not allowed to camp
on a particular cell. We suspect that during overload conditions, cells can initiate load
balancing by systematically preventing UEs from anchoring on them. In order to evaluate
our theory, we analyze cellBarred messages to compare the percentage of these messages
in our datasets.
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(a) SPD (b) SPD base
(c) CSR (d) CSR base
Figure 4.5: Distribution of average
waitTime.
(a) SPD (b) SPD base
(c) CSR (d) CSR base
Figure 4.6: Omega (Ω) measure in thir-
ty-second bins.
The Omega (Ω) metric allows us to measure the ratio of cellBar− red signals transmit-
ted to the number of SIB1 frames received, in thirty-second bins. We use this second-order
metric to establish a correlation between Omega and overload. Figure 4.6 depicts the
variation in Omega across all datasets. We observe an increase of 20% in SPD and CSR
datasets over their respective baselines. This indicates a relationship between cell barring
signals and overload, confirming our hypothesis. However, it is interesting to observe that
each of the MNOs (i.e., T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T) have comparable Omega values in
SPD and CSR, even though they exhibit noticeably different trends in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
That is because the inherent load-handling capacity of eNodeBs, as well as the density
of users served, apparently differs. This suggests that overloaded eNodeBs operating in
disparate network conditions prefer to consistently reject incoming connection requests
rather than broadcast unavailability (through cell barring messages), regardless of their
proprietary overload mitigation schemes.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a novel method to assess overload in nearby LTE eNodeBs,
utilizing off-the-shelf hardware and without requiring cooperation of the cellular provider.
Our analysis offers convincing evidence that messages broadcast by the eNodeB can be
used to detect cellular overload using passive monitoring. In future work we will explore
how passive overload inference can be leveraged in a system for automated overload
mapping using ground-based data collection and UASs, independent of collaboration from
a cellular provider. Such tools can be leveraged by regulators and policy makers and allow
targeted deployment of alternative communication channels.
Lack of coverage, damaged infrastructure, and overloading are not just a problem for
UEs. In rural regions, and in crisis conditions WSNs used for situational awareness and
modeling are similarly effected. In the next chapter we shift our focus from communicating
with human held devices, to IoT devices and sensors.
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Chapter 5
Optimizing 802.15.4 Outdoor IoT
Sensor Networks for Aerial Data
Collection
The value of Internet connectivity is not limited to human held devices. As we have
discussed previously, IoT is a booming industry, with 802.15.4 connected devices showing
a large growth. Connected sensors monitoring environment and infrastructure can be
invaluable to providing modeling and situational awareness before, during and after
disasters. While 802.15.4 can provide local connectivity, in most cases the data is most
valuable when it makes it way to the Internet. A promising solution is the development
of FUSNs, which utilize UASs to incorporate DTN approaches to WSN data delivery.
Unlike the 802.11 standard, the 802.15.4 radio standard emphasizes energy perfor-
mance over data rates. 802.15.4, as well as derivative standards, such as Zigbee [18],
WirelessHART [46], and Thread [240], are widely used for applications requiring low-
rate, low-power communication, such as those utilizing IoT sensors in rural outdoor
WSNs. The interaction between these transmission standards and aerial systems is not
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well understood, but is essential to the feasibility of 802.15.4 FUSN for a variety of
applications, including disaster management, environmental monitoring and precision
agriculture [241, 16, 17, 242].
In this chapter, we examine the IEEE 802.15.4 LR-WPAN standard [243] and its
use in aerial vehicles. We identify elements critical to successful data collection from
an 802.15.4 2.4 GHz network using a moving quad-copter. Our work provides three
key contributions: (1) We conduct performance measurements of the RSSI and PRR by
evaluating the impact of variables, such as altitude, displacement, antenna orientation,
obstruction, transmission rate, and transmitter elevation. (2) We use the results to model
the independent impact that each variable has on RSSI and PRR. (3) We show how
network configuration can be used to model and predict network performance.
Our work suggests that optimal network performance in an outdoor rural 802.15.4 2.4
GHz network can be achieved by flying the UAS at altitudes of approximately 45 m with
the receiver mounted parallel to the ground. The orientation of the transmitter does not
have a significant impact on reception. Further, we find that RSSI is a poor indicator of
overall network performance.
5.1 Methods
Our experiment comprised approximately nine hours of experimental flight data
collected from an outdoor aerial testbed, near the University of California, Santa Barbara
in March 2019. We deployed four identical IoT transmitters utilizing the 802.15.4 standard,
broadcasting packets at 500 ms intervals at three different locations. To collect the data,
we flew a UAS at varying altitudes and distances. The experimental setup is shown in
Figure 5.1. We conducted three repeated runs, on multiple days, at each location. Each
experiment comprised approximately one hour of flight, divided across thirteen altitudes.
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Figure 5.1: 802.15.4 aerial testbed system overview.
5.1.1 Equipment
Our equipment consisted of four transmitters on the ground, each transmitting packets
received by a single UAS. To communicate, they utilized a total of six Digi WRL-15126
XBee3 RF 2.4 GHz transceivers using PCB antennae implementing the 802.15.4 standard.
The specifications for these transceivers advertise an outdoor range of 1200 m at a power
of 8 dBm and a receiver sensitivity of −103 dBm [244]. We utilized the XBee3 2.4 GHz
model (as opposed to 900 MHz or 868 MHz models) to make our work comparable to
previous research, including work that studies 802.11 at 2.4 GHz [138, 135, 136, 139].
Transmitters
For transmitters, we used four XBee3 radios mounted on SparkFun XBee Explorer
boards controlled by a SparkFun Teensy LC. The transmitters were powered by external
USB battery packs from varying vendors via a USB-to-Serial converter on the Teensy
LCs. The transmitters were configured to broadcast 23 byte packets, every 500 ms. The
packets consisted of a randomly generated floating point number to simulate sensor data,
as well as unique device and packet identifiers.
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(a) Horizontal. (b) Vertical. (c) Elevated 0.5 m. (d) Obstructed.
Figure 5.2: Equipment deployed in the aerial testbed.
Before each experiment, the transmitters were randomly distributed in a line, ap-
proximately 11 m apart. Placement was chosen so that there was no obstruction within
the 15 cm vicinity of the transmitter. A linear configuration was chosen to ensure the
UAS (flown in parallel over the transmitters) covered approximately equal horizontal
displacement ranges for all transmitters. The latitude and longitude of the transmitter
were recorded manually from repeated readings using a smartphone GPS. Each of the
four transmitters was deployed a different configuration, as shown in Figure 5.2, in order
to evaluate the effect of the antenna orientation, elevation, and obstruction:
• Horizontal: Laid flat, parallel to ground.
• Vertical: Placed on edge on ground.
• Elevated: Mounted to pole 0.5 m above ground.
• Obstructed: Laid flat under 1 quart of debris.
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Figure 5.3: DJI Matrice 100.
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
The aerial data collector was a DJI Matrice 100 quad-copter, show in Figure 5.3. Two
XBee radios, set only to receive packets, were mounted to the bottom of the UAS with the
horizontal receiver parallel to the ground and the vertical receiver perpendicular to the
ground. The Matrice 100 communicates with a remote control at 5.725–5.825 GHz, which
is outside the frequency range of the 2.4 GHz XBee nodes. The UAS was flown with no
on-board camera. A Raspberry Pi (RPi) 2—Model B served as an onboard computer.
The two XBees forwarded packets to the RPi via USB connections. The location of the
UAS was recorded from the Matrice 100 onboard GPS, sampling at a rate of 50 Hz and
using a UART connection to the RPi.
We flew the UAS over the transmitters in a straight line, at an average speed of 2.2
m/s. The exact flight path and speed varied due to manual execution under varying wind
condition on multiple days. Each flight consisted of 13 altitudes (in relation to ground
level at the lowest transmitter) of 9m, 12m, 15m, 18m, 21m, 24m, 27m, 30m, 46m, 61m,
76m, 91m, and 122m. Altitudes were originally chosen in feet and converted to meters
for this publication, as the FAA regulates altitudes in feet. The maximum altitude of
122m corresponds to the FAA max altitude limit of 400 feet. Each flight varied in total
maximum horizontal displacement, but exceeded a minimum horizontal radius of 250m
from the closest transmitter to the UAS .
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5.1.2 Location
The experiments were conducted at Coal Oil Point UC Reserve, a coastal grassland
reserve near the university. The area is relatively flat with minor obstruction due to
tall grass and bushes. In the grassland, we experimented in three locations with varying
topography:
• Road: Transmitters were deployed along a 200 m section of a flat dirt road. The
area had the lowest level of natural obstruction among the three experimental sites.
• Grassy: Transmitters were deployed in a field with tall grass and nearby bushes, ≈1
m tall, but with the immediate 15 cm around each transmitter unobstructed.
• Hills: Transmitters were deployed on the uneven terrain of hills with a shallow
trench, (≈0.5 m deep), cut out by erosion. Tall grass and a denser concentration of
bushes were prevalent, but the immediate 15 cm surrounding the transmitter was
unobstructed.
5.1.3 Modeling RSSI
In our analysis, we analyze the distributions of RSSI by experimental variables that we
hypothesize will impact RSSI (displacement, altitude, location, and transmitter/receiver
configuration). To evaluate the independent influence of the variables on RSSI, we use a
Generalized linear model (GLM) with robust variance estimation. We set RSSI as the
outcome variable and natural log of displacement, altitude (13 groups), and configuration
group (8 groups) as fixed covariates while also controlling for location (3 groups). We
present the results in Section 5.2.1 and the resulting variable estimates in Table 5.1.
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5.1.4 Measuring Packet Reception Rate
Physical layer metrics, such as RSSI, are used to passively infer the expected perfor-
mance of a network. As outdoor IoT applications are delay tolerant in nature not all
metrics of always-connected wired and wireless network performance apply. Time-based
metrics utilizing latency and jitter are inappropriate for this application, as the UAS might
be acting as a DTN node. While throughput is a common metric for 802.11 networks,
it may be inappropriate for 802.15.4, since typical IoT applications do not saturate a
network’s bandwidth. Instead, they optimize for low-power consumption, especially in the
context of outdoor sensor networks that may lack access to the power grid. We therefore
examine the packet reception rate, which is the number of packets received divided by
the number sent. Because each packet loss is wasted energy, PRR is a more appropriate
network performance metric for this type of application.
PRR =
# of packets received
time in sector ∗ transmission rate (5.1)
We group the experimental data by horizontal displacement into concentric circular
sectors radiating out from each transmitter (10 m wide for heat maps, and 25 m wide for
models), keeping other experimental variables (altitude, receiver/transmitter configuration,
and location) separated. To determine the sector into which a packet from a particular
transmitter falls, we compare the UASs high frequency (50 Hz) on-board GPS with the
manually recorded transmitter location. To estimate the number of packets sent by a
transmitter, we calculate the product of the pre-programmed transmission rate and the
time-in-sector by the UAS . We drop groupings where fewer than 5 packets were sent.
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5.1.5 Predicting Packet Reception Rate
When planning a deployment, the ability to estimate the expected PRR for a network
configuration and drone flight path is critical to ensuring that aerial data collection is
successful. To investigate this possibility, we model the expected mean PRR based on our
experimental variables.
We evaluated Poisson regression, Zero Inflated Poisson, Negative Binomial, and ZINB
as possible models. By running the Vuong’s closeness test, we found that ZINB was the
best fitting model, as it accounts for the over-dispersion due to high number of PRRs at
zero from locations and altitudes that never receive a packet. We therefore modeled both
the chances that a packet is received at all, and the estimated number of packets received.
We assessed the goodness of fit for our ZINB model by Scaled Pearson Chi-Square criteria,
which was close to one and by the Full Log Likelihood criteria. We also compared the
observed relative frequencies of the various counts to the maximum likelihood estimates
of their respective probabilities. We found that our model was a good fit for the observed
data.
The input data to the model were grouped by displacement bins, as described in
Section 5.1.4. Before analysis, we randomly divided these data into three three sets: 50%
were allocated as a training set, 40% were allocated as a validation set, and the remaining
(10%) were the test set. Roughly 59% of the observations received at least one packet.
We used a ZINB model with the number of received packets as the outcome. We set
displacement as a categorical variable with seven groups (<50 m, (50 m, 75 m], (75 m,
100 m], (100 m, 125 m], (125 m, 150 m], (150 m, 175 m], and > 175 m), altitude as
a categorical variable with 11 groups (9 m, 12 m, 15 m, 18 m, 21 m, 24 m, 27 m, 30
m, 46 m, 61 m, and 76 m), and transmitter–receiver configuration with eight groups
(Vertical and Horizontal Receivers paired with Horizontal, Elevated, Obstructed and
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Vertical Transmitters) as fixed covariates for both parts of our model. We left out location
as it was not a significant variable in this model. We used a natural logarithm of sent
packets as an offset in the NB part of the model and control for the number of of sent
packets in the ZI part of the model. As before, we dropped bins where fewer than five
packets were sent.
5.2 Results
Our results comprise nine hours of collected data, totaling 121,503 received packets,
and include only the experimental portion of each flight; landing, takeoffs, and transitions
between experiments are omitted. The dataset is available online [245].
5.2.1 RSSI
Past measurement studies of UAS-ground communication have focused on RSSI as a
key indicator of performance [126, 122, 123]. RSSI is a common signal strength indicator,
often the only signal metric reported by radio modules. Past work has shown that reported
RSSI is proportional to the actual received signal strength [246]. We therefore begin our
analysis by examining how RSSI is affected by varying experimental variables. Given the
literature, we expect:
• Altitude/Displacement: Receivers should have the best reception in proximity to
a transmitter.
• Location: Obstacles introduce interference, so the unobscured road should have the
best signal.
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• Transmitter/Receiver Configurations: Horizontal transmitters and receivers
should have the best reception. Obstructions should decrease reception, while
elevating equipment should increase it.
As described in Section 5.1.3, we model RSSI using a GLM . This allows us to examine
the independent influence of our experimental variables on RSSI. We summarize the model
estimates in the left part of Table 5.1, predicted values of RSSI with confidence intervals
from the GLM . For a baseline, we set what we consider reasonable variable choices for a
realistic IoT UAS collected deployment: an elevated transmitter in a location with low
obstruction, flying the UAS 101–125 m away, at an altitude of 45 m above ground level,
using a horizontal receiver. In our analysis, we contrast other variable choices to this
baseline.
Figure 5.4: Observed RSSI distribution. Grouped by altitude (left) and location (right).
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Table 5.1: Estimates by parameter for GLM and ZINB models.
RSSI GLM Model PRR ZINB Model
Parameter
Estimated
Mean RSSI
Mean Confidence
Interval
Estimated
Mean PRR
Mean Confidence
Interval
B
as
el
in
e
Rec. Horiz.
Trans. Elev.
Alt. 150 ft
D. 101–125 m
Loc. Road
−87.2114 −87.1066 −87.3162 0.204 0.1777 0.2341
R
ec
.
H
.
Trans. Horiz. −86.5816 −86.4676 −86.6956 0.1528 0.1319 0.1769
Trans. Obs. −86.8098 −86.6867 −86.933 0.1369 0.1175 0.1595
Trans. Vert. −86.5092 −86.3997 −86.6187 0.1865 0.1625 0.214
R
ec
.
V
. Trans. Horiz. −89.2424 −89.1179 −89.3668 0.1218 0.1046 0.1418
Trans. Elev. −89.6226 −89.503 −89.7422 0.125 0.1082 0.1445
Trans. Obs. −90.155 −90.0124 −90.2977 0.0877 0.0746 0.1032
Trans. Vert. −89.2804 −89.1584 −89.4023 0.1203 0.1038 0.1395
A
lt
it
u
d
e
9 m −84.1888 −84.0457 −84.3319 0.1859 0.1626 0.2126
12 m −84.2479 −84.107 −84.3889 0.2025 0.1779 0.2304
15 m −84.5907 −84.4674 −84.714 0.2147 0.1884 0.2446
18 m −85.2649 −85.1463 −85.3836 0.2117 0.1859 0.2411
21 m −85.1696 −85.0613 −85.2778 0.2025 0.1781 0.2302
24 m −85.8722 −85.7614 −85.983 0.2234 0.1971 0.2533
27 m −85.6163 −85.5125 −85.7201 0.21 0.1854 0.2378
30 m −85.7763 −85.6692 −85.8834 0.213 0.1873 0.2422
61 m −86.8529 −86.7577 −86.9481 0.1897 0.1676 0.2147
76 m −88.1146 −88.006 −88.2232 0.1563 0.1354 0.1805
91 m −87.4706 −87.3676 −87.5736 - - -
122 m −87.7332 −87.6294 −87.837 - - -
D
is
p
la
ce
m
en
t < 50 m −82.1024 −81.9858 −82.2189 0.5518 0.4923 0.6185
50–75 m −85.3911 −85.2856 −85.4966 0.3116 0.2746 0.3535
76–100 m −86.4356 −86.331 −86.5402 0.258 0.2276 0.2925
126–150 m −87.8248 −87.7193 −87.9303 0.1984 0.1715 0.2295
151–175 m −88.3346 −88.2282 −88.441 0.1535 0.1302 0.1809
> 175 m −88.9355 −88.8277 −89.0434 0.1271 0.1036 0.1559
L
o
c. Grassy −88.2025 −88.0827 −88.3222 - - -
Hills −87.2797 −87.1742 −87.3853 - - -
This table shows the mean estimates for possible experimental variable choices for the
two models, using the top row’s variable choices as a baseline. Each subsequent row
reflects the effect of changing that one variable while keeping all other variables to their
baseline settings (Horizontal Receiver, Elevated Transmitter, Altitude of 46 m,
Displacement of 101–125 m, at the Road location). Altitudes > 76 m and locations are
not in the PRR ZINB model. All p-values for reported data are <0.0001.
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Figure 5.5: Predicted mean RSSI from GLM. Grouped by altitude (left) and horizontal
displacement (right).
Altitude
We present the distribution of the reported RSSI by altitude from ground level at
the location of take-off in Figure 5.4 (left). As only the radio module reports RSSI, the
data represent only packets successfully captured and decoded by the radio module. We
observe that higher altitudes have fewer high RSSI values. However, the mean and median
values decrease only slightly as altitude increases.
We examine the predicted effect of altitude on RSSI from the GLM averaging across
displacements and locations, as presented in the Figure 5.5 (left). As expected, we find
that, for all receiver/transmitter configurations, RSSI decreases with altitude; however,
this mean decrease is small (<1 dB per 3 m) compared to the wide fluctuations in
individual observed RSSI measurements. In Table 5.1, altitude changes the RSSI by a
maximum of 4 dB and the trend is not monotonic.
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Location
We present the distribution of RSSI for the three locations in Figure 5.4 (right). The
mean and median RSSI values remain similar across the three locations. However, counter
to expectations, the most obstructed site (Hills) displays the highest median RSSI, and
the area of least obstruction (Road) yields the greatest variance in RSSI values, although,
once again, the difference in dB is small. When examining the predicted values from
GLM, we observe a different pattern with the Road displaying the optimal RSSI but with
1dB of difference.
Horizontal Displacement
Averaging across altitudes and locations, we examine the predicted impact of displace-
ment on RSSI from the GLM . As shown in Figure 5.5 (right), we observe that greater
horizontal displacement reduces RSSI slightly (approximately 2 dB per 30 m) for all
receiver/transmitter configurations. When comparing displacements to the baseline in
Table 5.1, we observe a 1 dB monotonic drop per 25 m displacement. Once again, we note
that the mean decrease is small relative to the total observed fluctuations in individual
RSSI measurements.
Figure 5.6: Observed RSSI distributions by configuration.
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Transmitter/Receiver Configurations
We examine the distributions for data grouped by configuration of the receiver and
the transmitter. In Figure 5.6, the left part of the graph represents packets collected by
the horizontal receiver (mounted on the UAS parallel to the ground), while the right
shows data collected by the vertical receiver (mounted perpendicular to the ground). For
each receiver, the data are further categorized by transmitter configuration on the ground
(Horizontal, Vertical, Elevated, and Obstructed).
For the observed distributions, transmitter and receiver orientation minimally affect
mean RSSI. However, receiver orientation has a slightly more pronounced impact. All four
transmitters had lower observed mean RSSI for the vertical receiver than the horizontal
receiver. These observations are consistent with the predicted values from the GLM . With
regards to the effect of horizontal displacement on receiver/transmitter configuration in
Figure 5.5 (right), receiver orientation slightly impacts RSSI, while transmitter orientation
minimally impacts RSSI. Mirroring this result in Table 5.1, receiver orientation changes
RSSI by approximately 3 dB, while the transmitter orientation makes little difference.
When examining the impact of altitude on receiver/transmitter configuration per-
formance, we identified a more complicated interaction for the mean RSSI predicted
by the GLM in Figure 5.5. While the horizontal receiver still performs better overall,
the transmitter behaviors are contrary to expectations. The obstructed transmitter
paradoxically outperforms the elevated transmitter for all altitudes.
The similarity in RSSI between transmitter configurations is contrary to expectations,
especially comparing the elevated transmitter, with superior line of sight, to the obstructed
transmitter, which is buried in debris. For the observed distributions in Figure 5.6, all
transmitters broadcast at the same rate (one packet per 0.5 s), yet the elevated transmitter
delivers a greater number of packets than the obstructed one (in the horizontal case, 10 k
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more). Therefore, the obstructed transmitter is in fact delivering fewer packets despite
showing an overall better RSSI.
Deviations from Expectations
Overall, the observed RSSI does not match the expectations stated at the start of this
section. When examining mean RSSI alone, one might conclude that the experimental
variables minimally impact network performance. Further, the slight improvement in
RSSI due to obstructing the transmitter proves yet more confusing.
A high RSSI reflects successfully received packets, while lost packets are unaccounted
for in the data. Their RSSI is never reported to the receiver module. Therefore, the
mean of the received RSSI remains relatively consistent despite changes to experimental
variables, especially when compared to the fluctuation in RSSI for fixed experimental
variables, due to outside factors, such as external RF interference and minor changes to
reception geometry due to small variations in flight paths.
Therefore, for applications involving UAS data collection on 802.15.4, RSSI alone
does not provide a complete picture of network performance for our data. As noted
above, while our analysis of RSSI showed little mean fluctuation between experimental
configurations, our total number of received packets indicates significant differences in
network performance not accounted for by RSSI. We therefore must investigate further to
adequately assess the performance of our network during aerial data collection.
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5.2.2 PRR by Altitude and Displacement
We examine the underlying network performance via the observed PRR. As introduced
in Section 5.1.4, we grouped the measurements into 10m concentric circular sectors
radiating from each transmitter, resulting in 29,161 grouped measurements. The observed
PRR (averaged across runs and locations) is presented in Figure 5.7 with each heat map
representing a transmitter/receiver configuration.
As expected, close proximity to the transmitter, in terms of both altitude and horizontal
displacement, leads to a higher rate of received packets. A greater horizontal displacement
from the transmitter has greater packet loss. When examining PRR, most configurations
demonstrate a sharp drop in RSSI for distances over 150 m, while the mean RSSI
displays a small decrease. While lower altitudes produce a better PRR at lower horizontal
displacements, altitudes between 46 and 76 m show improved performance at greater
displacements. Thus, a UAS need not fly low to the ground, where it is more likely to hit
obstacles, in order to optimize data collection.
Likewise, receiver orientation noticeably impacts loss. For all transmitters, the vertical
receiver ’s PRR is the worst at higher altitudes and displacements. According to Figures
5.7e and 5.7f, the PRR is best for lower altitudes, where elevating the transmitter 0.5 m
off the ground overcomes ground obstacles (such as tall grass) to establish line-of-sight
with the UAS . Furthermore, Figures 5.7g and 5.7h show that, while the obstructed
transmitter maintains a high PRR when the UAS is in proximity, the maximum horizontal
displacement at which the UAS has good reception is lower than other configurations,
especially at lower altitudes. This behavior is masked when examining RSSI.
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(a) Horizontal Trans. to Horizontal Rec. (b) Horizontal Trans. to Vertical Rec.
(c) Vertical Trans. to Horizontal Rec. (d) Vertical Trans. to Vertical Rec.
(e) Elevated Trans. to Horizontal Rec. (f) Elevated Trans. to Vertical Rec.
(g) Obstructed Trans. to Vertical Rec. (h) Obstructed Trans. to Vertical Rec.
Figure 5.7: Observed packet reception rates grouped by altitude and 10 m displacements
from transmitter. Cells with fewer than five sent packets are left blank.
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5.2.3 Optimizing PRR
We model how experimental variables impact PRR using a ZINB model, described in
Section 5.1.5. The input data consisted of 7,906 observations (divided by displacement
bins of 25 m), and divided into a training set (3,910 observations), validation set (3,166
observations), and test set (830 observations). The model’s estimated PRRs are presented
on the right side of Table 5.1.
Using this model, we can predict (for a given altitude, horizontal displacement, and
receiver/transmitter configuration) the expected mean PRR. This serves to help identify
the conditions under which a packet of data can be delivered to the drone, as might be
required, for example, when planning a deployment.
We can convert the ZINB model, which predicts PRR, into a binary classifier, predicting
when at least one packet will be received, by specifying a threshold below which we expect
the packet to be lost. This can be done in two ways. In Figure 5.8, we present a Receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) graph from the test set displaying the possible true and
false positive rates based on threshold choices. Figure 5.8a (left) employs the ZI part
of the model to calculate the probability that zero packets are received and shows the
corresponding ROC. This method does not incorporate the number of sent packets, and
could be sensitive to transmission rates. Figure 5.8b (right) first calculates predicted
PRR, incorporating number of sent packets in the modeling, and then shows the resulting
ROC. For example, picking a PRR threshold of 40% for the test set, the resulting binary
classifier correctly identifies 86.9% of the observations with a specificity of 86.2% and
recall of 87.5%.
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(a) Probability of Zero Packets. (b) Packet Reception Rate.
Figure 5.8: ROC curves for ZINB model estimates of test set.
Altitude
Based on the ZINB model of our training set, we examine the effect of altitude
on the PRR. Figure 5.9 (left) shows the impact of altitude by group (averaging across
displacements). For most transmitter/receiver configurations, PRR peaks at 46 m altitude.
As observed in the Figure 5.7 heat maps, the impact of altitude seems tied to displacement.
When fixing a displacement, as we do in Table 5.1, the altitude minimally effects PRR
with single percent fluctuations until altitude exceeds 61 m.
Horizontal Displacement
We similarly use the ZINB model of our training set to examine the effect of horizontal
displacement on the PRR. In Figure 5.9 (right), we show the impact of displacement by
group (averaging across all altitudes). Here, the effect is more linear, with displacement
causing a monotonic drop in PRR until no packet is received. When comparing to our
baseline, in Table 5.1, we observe a nearly 5% drop in PRR per 25 m, after 50 meters.
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Figure 5.9: Predicted mean PRR from ZINB model for each receiver/transmitter
configuration grouped by altitude (left) and horizontal displacement (right).
Transmitter/Receiver Configuration
As expected, the elevated transmitter has a significantly better PRR across all altitudes
and displacements, while the obstructed transmitter has the worst. The horizontal and
vertical transmitters behave similarly. The horizontal receiver shows better PRR for all
groups. When compared to our baseline in Table 5.1, a horizontal receiver gives a 3%–8%
increase in PRR. We similarly observe that obstruction causes a 2%–4% decrease in PRR
compared to a horizontal transmitter, while elevating the transmitter gives a 5% boost
but only in the case of a horizontal receiver.
Predicting PRR from RSSI
Predicting PRR from RSSI can be difficult because RSSI remains unreported when
no packets are received (i.e., the PRR is zero). The ZINB model comprises two parts, a
logistic regression model predicting the probability any packets are received and a negative
binomial model predicting a PRR given that a packet is likely to be received.
To examine whether RSSI, acting as a mediator variable, can be used to model and
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Figure 5.10: Accuracy of predicted mean PRR grouped by altitude (left) and horizontal
displacement (right).
predict PRR, we used RSSI to train a negative binomial model on our training set. To
properly compare it, we also reran the negative binomial portion of the model based
on experimental variables for our training set, dropping PRRs of zero. We evaluate our
model on the test set, without PRRs of zero. Figure 5.10 shows the results of the two
models. We compare the predictions of those models to the observed PRR in the test set
(including and not including PRRs of zero), as well as the result of the full ZINB model,
which predicts using experimental variables.
When we ignore PRRs of zero and average across other variables, RSSI closely predicts
PRR. However, the model that is based on experimental variables, rather than RSSI, is
still a better fit to the observed data. While inferring PRR, in order to gauge how many
re-transmissions may be required for successful data delivery, may be useful, doing so fails
to predict whether packets will be received in the first place. When we compare the RSSI
prediction to the observed readings that include PRRs of zero, RSSI over-predicts the
real PRR by more than double. In contrast, the ZINB model, trained to predict total
packet loss, is a good fit.
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5.3 Discussion
Our measurement study provides insight into optimizing an IoT deployment for aerial
data collection by a UAS . While existing literature focuses primarily on mean RSSI as a
principle indicator for an aerial network’s performance, our analysis reveals that RSSI
inadequately reflects the network behavior. Because radio modules report RSSI only when
a packet is successfully delivered, RSSI fails to capture steep drops in PRR. Instead, in
open spaces without strong sources of interference, the geography of a network, such as
distance from node and mounting of transmitters, can be used to estimate the expected
performance. In this section, we discuss how, based on our results, one can optimize such
an 802.15.4 network for aerial data collection.
5.3.1 Effective Reception Range
During initial planning of this measurement campaign, we expected to observe con-
nectivity at distances far greater than those measured. Digi advertises an effective total
distance of 1200 m for the XBee3, with the caveat that “[a]ctual range will vary based
on transmitting power, orientation of transmitter and receiver, height of transmitting
antenna, height of receiving antenna, weather conditions, interference sources in the area,
and terrain between receiver and transmitter” [244]. However, in near optimal real-world
conditions, we only successfully captured packets at a maximum total distance of 297 m
in our experiments. When accounting for the UASs altitude, this corresponds to a 278 m
maximum horizontal displacement from the transmitter, but the UAS was highly unlikely
to receive a packet at this displacement.
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5.3.2 Optimal Altitude
Although low altitudes generally improve PRR and RSSI, higher altitudes provide
better connectivity at greater horizontal displacements. We theorize that higher altitudes
provide a steeper angle between the UAS and transmitter, which reduces signal blockage
from obstacles, such as trees and bushes. An altitude of 46 m provides the best overall
reception. This is fortunate as a high altitude allows a UAS to clear most trees and
ground obstacles.
5.3.3 Optimal Antenna Orientation
Previous work investigates how radiation patterns cause antennae orientations to
affect signal quality. In our work, the antenna orientation of the transmitter did not
significantly impact performance, while the orientation of the receiver had a far greater
impact, with the vertically mounted receiver performing substantially worse than the
horizontally mounted one.
In our case, this may indicate that signal radiation is a smaller factor than minor
fluctuations in line-of-sight. Unlike past experiments that employed a 1.1 inch straight wire
as an antenna for a 802.15.4 2.4 GHz CC2420 transmitter [139], our setup employed a coiled
embedded antenna directly on the comparatively smaller XBee. While Lymberopoulos et.
al. [139] studied distances of <10 m, our work includes signals at distances of >250 m
where the topography and antennae geometry might reduce impact of orientation.
The better performance of the vertically mounted receiver could be due to the superior
line of sight to the horizontally mounted receiver. The horizontal receiver was parallel to
ground at all times, while the vertical receiver ’s own body may have blocked the signal
from unfavorable angles.
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In further consideration of transmitter orientation, aerial networks might serve as
auxiliary modes of connection to on-the-ground infrastructure. For example, cluster heads
may use the same 802.15.4 radio to communicate with other nodes and the UAS. In such
a case, tailoring ground transmitters to communicate with one another without taking
communication with the UAS into account would be optimal.
5.3.4 Elevating Transmitters
In IoT deployments where elevating the transmitter is possible, it is advisable to do
so. While the elevated transmitter had a very similar RSSI performance to the horizontal
transmitter on the ground, the PRR of the elevated transmitter was much improved,
especially for lower UAS altitudes. The transmitter cleared much of the ground-level
obstruction and attained better line-of-sight to the UAS when elevated even half a meter
above the ground. The optimal height for a transmitter may depend on the specific local
geography.
5.3.5 Obstruction
Sensor nodes are frequently deployed in the field with little protection from extreme
weather. Nodes and antennas can be affected by various obstructions, including dirt from
rain or wind. While obstruction minimally affects reported RSSI, it significantly impacts
PRR. Buried sensors communicate at a high loss rate. However, most packets are lost at
greater distances, wasting transmission power. If the IoT device relies on solar power,
which may likewise become obstructed, this exacerbates the issue.
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5.3.6 Transmission Rate Selection
IoT deployments typically minimize the transmission rate in order to save power.
However, we found that achieving this may be difficult when performing aerial data
collection with a UAS, since the flight time on consumer multi-copters as of spring 2019 is
approximately 20 min (1200 s) per battery. As flight speed correlates with successful data
capture at a particular data transmission rate, multi-copter battery capacity constrains
viable transmission rates. Fixed-wing aircraft are similarly constrained as they have a
minimum flight speed of >10 m/s.
We flew the quad-copter at an average speed of 2.2 m/s (5 mph). On a single battery,
at this speed, the UAS could cover 2.6 km. This is already a relatively small coverage
area when accounting for a round trip flight—approaching the lowest feasible flight speed
for UAS-based data collection.
At our low flight speed, both 500 ms and 1 s inter-packet transmission rates produced
similar RSSI and PRR values. While we attempted slower transmission rates, we received
too few packets for a meaningful analysis. At one packet per 15 s, we received an average
of only 258 packets per transmitter–receiver pair across all locations, altitudes, and
repeated trials. For one packet per minute, the average per transmitter-receiver pair was
only 127 packets. Given the experimental results, determining the max flight speed that
guaranteed delivery at low transmission rates is difficult, as the data is sparse.
This is a potential complication for aerial collection, as high transmission rates would
correspond to increased power consumption. Strategies such as pre-scheduling collection
windows or a signaling mechanism, during which the transmitters increase rate, could
mitigate this issue.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this study, we reviewed the effects of altitude, antenna orientation, obstruction,
antenna elevation, and transmission rate on RSSI and PRR of a 802.15.4 2.4 GHz IoT
network. We found that RSSI is a weak indicator of network performance for aerial
data collection of an IoT network, as it poorly reflects high levels of packet loss. When
examining reception rate, our experimental variables had far greater variability than RSSI
showed.
An 802.15.4 network optimized for ground based communication may not be suitable
for aerial data collection without modification and consideration of a variety of factors,
such as device placement, altitude of collection, transmission rate, and resilience to
obstruction. Our work provides a model for making informed choices about these factors.
As we discussed in this chapter, for this series of measurements we used Digi WRL-
15126 XBee3 with PCB antennae. While this is a compact and often used form factor.
While our work provides valuable insight for a large class of deployments, this work does
not examine straight wire dipole antennas that are also sometimes utilized by WSNs.
Past work suggests that these straight wire antennae may be tied to higher impact of
the impact of antenna orientation [139]. In the next chapter, we study how antenna type
impacts the performance of FUSNs.
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Chapter 6
Impact of 802.15.4 Radio Antenna
Orientation on UAS Aerial Data
Collection
In chapter 5 we discovered that embedded coiled antenna orientation of the transmitters
and the receivers had little impact on signal strength. However, we theorized that external
antenna modules may be more sensitive to orientation and therefore might display behavior
observed in 802.11 works, such as toroidal radiation.
In this chapter, we compare external antenna configurations to the commonly used
embedded coiled antenna modules. We study the effects of toroidal radiation and antenna
polarization on signal strength. We model our data using a ZINB model. For each
hardware configuration and orientation we identify the optimal altitude to fly an UAS.
Our results show that choosing antenna configuration (including type and orientation)
for an IoT network depends on the intended UAS collection flight plan. For example,
in our study, we find that UAS flights with a horizontal displacement to transmitters
less than 150 meters optimize when using vertically oriented transmitters with internal
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antennae and a UAS flight altitude of 150-250ft. On the other hand, UAS flights with a
horizontal displacement to transmitters exceeding 150 meters optimize when using vertical
transmitters with external antennae and are not sensitive to flight altitude.
6.1 Methods
The results of this paper are based on experimental data collected using an outdoor
aerial testbed at Coal Oil Point Reserve near the University of California, Santa Barbara
in March, September, and October 2019. We deployed 802.15.4 transmitters broadcasting
packets at 500ms intervals to a mobile UAS. We varied radio hardware, antenna orientation,
altitude, distance, and amount of obstruction. We performed multiple repeated measures,
varying sensor placement and UAS flight path.
6.1.1 Equipment
The experiments used a single UAS and two sets of 802.15.4 Digi 2.4GHz Xbee3 radios,
a set of transceivers with integrated antennae, and a set of transceivers with external
antennae. The specifications for both sets of transceivers advertise an outdoor range
of 1200m at a power of 8dBm and a receiver sensitivity of -103dBm [244]. To evaluate
the choice of antenna type, we first conducted experiments utilizing radio modules with
integrated antennae, then swapped for external antenna modules described in this section.
Integrated Antenna Modules: The first set of six transceivers comprised Digi WRL-
15126 XBee3 using PCB antennae; we refer to these as integrated antenna modules. These
radios are popular due to their compact form factor. Because the antennae are integrated
into the circuit board, changing antenna orientation also rotates the entire radio module.
For transceivers with integrated antennae, we define horizontal orientation as one where
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(a) Horizontal Internal. (b) Vertical Internal. (c) Obstructed External.
(d) Horizontal External. (e) Vertical External. (f) Elevated External. (g) Elevated Internal.
(h) UAS: DJI Matrice 100.
Figure 6.1: Equipment deployed in our aerial testbed.
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the radio module circuit board is parallel to the ground, as shown in Figure 6.1a. We
define vertical orientation as one where the circuit board is perpendicular to the ground,
as shown in Figure 6.1b.
External Antenna Modules: The second set of six transceivers were Digi WRL-15130
XBee3 with an external WRL-00145 RP-SMA 2.2dBi Duck Antenna [247]; we refer to
these as external antenna modules. The external antennae allow control of antenna
orientation independent of the radio module. For transceivers with external antennae, we
define horizontal orientation as one where the antenna is parallel to the ground, as shown
in Figure 6.1d. We define vertical orientation as one where the antenna is perpendicular
to the ground, as shown in Figure 6.1e.
Transmitters: For each set of Xbee3 radio modules, four of the six were designated as
transmitters. These were mounted on SparkFun XBee Explorer boards controlled by a
SparkFun Teensy LC, powered by external USB battery packs from varying vendors via a
USB-to-Serial converter on the Teensy LCs. For both antenna variants, the transmitters
were programmed to broadcast 23 byte packets every 500ms. The payload of the packets
consisted of a randomly generated floating point number (simulating numerical data of a
potential attached sensor), as well as device and packet identifiers.
At the start of each experiment, the transmitters were randomly placed approximately
10 to 15 meters apart, avoiding obstruction within the 15cm vicinity of each transmitter.
The latitude and longitude of the transmitter were recorded manually via a GPS.
Each of the four transmitters was, as shown in Figure 6.1, deployed in one of four
unique configurations: horizontal, vertical, elevated, and obstructed. The horizontal
transmitter was placed on the ground with its antenna in the horizontal orientation (as
previously defined). Similarly, the vertical transmitter was placed on the ground with its
antenna in the vertical orientation. The elevated transmitter was mounted to a pole one
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half meter above the ground with its antenna in the vertical orientation. The obstructed
transmitter was laid flat on the ground with its antenna, in a horizontal orientation,
covered with one quart of debris consisting of dirt and wood chips.
Unmanned Aircraft System: Packets broadcast by the transmitters were collected
using an unmanned aircraft system. For the UAS, we utilized a DJI Matrice 100 quad-
copter, as shown in Figure 6.1h. The Matrice 100 communicates with a remote control at
5.725 - 5.825 GHz, which is outside the frequency range of the 2.4GHz XBee nodes. The
UAS was flown manually with no attached camera. A Raspberry Pi (RPi) 2 - Model B
served as an on-board computer. The location of the UAS was recorded from the Matrice
100 on-board GPS, sampling at a rate of 50Hz and using a UART connection to the RPi.
When evaluating antenna type we used a matching pair of receivers on the UAS. So
when evaluating internal antennae, four of the six XBee3 radios with internal antennae
were used as ground based transmitters and two of the six were mounted to the bottom
of the UAS. Likewise for the external antennae tests. These modules acted exclusively as
receivers set to capture only. We oriented the antennae of the receiver in two configurations.
The horizontal receiver had its antenna in a horizontal orientation, while the vertical
receiver had its antenna in a vertical orientation. The two XBees forwarded packets to
the RPi via a USB connection.
We flew the UAS over the transmitters at an average speed of four meters per second.
The exact flight path and speed varied due to manual execution under varying wind
conditions. Because the FAA, which governs the airspace over our testbed, regulates
altitude in feet, we represent altitude (relative to ground level at the start of flight) in
feet, while keeping displacement in meters. Flights for the integrated antennae were at
altitudes of 50ft, 100ft, 200ft, 300ft, and 400ft at horizontal displacement of up to 250-325
meters from the closest transmitter to the UAS. When conducting flights for the external
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antenna modules, we saw an improved reception range for certain configurations and
altered our flight plan to include altitudes of 150ft and 350ft and horizontal displacement
of up to 650 meters. As the FAA limits max altitude to 400 feet, we restricted our
maximum experimental flight altitude to match (the EU similarly limits flight to 120m ≈
394ft).
6.1.2 Experimental Area
The experiments took place outdoors at Coal Oil Point UC Reserve, a coastal grassland
near the university. The experiments were conducted in a relatively flat area with some
ground level obstruction due to tall grass and shrubs. The transmitters were placed so
that the 15cm around each transmitter was clear of any obstruction, in areas with no
tall shrubs in the 2m vicinity. For UAS horizontal displacement of over 350 meters, tall
clusters of trees lined the sides of the flight path, however the UAS kept a line of sight
corridor to the deployment area.
6.1.3 Measurements
Received Signal Strength Indication: RSSI is a common indicator of signal strength;
in fact it is often the only signal quality metric reported by radio hardware. As a result,
prior research of air to ground networks has relied on RSSI as a key indicator of network
performance [126, 122, 123].
However, as our past work has shown [47, 48], RSSI may not be the ideal indicator
for 802.15.4. RSSI is typically calculated by the receiver from successfully received
packets. When conditions are poor and RSSI is low, the packets may not be received
by the receiver and, as a result, their RSSI may not be recorded. Therefore, in past
outdoor aerial 802.15.4 measurements, we observed that the mean of the received RSSI
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remains relatively consistent despite changes to experimental variables, such as adding
obstruction. In contrast, with fixed transmission frequency, significant shifts to the total
number of received packets suggest significant differences in network performance between
configuration scenarios not accounted for by RSSI.
In this work, while we provide an overview of RSSI for comparability to past work,
we focus on packet reception as a more definitive network quality metric for the outdoor
aerial 802.15.4 data collection use case.
Packet Reception Rate: Unlike other applications, where throughput, latency, and
jitter are the principle metrics of performance, IoT applications are often delay tolerant
and do not saturate network bandwidth. Instead, IoT networks try to minimize power
consumption, especially outdoors where there may not be access to grid power. Similarly
a UAS has a limited battery, and hence limited flight time. Therefore to maximize
performance of an aerial data connection, we seek to minimize the number of failed
transmissions. Accordingly, we measure the PRR, which is the number of packets received
divided by the calculated number sent, as the principle metric of 802.15.4 IoT network
performance:
PRR =
number of packets received
time of UAS in sector ∗ transmission rate
Because PRR only makes sense over an aggregate of readings, we group the ex-
perimental data by horizontal displacement from the corresponding transmitter into
concentric circular sectors, 25m wide, radiating out from each transmitter, keeping other
experimental variables separate. To determine the sector into which a packet from a
particular transmitter falls, we compare the UAS’s on-board GPS with the manually
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recorded transmitter location. We estimate the number of packets sent by a transmitter
by taking the product of the transmission rate and the time-in-sector occupied by the
UAS. We drop measurement windows where fewer than five packets were sent.
6.1.4 Modeling Packet Reception Rate
To study the effect of each variable on PRR, we model the expected mean PRR using
ZINB. From past work [48], we found that ZINB was the best fitting model, as it accounts
for the over-dispersion and high number of PRRs at zero from locations and altitudes that
never receive a packet. We therefore model both the chances that a packet is received
at all and the estimated number of packets received. As the internal and external data
sets had some experimental differences (the internal antenna had fewer displacement
bins, and one fewer altitude), we constructed two independent ZINB models for each
antenna type. We assessed the goodness of fit for our ZINB models by Scaled Pearson
Chi-Square criteria, which were close to one and by the Full Log Likelihood criteria. We
also compared the observed relative frequencies of the various counts to the maximum
likelihood estimates of their respective probabilities. We found that our models were a
good fit for the observed data.
To prepare for modeling we aggregated our readings into sectors, as discussed in
the last section. We separated our data into internal and external antennae. We then
randomly divided each group data into two sets: 60% was designated as a training set,
while the remaining 40% was designated as a test set. We used a ZINB model with
the number of received packets as the outcome. For the model of external antennae we
set displacement as a categorical variable with 25 groups (25m to 625m), altitude as a
categorical variable with 8 groups (50ft to 400ft). For the model of internal antennae we
grouped displacement as 11 groups (25m to 275m) and altitude with 7 groups (omitting
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(a) Grouped by altitude and antenna. (b) Grouped by antenna and configuration.
Figure 6.2: Distributions of RSSI from aerial measurements.
350ft). For both models the transmitter-receiver configuration was 8 groups (Vertical &
Horizontal Receivers paired with Horizontal, Elevated, Obstructed & Vertical Transmitters)
as fixed covariates for both parts of our model. We used a natural logarithm of sent
packets as an offset in the NB part of the model and control for the number of sent
packets in the ZI part of the model.
6.2 Evaluation
6.2.1 Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
For each received packet we logged the RSSI reported by the receiver modules on the
UAS. In particular, we examined how RSSI changed based on antenna type (internal vs.
external), antenna orientation of the transmitter and receiver, amount of obstruction, and
altitude.
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Altitude: To examine the impact of altitude, we group the data by antenna type
and altitude. We present the distribution by group as a box plot in Figure 6.2a. These
distributions include data from all horizontal displacements and transmitter configurations.
The top plot shows the distribution of observed measurements from the set of transmitters
with internal antennae, and the bottom shows those with external antenna.
The median and mean RSSI for both internal and external antenna remained close to
one another with fluctuations within ±2dB for each altitude. The minimum RSSI values
remained likewise fixed. However the interquartile ranges shrank at higher altitudes,
as the UAS increased in total vertical distance from the transmitters. Notably the
external antennae’ maximum RSSI is ≈ 10dB better than the internal antennae, across
all altitudes.
Transmitter Configuration: To examine the impact of antenna orientation and
obstruction, we group the data by antenna type, orientation, and obstruction. We present
the resulting box plot in Figure 6.2b. The two left plots show results from internal antenna
modules for both the transmitter and receiver, while the two plots on the right show those
for external modules. The top two plots correspond to horizontal antenna orientations
for the receivers, while the bottom two plots show vertical receiver orientation. Each of
the four subplots show the four possible transmitter configurations: horizontal antenna
orientation, vertical orientation, elevated transmitter with a horizontal orientation, and
obstructed transmitter with horizontal orientation.
We can see that the mean and median RSSI across all conditions remain within ±3dB
of each other, with similar interquartile ranges. Overall, the external antennae perform
better than the internal antennae, the majority of the packets are received with higher
RSSI.
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The internal antennae display unusual behavior in the performance of the elevated and
obstructed transmitters, showing that, contrary to expectation, the obstructed transmitter
performs better than the elevated transmitter. When controlling for the number of packets
sent, we found that while the obstructed transmitter RSSI is not significantly different,
the obstructed transmitter successfully delivered less than half the number of packets.
This strongly suggests that RSSI is not a reliable indicator of network performance for
this application.
6.2.2 Packet Reception Rate (PRR)
Because RSSI does not provide a comprehensive look at network performance, we focus
the majority of our analysis on packet loss by examining PRR. As explained in Section
6.1.3, we group our observations into 25m sectors. In our analysis we omit observations
where fewer than five packets were sent, resulting in 12,891 total observations (8,591
observations for the external antenna set and 4,300 observations in the internal antenna
set). Roughly 36% of the groups received at least one packet.
A heatmap of the observed PRR grouped by antenna type, antenna orientation,
altitude, and horizontal displacement, averaged across multiple runs, is shown in Figure
6.3. Results for the internal antenna modules are shown in the left (Figures 6.3a and
6.3c), while those of the external modules are shown in the right (Figures 6.3b and 6.3d).
Each figure is broken down by transmitter configuration with the color of each square
representing the average PRR of a horizontal displacement sector at a particular altitude.
White squares indicate fewer than five packets were sent at those variable conditions and
so are omitted from the heatmap.
The internal antenna flights have fewer (displacement, altitude) pairs filled than the
external antennae. As we performed those experiments first, we tailored the flight plan
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(a) Horizontal receiver (internal antenna). (b) Horizontal receiver (external antenna).
(c) Vertical receiver (internal antenna). (d) Vertical receiver (external antenna).
Figure 6.3: Observed packet reception rates grouped by altitude and 25 m displacements
from transmitter. Cells with fewer than five sent packets are left blank.
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(a) Internal antenna model. (b) External antenna model.
Figure 6.4: ROC curves for ZINB models evaluated on test sets.
to preliminary results on that hardware type. As we found near total loss at distances
greater than 250 meters, we limited our flights around that range. In contrast, the
external antennae showed greater reception range, so we tripled our maximum horizontal
displacement (further displacements was limited by restrictions on our airspace) and
added an additional altitude measure of 350ft. Due to the significantly increased flight
times from the increased horizontal range, we restricted altitude to 50, 100, 150, 200, 250,
300, 350, and 400 feet.
Modeling PRR: From the training set, we constructed a pair of ZINB models of PRR
(one for internal and one for external antennae), as described in Section 6.1.4. Using these
models, we can predict (based on input variables of hardware type, antenna orientations
of transmitter and receiver, horizontal displacement, and altitude) the expected mean
PRR. We utilize these model to study the effects of each variable on PRR. Network
planners could likewise use this type of model, perhaps expanding the training set to fit
more geographic topographies, to plan out sensor network equipment deployment and
aerial data collection.
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(a) Internal antenna.
(b) External antenna.
Figure 6.5: Observed PRR grouped by altitude and displacement, varying antenna
type and configuration.
We can turn the ZINB model, which predicts a rate, into a binary classifier, predicting
when at least one packet will be received, by specifying a threshold below which we expect
the packet to be lost. We verify the resulting classifier based on the test set. We present
a ROC curve of the ZINB for both models executed on the test set in Figure 6.4. This
displays the possible true and false positive rates based on threshold choices. For example,
given an external antenna and a PRR threshold of 30%, the resulting binary classifier
correctly identifies 77% of the observations with a recall of 78% and specificity of 76%.
A key focus of this study was to examine the difference between the internal coiled
circuit board embedded antennae that we previously evaluated [47, 48] and the external
straight wire antennae. To make this comparison, we examine the differences between the
PRR of the four receivers (external horizontal, external vertical, internal horizontal, and
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internal vertical) across UAS altitudes and horizontal displacements. Due to limits in
manpower, this work does not examine mixing transmitter and receiver antenna types
(for example internal transmitter with external receiver). For this study, we assume
that antenna types are homogeneous between transmitter and receiver, we will examine
heterogeneous antennae types in future work.
Transmitter Configuration: First, we compared the PRR based on transmitter
configuration, examining antenna type, obstruction, altitude, and orientation. In Figure
6.5, we present plots from the model for the PRR grouped by altitude and displacement,
separated by internal and external antennae.
The difference between configurations of transmitters with internal antennae was
less stark than the external antenna models. For the internal antennae, as expected,
the vertical elevated antenna with the horizontal receiver showed the highest PRR rate,
followed by the vertical ground level antenna with the horizontal receiver, then followed
by the vertical elevated with a vertical receiver. The worst PRR was, again as expected,
the horizontal obstructed transmitter with the vertical and horizontal receivers. This
order held across altitudes and displacements.
For transmitters with external antenna modules, there was a higher variance in PRR by
configuration. The vertical transmitters (both elevated and not) paired with the vertical
receiver had a PRR nearly double that of the other antennae configurations. Unlike
the internal antennae, for the external set, altitude did not make a difference on PRR.
For the external set, the vertical transmitters outperformed the horizontal transmitters,
particularly when paired with vertical receivers.
Interestingly, the obstructed horizontal transmitter had a higher PRR than the
horizontal unobstructed transmitter when collected by the vertical receiver. The obstructed
horizontal transmitter had the worst PRR when collected by the horizontal receiver.
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Figure 6.6: PRR grouped by receiver type.
Receiver Configuration: Next, we compare the PRR by receiver across all transmitter
configurations of the matching antenna type. We present plots from the model for the
PRR grouped by altitude and displacement in Figure 6.6. Overall, the receivers with
internal antennae exhibited higher PRRs, regardless of orientation.
When examining the effect of receiver orientation, we found that for the internal
antenna hardware, the horizontal receiver produced a better PRR across all altitudes and
displacements than the vertical receiver. The behavior of the internal antenna modules is
attributable to the mounting of the receivers. While the horizontal receiver was mounted
on the bottom of the UAS, with clear line of sight to the ground at all times, the vertical
receiver was mounted on the side of the UAS undercarriage with the mounting potentially
interfering with line of sight at some angles.
The effect of receiver orientation on the external antenna modules is more complex.
At smaller displacements (< 100m), the receiver with horizontal antenna orientation
exhibited a higher PRR, while at greater displacements the vertical antenna had higher
PRR.
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Horizontal Displacement: As expected, PRR drops off as horizontal displacement
between the UAS and transmitter increases, influenced by the inverse square law of
signal strength decay. The internal antennae sets have an overall higher PRR at close
displacements, but as displacement increases to 250m, PRR falls to near zero. In contrast
the external antennae, while overall yielding a lower PRR, still perform well at extreme
distances of > 600m.
Altitude: For internal antenna modules, as seen in Figure 6.5a (right), collecting at
altitudes of around 150ft maximizes PRR (the exact optimal altitude depends on antenna
configuration). In contrast, for the external antennae shown in Figure 6.5b (right), there
is no optimal altitude. For external antennae higher altitude corresponds to a higher
PRR up to the FAA limit of 400ft (likely there is an optimal altitude past this limit).
The toroidal radiation pattern of the external dipole antenna introduces additional
considerations when selecting an altitude for UAS data collection. Dipole antennae radiate
outwards, perpendicular to their orientation, with a cone of low signal strength at the tip
of the antenna (the exact radiation pattern can be found in [247]). While overall lesser
horizontal displacements produce a higher PRR, for vertical transmitters there is a dip in
PRR at displacements < 100m for altitudes > 200ft. This is most clearly seen in Figures
6.3b and 6.3d. In contrast, external horizontal transmitters perform better across all
altitudes at smaller displacements.
6.3 Conclusion
When evaluating the efficacy of an outdoor aerial assisted data collection strategy
for a sensor network, network administrators need real-world models of optimum flight
altitude, expected reception rates, and maximum effective horizontal displacement for
reliable data reception. Our work provides a foundation for understanding 802.15.4
109
Impact of 802.15.4 Radio Antenna Orientation on UAS Aerial Data Collection Chapter 6
2.4GHz outdoor performance for three dimensional network communication using physical
experimentation.
The widely used XBee3 module evaluated in this work has an advertised effective
operating range of 1200m [244], but, as our evaluation shows, variables such as altitude
of UAS, antenna type, antenna orientation (of transmitter and receiver), evaluation, and
obstruction can dramatically limit the maximum horizontal displacement with a usable
PRR. Moreover there is not a one size fits all configuration.
For an outdoor grassland setting, results show that if the UAS flight plan is expected
to come close to the transmitters (< 150m), then an altitude of 150-250ft with internal
antennae consisting of an elevated vertical transmitter and a horizontal receiver produce
the best PRR. For effective data collection at greater displacements (> 150m), external
antennae consisting of a vertical transmitter and a vertical receiver are optimal regardless
of flight altitude.
In our experiment packets were broadcast by the transmitters at a rate of 500ms,
which is highly energy intensive for deployments that might need to operate on battery
power for weeks or months. Unfortunately, experimentation on lowering transmission
rate proved challenging due to the power requirements of the UAS. As each UAS battery
provides just over 20 minutes of useful flight, experimentation on slow transmission rates
makes collection of a meaningful amount of data challenging. Initial results showed that
the UAS would have to slow flight speed substantially for slower transmission rates. To
address this issue there is active research on using low power radios for “waking” 802.15.4
radios for transmission [248]. While our dataset will likely not generalize to all terrain
and geographies (e.g. an urban sensor deployment), we believe our method of modeling
and insights into three dimensional performance of 2.4GHz 802.15.4 under a variety of
antenna configurations is highly transferable to future work in 802.15.4 analysis and to
real-world sensor network planning.
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So far in this dissertation, we have focused on evaluating and restoring connectivity
to networks. In the next chapter we explore how wireless transmission capability of UEs
can be valuable, even in the absence of a functioning network.
Acknowledgment
This work was done in collaboration Maxton Ginier, Ryan Allen, Irina Artamonova
and Elizabeth Belding. Thanks to Coal Oil Point UC Reserve for allowing us to utilize
your space for our aerial testbed.
111
Chapter 7
Real-Time Multilateral RSSI
Localization from UASs for Disaster
Response
In chapters 5 and 6 we evaluated the feasibility of 802.15.4 DTN data delivery from FUSN.
Unlike 802.15.4, the IEEE 802.11 family of standards has relatively short communication
ranges, typically under 100 meters. Further as we discuss in chapters 1 and I, due to the
wide range of device types and security concerns consumer mobile devices do not have
a standardized way to share data such as location. In this chapter we explore how the
passive monitoring of 802.11 transmissions, even after network failure can be used to aid
in disaster response applications.
While white-light or thermal imaging techniques may be viable in the case of a disaster,
poor visibility, visual obstruction, and thermal variations can impede a visual-only system.
When other communication channels are unavailable, UAS based radio localization can
augment visual systems by providing localization of mobile devices in the possession of
affected individuals. WiFi is ubiquitous in consumer devices, and the MAC address in
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802.11 packet headers facilitates distinguishing the source of a transmission.
WiFi broadcasts, such as probe requests sent by user devices to locate an access point
when no existing connection is present [57], can be used to passively locate UEs carried
by users during a disaster. Disaster victims might be unable to actively engage with an
emergency system due to physical impairment or time constraint. In addition, victims may
not have prepared for an emergency situation ahead of time (i.e. by pre-loading emergency
apps). We, therefore, do not assume cooperation from mobile devices. This precludes
devices from self-reporting location obtained via GPS or using custom communication
protocols.
In such cases, rescuers need a way to quickly and passively locate people on the
ground. Our work addresses this problem through voxel-based approximation (VBA),
a novel algorithm for UAS-based multilateral localization. A key difference between
our work and prior localization algorithms is that most prior work focuses on the user
device performing the localization through passive reception of beacons from multiple
stationary transmitters. In contrast, VBA operates on a single mobile UAS. It enables
the UAS to localize a transmitting device on-the-ground, through the aggregation and
analysis of RSSI data points collected as the UAS moves over the affected terrain. With
this information, emergency personnel can locate and assist an individual in a situation
where standard communication avenues (cell towers, broadband Internet) have become
inoperable due to power outages, damage, or capacity overload.
In this chapter, we describe the operation of VBA and evaluate its efficacy in locating
WiFi-enabled devices through physical experimentation using an in-flight UAS. Through
multiple scenarios, we evaluate VBA and compare it to other approaches, such as linear
least squares and maximum likelihood estimation. Our results show that VBA has
comparable error rates to established algorithms, while maintaining a constant run time
and memory requirements for each new update. This is key to the deployability of any
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localization algorithm, as UASs are constrained in power, due to their use of batteries;
and on-board computational and storage resources, due to maximum weight requirements.
Our specific contributions are as follows:
• We present a novel mobile-UAS-based localization algorithm, where a mobile in-air
vehicle localizes a stationary transmitting device in 3D space. Our approach reverses
the standard localization scenario, and breaks new ground in successful device
location.
• Unlike past algorithms for multilateral localization, VBA computation time and
storage for each measurement update is constant, making it ideal for real-time
localization and location updates that leverage the entire received data set.
• We validate and evaluate our work through extensive physical in-the-air experimen-
tation and explore the efficacy of 802.11 2.4GHz localization in the context of a
disaster response. We demonstrate that VBA outperforms alternative approaches
in resource requirements while maintaining comparable localization error, even in a
”mock disaster” scenario.
7.1 3D Aerial Localization
As the UAS moves across a search path, it collects broadcast 802.11 packets sent by
the device. Even when not connected to an access point, 802.11 device broadcasts packets
called probe requests that assist in connectivity. A UAS can monitor broadcasts and
correlate them with its own position coordinates at time of reception via an on-board
GPS. It filters packets based on their MAC address and extracts the RSSI values for a
transmitter. Unlike WSN approaches, where nodes, numbering in the tens to hundreds,
broadcast periodically (generating time series of readings), our approach can receive
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thousands to tens of thousands of measurements in the case of an active 802.11 stream.
When operating in a disaster area the UAS can filter the devices by MAC address and
investigate each location to see if someone needs help.
As the UAS flies, it continually updates its estimate of the transmitter’s location, based
on newly arriving broadcasts. The UAS could use this data for real-time flight-planning,
converging on the geographic location of the transmitter, and facilitating immediate
response by emergency personnel. Methods relying on post hoc analysis are less suited
for emergency scenario applications because they cannot react as quickly.
As we explore in Section 7.1.3, common methods of multilateral localization grow in
computation time and storage space with the size of the data. Because of our time and
storage constraints, these solutions are far from ideal. To solve this problem, we present
VBA, a novel algorithm for generating a real-time heat-map matrix for approximate
multilateral localization. This method updates a representation of a physical space in the
form of a matrix of location probabilities. At any point, the UAS can query the matrix for
the most probable location(s) of the transmitter. We explain the process of localization
and our contribution in further detail in this section.
As stated above, 802.11 broadcasts are sorted by MAC source address, and only
broadcasts from a single source are used for that device’s location calculation. For the
remainder of this chapter, we focus on the task of locating a single transmitter. For
multiple sources the same approach can be re-run for each MAC address.
7.1.1 Computing Distance from RSSI
As the UAS travels, it captures 802.11 broadcast packets and extracts the RSSI, as
reported by the wireless adapter. From the RSSI, we can compute the approximate relative
distance between the transmitter and the UAS, using an appropriate path loss model
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[249]. For the purpose of our experiments, which are primarily in an open space with
little obstruction or interference, we use an extension of the Friis transmission equation
[250, 249] (as shown in equation (7.1) where d is the distance to the transmitter, d0 is a
reference distance, α is the signal decay constant and f corresponds to the frequency on
which the UAS is listening - in this case, that of a target 802.11 channel).
PathLoss = 10α log10(
d
d0
) + 20 log10(f) + 20 log10(
4pi
c
) (7.1)
Assuming free space transmission (setting α to 2), equation (7.1) can be simplified as
(7.2), where A is some calibration constant for a wireless adapter, that we can compute
through experimentation.
d = 10
RSSI−20 log10(f)−A
20 (7.2)
7.1.2 Localizing the Transmitter
As we aim to locate an object using a single UAS, we will assume a slow moving
transmitter relative to the agile UAS. This would be consistent with natural disaster
scenarios, such as flooding or mudslides where survivors may be confined to high-ground
with limited mobility.
As the UAS moves in three-dimensional space, it uses GPS to note its own coordinates.
For each received 802.11 packet, it collects the time, latitude, longitude, altitude, MAC
address of the transmitter, and the calculated distance to the transmitter using (7.2). As
GPS coordinates are spherical, we can convert them into a Cartesian earth centered earth
fixed (ECEF) representation to effectively work with them.
Given a set of four measurements, we, in an ideal setting, employ quadrilateral
localization to locate an object in three-dimensional space using a system of equations of
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the form (xm − x)2 + (ym − y)2 + (zm − z)2 = d2m, where (xm, ym, zm, dm) corresponds to
the mth measurement by the UAS, and (x, y, z) to the position of the transmitter. Note
that using only three measurements would give two possible solutions, hence two possible
locations. A fourth measurement refines this to one location.
In practice, wireless transmissions are not ideal. The RSSI measurement of any
given packet can be prone to error, due, for example, to interference, multi-path, or
angle of antenna [122, 251, 252]. To refine the location, the UAS can continue to collect
measurements. Each measurement can then be used to recompute the predicted location
of the transmitter through multilateral localization. This gives a system of equations (7.3)
that grows as more measurements are collected.

(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 + (z1 − z)2 = d21
(x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 + (z2 − z)2 = d22
...
(xm − x)2 + (ym − y)2 + (zm − z)2 = d2m
(7.3)
We can convert this into linear matrix form by subtracting each mth equation from
the m-1th equation, as is done in the two dimensional case in [253]. This gives m-1 system
of linear equations of form (7.4), which can be rewritten as Ax = b as shown in (7.5).
7.1.3 Multilateral Localization
A is a matrix m x 3 where m can number in the millions of measurements, each with
a certain error. So the system of equations (7.5) is overdetermined and, moreover, likely
inconsistent. Therefore, the goal of our localization is, given m measurements, to find
the optimal location x that best fits the available data. Common ways of performing this
optimization are either to approximate using linear least squares (LLS) [254], weighted
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Table 7.1: System of equations for 3D multilateral localization

2x(x2 − x1) + 2y(y2 − y1) + 2z(z2 − z1) + x21 − x22 + y21 − y22 + z21 − z22 = d21 − d22
2x(x3 − x2) + 2y(y3 − y2) + 2z(z3 − z2) + x22 − x23 + y22 − y23 + z22 − z23 = d22 − d23
.
.
.
2x(xm − xm−1) + 2y(ym − ym−1) + 2z(zm − zm−1) + x2m−1 − x2m + y2m−1 − y2m + z2m−1 − z2m = d2m−1 − d2m
(7.4)

2(x2 − x1) 2(y2 − y1) 2(z2 − z1)
2(x3 − x2) 2(y3 − y2) 2(z3 − z2)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2(xm − xm−1) 2(ym − ym−1) 2(zm − zm−1)

xy
z
 =

d21 − d22 − x21 + x22 − y21 + y22 − z21 + z22
d22 − d23 − x22 + x23 − y22 + y23 − z22 + z23
.
.
.
d2m−1 − d2m − x2m−1 + x2m − y2m−1 + y2m − z2m−1 + z2m

(7.5)
least squares (WLS) [255, 256], or use MLE to approximate the coordinates [205, 257].
As the UAS continues to collect measurements, an ideal system would use each new
measurement to refine the localization without recomputing for the entire dataset. This
would enable real-time applications, such as dynamically adjusting a flight-plan based
on most accurate data. While these established approaches work well for a given data
set, they are not well-suited for continuously reanalyzing data at each collection step.
Suppose, each time we collected data, we re-ran our algorithm. For m measurement both
LLS and MLE take O(m) time for a single optimization run. Re-running LLS or MLE
each time a new packet is collected would yield O(m2) time.
In a disaster scenario, there may not be a reliable backbone link to utilize off-UAS
computational resources, forcing us to use on-board computing power limited by weight
and energy. Further, the time sensitive nature of this task encourages utilizing real-time
analysis. Algorithms where the computational load increases, based on the size of the
current data, are not well suited for this task.
7.1.4 Voxel-based approximation (VBA)
To meet resource constraints, we developed Voxel-based approximation (VBA) - an
algorithm for approximating transmitter location. We divide the geographic area of the
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(a) The circle formed by the intersec-
tion of spheres has the highest proba-
bility in this scenario.
(b) Example probability heat-map for
VBA search.
Figure 7.1: Example probability heat-map for VBA search. Darker reds represent
higher probability.
search operation into cubes represented by voxels. Voxels are like pixels and contain values
at three dimensional coordinates that are recorded by their position in a 3-dimensional
array. Each voxel represents a cube of physical space and stores the likelihood that the
transmitter is in that cube. How much physical space a voxel represents can scale based on
the size of the total physical 3D volume of the UAS operation, and the available computing
and memory of the device running the localization. For example, given a 500x500x500
meters3 search area, we can set a maximum 3D matrix size of 100x100x100 which
stores 1003 voxels, each corresponding to a 5m3 cube of physical space.
For each measurement, the predicted location of the transmitter can be described
as positioned somewhere on the surface of a sphere, centered at the UAS with a radius
equal to the computed relative distance. When two spheres intersect, as shown in Figure
7.1a, a point in the area of intersection of their surfaces is the most likely location of
the transmitter. Multiple measurements can further refine the probability matrix for the
position of the transmitter, as seen in Figure 7.1b, which is produced from experimental
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data from one of our experiment trials. In the figure, the darker areas represent regions
of higher probability for the transmitter location.
Each time a measurement is received, we identify the voxels of the surface of a sphere
S of radius d, and increase the value of those voxels by a scalar β. Because transmitters
may be moving, old information in the matrix needs to expire. For this we introduce a
decay constant λ in range (0, 1], which gradually eliminates stale values in the matrix.
For cases where there is little mobility, we can set this to 1. Each update takes the form
(7.6). This can be done in O(g) time, where g is the number of cells in M .
M = λM + βS(x, y, z, d) (7.6)
In a disaster, transmitters are most likely positioned on the ground, inside buildings,
or on roof tops. We might, therefore, choose to assign greater weights to these guesses,
by specifying a topography T for a physical region, as opposed to, for instance, guesses
suggesting that a transmitter is floating in the air. We can represent this by taking the
Hadamard product of S and T :
M = λM + βS(x, y, z, d) ◦ T (7.7)
If we are entirely disinterested in points deviating from our topography (floating
transmitters, transmitters under the ground, etc.), we can assign the corresponding
weights in T to zero. This could be used to speed up computation.
At any point, the system utilizing this localization algorithm can generate a heat-map
of the probability that a transmitter is at a voxel by normalizing the matrix. Again, this
can be done in O(g).
A notable property of this algorithm is that each update cost is determined by the
size of the matrix and not the input data, and that the storage size is constant. Each new
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measurement updates the matrix without re-computing using past measurements. For m
measurements, our approach takes O(m · g) time and O(g) space, where g is specified
at initialization. In contrast, traditional approaches, such as LLS, WLS, and MLE take
O(m2) time and O(m) space. Further, unlike traditional approaches, computational
and memory requirements are scalable at the cost of precision. We can select a matrix
size g meeting our hardware constraints. As computational capabilities of UASs grow,
the algorithm can scale to take advantage of these resources.
7.2 Methods
To understand both the efficacy of our approach and real-world constraints of localiza-
tion from an aerial system, we conducted extensive empirical measurements to evaluate
our system in a semi-controlled environment. The goal was to understand the impact
algorithmic design choices (such as the size of the approximation matrix, and the use
of pre-defined topography) have on accuracy over time, and compare our approach to
two other commonly used approaches: Linear least squares (LLS) Maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE).
7.2.1 Equipment
In our experiments, our UAS was a DJI Matrice 100 [258] that communicates with a
remote control at 5.725 - 5.825 GHz (outside our monitoring frequency of 2.4GHz). The
UAS was equipped with a pair of Alfa network adapters running the Atheros AR9271
chipset located at opposite sides of the UAS, as shown in Figure 7.2. Both adapters ran
in monitor mode, listening to channel 6. In a real use case, we could utilize more adapters,
each with a dedicated channel or implement a round robin scanning technique to scan all
802.11 channels. We used Raspberry Pi (RPi) 2 Model B for on-board computation.
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Figure 7.2: UAS used in VBA localization evaluation.
We ran Tshark [234] to log, for each received packet, time of reception, RSSI, MAC
address, and channel. Using a UART connection, we interfaced with the quad-copter to
access its on-board telemetry, including GPS. Data was collected at 50HZ and synchronized
with the Tshark data.
The transmitter (the device the UAS was trying to locate) was a Lenovo X230 Laptop
with an Intel Centrino Advanced-N 6205 wireless card. We determined the ground truth
of the transmitter location via averaging GPS points from a GlobalSat BU-353-S4 GPS
attached via USB. This location was later used in our analysis to compute error rate.
The Lenovo laptop was connected to a Raspberry Pi (RPi) 3, acting as an 802.11n Access
Point broadcasting on channel 6. In our initial test cases, the Lenovo transmitted a
constant stream of UDP packets using iperf to the RPi. We vary and reduce the rate of
this transmission based on experimental scenarios as specified in section 7.2.2.
We used a laptop instead of a mobile device to facilitate our experiment. A laptop
is easier to control without additional programming, and is more predictable in terms
of energy optimization and program execution. We also use a constant stream of UDP
packets, which would be unlikely in a real disaster scenario. Instead we would expect
more infrequent probe requests. We look at the effect using fewer packets has on accuracy
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in our analysis. The primary goal of this experimentation is to evaluate our approach in a
more controlled setting, we leave closer simulation to disaster conditions as future work.
7.2.2 Experimentation Scenarios
We explored four test scenarios. For each scenario the receiver (the UAS) listened to
the packets sent between the transmitter (Lenovo) and the access point (RPi 3). Each
scenario was conducted in three different locations. Each location was a grassy area
with minimal change in elevation, minimal obstructions from trees and bushes, and
minimal interference from other 802.11 devices (there was a nearby 802.11 wireless mesh
in the vicinity). At each location we performed two trials per scenario and configuration
(elevation, presence of obstruction), yielding a total of 48 trials.
We varied the starting point of the UAS in each trial; we only relocated the transmitter
when relocating to a new location. We manually piloted the UAS in all trials, which,
when coupled with wind, resulted in some variation in velocity. As a result, the total
time each trial took to complete varied as well. Overall, each trial took between 5 to 10
minutes, depending on the specific scenario.
Scenario 1 - Vertical Fly-over : In this scenario, we fly over the transmitter in a
straight line, at altitudes (above ground level) of 20, 30, 40, and 50 ft, as shown in Figure
7.3. We maintain a 10MBps UDP stream between the transmitter and access point with
a 1k buffer size using iperf. This trial examines both the accuracy of VBA, as well as the
effect of the UASs altitude on localization accuracy.
Scenario 2 - Lane Search : In this scenario, the UAS flies in a lane search-pattern at
a constant altitude of 25 ft above ground level. An example GPS trace from one of the
test runs is shown in Figure 7.4. The left of the figure shows the trace projected onto the
horizontal plane, while the right the full 3D space. We again maintain a 10MBps UDP
123
Real-Time Multilateral RSSI Localization from UASs for Disaster Response Chapter 7
Figure 7.3: Flyover UAS path of VBA experimental GPS traces.
YZ plane (left) and 3D (right).
stream. This evaluates localization in a pre-defined search pattern, where the UAS does
not change behavior based on estimated location.
Figure 7.4: Lane search UAS path of VBA experimental GPS traces.
XY plane (left) and 3D (right).
Scenario 3 - Inward Spiral : In Scenario 3, we perform an inward spiral search
pattern. An example GPS trace from one of the runs is shown in Figure 7.5. For this
scenario we fly the UAS at an altitude of 25ft above ground level starting at the outer
edge and slowly spiraling in to the transmitter. As the UAS nears the transmitter, it
drops in elevation until it is hovering a meter above it, at which point the trial ends.
This trial mimics the situation in which the UAS was able to use some combination of
localization methods to hone in on an object and examines the change in accuracy as the
UAS flies in the circular pattern around the object. In this scenario, we again manually
pilot the UAS and maintain a 10MBps UDP stream.
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Figure 7.5: Inward spiral UAS path of VBA experimental GPS traces.
XY plane (left) and 3D (right).
Scenario 4 - Mock Disaster : Scenarios 1 through 3 enable us to evaluate the basic
operation of VBA without confounding factors, such as signal obstructions. However, in
order to more closely model a disaster scenario, we add some realism. In this scenario,
the transmitter sends only 1 packet per second to the access point (in a real situation,
this would be analogous to a periodic probe request sent by a mobile device), resulting in
fewer total RSSI measurements with longer inter-packet durations. We again perform an
inward spiral search pattern, as in scenario 3.
We perform two variations of this scenario. In Scenario 4A, the transmitter is placed
in an unobstructed location on the ground. In Scenario 4B, we close the laptop, place
a book on it, and a box over it, adding objects around it to obstruct its transmissions.
This mimics the more realistic situation where the device might not have line of sight
connectivity to the UAS (i.e., if it was placed in a bag or pocket, or buried under light
debris).
7.2.3 Algorithm Implementations
We implement all our algorithms in Python 3.6 due to its versatility and ease of
cross platform compatibility. We endeavored to provide an equal comparison between the
algorithms. While it might be possible to further optimize the performance of LLS, we
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base our work on generalized representations from literature.
For our evaluation, we record all data from the UAS and then run it through each
algorithms off-line. This allows us to compare multiple approaches using the same data.
In a real deployment, the UAS would run the algorithm in real-time without necessitating
postponed analysis.
Voxel-based approximation (VBA) Implementation
While the majority of VBA (7.7) is written in Python, the most computationally
expensive portions of our algorithm (the embedding of spheres into the voxel matrix and
associated memory operations) are written as a C++ extension module to Python. This
puts it on equal footing with LLS and MLE, for which we use pre-written optimized
modules.
As in all of our experiments the transmitter is not moving. We set the decay constant
λ = 1. We will evaluate the effect of motion on our localization algorithm in future work.
In all scenarios, we defined the physical area of operations (for the VBA algorithm) as the
150m horizontal radius around the transmitter with a possible elevation range of -50m to
100m above and below the transmitter. From experimental data we found that this range
covered the maximum flight area of the UAS (100x100x15 meters) for all experiments
with room for predictions.
To test the scalability of our algorithm in terms of error and computation time, we
evaluate multiple matrix sizes as summarized in Table 7.2. Each matrix size corresponds
to the same physical 300x300x150 meter space around the transmitter, but changes the
ratio of the physical volume that each voxel in the matrix represents.
For each scenario and matrix size, we run an analysis without specifying topography
(allowing any point, even those hovering in the air as valid guesses), and we re-run the
analysis specifying a horizontally-flat topography T at the elevation of the transmitter.
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Table 7.2: Evaluated VBA matrix sizes.
Size
Name x · y · z Ratio
G10 10 · 10 · 5 1 voxel : 30m3
G50 50 · 50 · 25 1 voxel : 6m3
G300 300 · 300 · 150 1 voxel : 1m3
This limits guesses to be within ±1 voxel elevation to the transmitter, but does not
restrict the horizontal search space.
Linear least squares (LLS) Implementation
We compare our algorithm to the unweighted Linear Least Squares of equation
(7.5), as implemented in the Python SciPy module version 1.0 [259], which uses the
optimized gelsd LAPACK driver. During experimentation, we also compared to the
slightly computationally faster QR decomposition of the same linear system using the
Numpy QR decomposition and the SciPy triangulation solver. QR produces nearly
identical results to LLS, so we omit it from error rate comparison graphs, though the
results are computed at a lower computation cost. We explore this further in Section
7.3.6.
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) Implementation
The approach of Maximum Likelihood Estimation for localization sets up a likelihood
function based on a model using the measured data and tries to find the parameters that
maximize that likelihood function. We assume that our variables are independent and
follow a Gaussian normal distribution. Hence, we must find the x, y, z that maximizes
the likelihood function (7.8) given m measurements, with each measurement comprised
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of coordinates of the UAS (xi, yi, zi) and a computed distance di from (7.2).
L(x, y, z) =
m∏
i=1
(
1√
2piσ2
)e
−
(
di−
√
(xi−x)2+(yi−y)2+(zi−z)2
)2
2σ2 (7.8)
LL(x, y, z) =
m∑
i=1
(
di −
√
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + (zi − z)2
)2
(7.9)
We determine the parameters x, y, z that minimize equation (7.9) by running the SciPy
minimize method, which uses the L-BFGS-B algorithm [260] for bounded minimization
(with bounds matching the 300x300x150m geographic area as configured for VBA).
7.3 Evaluation
As described in Section 7.2.2, we run 48 flight experiments in four different scenarios,
localizing the transmitter using VBA, LLS, and MLE. Due to time constraints and the
computational cost of LLS and MLE (whose run-time time grows with the size of the data),
we re-sampled the data at 100ms by taking the mean of the time window. This allows a
direct comparison of VBA to these other algorithms. We evaluate the performance of
VBA compared to other algorithms in terms of error rate and computation time under
multiple scenarios and configurations of parameters with the goal of understanding the
efficacy of VBA and the constraints of WiFi based localization.
7.3.1 RSSI to Distance Conversion
As outlined in Section 7.1.1, the first step of localization is to convert RSSI measure-
ments to distances using equation (7.2). To do so we used a calibration constant A = 30,
which we computed by minimizing the mean error from initial calibration experiments
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(a) Histogram of errors across all scenarios. (b) Boxplots grouped by scenario.
Figure 7.6: Distribution of distance errors from VBA experiments.
when prototyping the VBA algorithm.
We compared the error (in meters) using the difference between the known GPS
coordinates of the UAS and transmitter as ground truth. The distribution of errors across
all scenarios and trials is summarized in Figure 7.6a. Our wireless adapters only return
RSSI in integer quantities, which leads to gaps in computed distances. This, in turn, may
contribute to the blocky distribution.
Figure 7.6b further delineates the distributions by test scenario. As expected, the
conversion process produces a Gaussian-like distribution of errors. The mean of the errors
shift based on the scenario setup.
7.3.2 Scenario 1: Effect of Altitude
For Scenario 1, we average trials across all three locations, differentiating by altitude.
Because the trials take different lengths of time to complete due to variation in speed
and starting location, we align the trials based on the horizontal displacement from the
transmitter. As the UAS passes the transmitter we assign negative displacement values.
We compute error as the difference between two points in 3D space: the actual location
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(a) Error rate of VBA G50. (b) Effective range by altitude.
Figure 7.7: Scenario 1: Altitude Variation
of transmitter (as determined by GPS) and the predicted value of transmitter. As VBA
can return multiple predictions of equally likely candidates, we take the root mean square
of the distances of predictions to the ground truth. We group our data by altitude for
each algorithm and configuration.
We present one algorithm as an example (VBA with a matrix size G50 as defined in
Table 7.2) in Figure 7.7a. As is the case with VBA G50, when examining other algorithms,
the effect of altitude on error rate is not quite clear. This is could be for a number of
reasons. One factor could be the 1-dimensional flight pattern. By flying in a straight line,
there is insufficient orthogonality in the data to effectively predict a point in the full three
dimensional space.
Increases in altitude result in changes in overall distance from the transmitter. As the
UAS increases in altitude above the transmitter, the maximum horizontal displacement
from the transmitter at which it is still able to capture packets shrinks. This can be seen
in the sharp jumps and missing data in the figure at greater horizontal distances.
In Figure 7.7b, we examine the distribution of distances at which we receive packets
in Scenario 1. While at 25 foot altitude, packets as far as 54 meters away horizontally
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(a) Scenario 2 (Lane Search). (b) Scenario 3 (Inward Spiral).
Figure 7.8: Localization error rate scenarios 2 and 3.
are received; as the altitude increases, the horizontal range where packets are received
shrinks.
Because a UAS has to fly high enough to avoid hitting obstacles, we want to pick the
highest possible altitude that still has good reception. For our other scenarios, we chose
an altitude of 25ft, which should safely clear trees and shrubs in the surrounding area.
However in an urban environment this altitude would not be enough to clear all obstacles,
such as buildings. This may mean that a UAS operating with this system would likely
need to be programmed with an obstacle avoidance algorithm, such as [261].
We initially experimented with altitudes > 50 feet, but the low number of received
packets per trial (zero to a dozen) forced us to limit our UAS height to 50ft. For
localization at higher altitudes, it may be necessary to switch to a different type of signal
with longer propagation characteristics, such as cellular.
7.3.3 Scenario 2: Lane Search
For scenario 2, we again average across all trials and locations. The horizontal
displacement is more variable for this scenario. The UAS periodically moves closer and
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then farther away from the transmitter. Hence instead of displacement, we align our trials
based on the completion percentage of the individual trials as defined by the reception of
first and last packet. We show the error by algorithm in Figure 7.8a. Note this figure
uses a logarithmic scale for the Y-axis.
As the scenario progresses, accuracy slowly improves for all algorithms. All forms
of VBA outperform LLS, and perform as well as or better than MLE. The smallest size
matrix, G10, has a higher average rate of error than larger matrix sizes. Despite having
higher granularity, G300 does not have lower error. This may be because a larger matrix
size is more sensitive to error and spheres that would intersect on a coarser voxel mapping
can miss each other when using finer granularity. This sets G50 as the most suitable size
for this scenario.
Specifying a topography does not negatively effect error. For most of the scenarios,
VBA G50 (Flat T) and VBA G300 (Flat T) do just as well or better than their unbounded
counterparts.
7.3.4 Scenario 3: Inward Spiral
In scenario 3, as shown in Figure 7.8b, the results follow a pattern similar to the lane
search. This scenario is analogous to a situation where the UAS uses some mixture of
localization techniques to identify the general area of the transmitter and then dynamically
updates its course to circle in on the object.
The middle matrix size of G50 again yields the best VBA performance. VBA does
best overall, with a lower error compared to the lane search. LLS has higher error and
more inconsistency. MLE has lower error across the trial duration compared to the other
algorithms, but as we explore in Section 7.3.6, this comes at much higher computational
cost. If computational power is limited, VBA is the better choice in this scenario.
132
Real-Time Multilateral RSSI Localization from UASs for Disaster Response Chapter 7
7.3.5 Scenario 4: Mock Disaster
(a) Scenario 4A (Unobstructed). (b) Scenario 4B (Obstructed).
Figure 7.9: Scenario 4 error rates, aligned by percent of experiment completed.
Scenario 4 has fewer data points to use in the localization algorithm due to the lower
packet transmission rate of the transmitter. This is analogous to a more realistic scenario
where, instead of a continuous stream of packets, a device periodically sends an 802.11
probe request, as the 802.11 standard dictates when the interface is on but the device is
not connected to an access point. The lower data packet rate produces sparser data, and
as a result the error graphs are more variable.
In the unobstructed case (scenario 4A), as shown in Figure 7.9a, VBA performs
similar to the inward spiral search. Despite receiving fewer measurements, VBA has a
similar error pattern to scenario 3, decreasing as more measurements are collected (albeit
slower than in the case of the higher transmission rate). MLE, however, performed worse
compared to the previous scenario.
The algorithms perform similarly in the obstructed case (scenario 4B), as shown in
Figure 7.9b. There are higher variations in error, as even fewer packets were received
than in scenario 4A. As a result, there is overall a slightly higher error rate. However,
the results are very promising, as despite receiving fewer packets and the presence of
obstructions, the error rate remains comparable to scenario 3. Notably, unlike scenario 3
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where MLE attained the lowest error rate, multiple configurations of VBA matched the
performance of MLE in scenario 4A, and others outperformed MLE in scenario 4B.
The unobstructed case, performed similarly with fewer variations in error and overall
slightly lower error rate. The results are very promising, as despite receiving fewer packets
and the presence of obstructions, the error rate remains comparable to scenario 3. Notably,
unlike scenario 3 where MLE attained the lowest error rate, multiple configurations of
VBA matched the performance of MLE in scenario 4A, and others outperformed MLE in
scenario 4B.
While the algorithms operated with lower measurement count without a significant
increase in error in scenarios 4A and 4B, the horizontal displacement from the transmitter
at which packets were received varied , as shown in Figure 7.10. The lower packet sending
rate and physical obstruction combine to narrow the effective transmission range. This
issue is irrespective of the algorithm used for localization, but a limitation of packet
transmission and reception using WiFi. In future work, we plan to look at alternatives,
such as cellular.
Figure 7.10: Horizontal reception range by scenario.
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Figure 7.11: Total algorithm run time per measurement.
7.3.6 Computation Time
We evaluate the computation time of VBA and compare it to LLS, QR decomposition,
and MLE. For each algorithm, each prediction is divided into two steps: an UPDATE
step, which adds new measurements to the model; and an APPROXIMATION step,
which uses the model to generate a best prediction of transmitter location. We record the
duration of each step and the sum is the total computation time to calculate a prediction
for the transmitter’s location. We average across all scenarios and trials based on the
number of measurements collected.
The total compute time (in microseconds) for each new prediction is shown in Figure
7.11. As expected, while the VBA algorithm maintains a relatively constant cost, LLS
compute time increases as more measurements are added. QR decomposition is an
alternative to LLS, producing identical results (in most cases) but with slightly lower
computation time for any given count. However, it too follows the same trend of increasing
computation time as the size of data grows. MLE has a much higher computational cost.
Further, prediction time also increases as more measurements are collected.
When we examine the performance of VBA by matrix size, the results are as expected.
Smaller matrix size leads to faster computation. VBA G10 is faster than VBA G50, which
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(a) Update time per measurement. (b) Total number of predictions by algorithm.
Figure 7.12: Closer look at algorithm performance.
is, in turn, faster than VBA G300. As shown in the previous section, the average error
rate of the larger matrix G300 is no better than G50, but comes at a high computation
premium, which makes it unsuitable for this situation.
When specifying a topography, we see a substantial performance improvement, in
terms of computation time. When we specify a flat topography, we can eliminate most of
the 3D matrix from the search (the voxels correspond to empty space). As we see in the
figure, this means we can have comparable error with substantially faster run time. Our
future work includes examination of the trade-offs of using more complex topographies.
For the first 500 measurements, VBA has a spike in computation time. If we break down
the components of computation time we can identify the source of the spike. When we
examine the UPDATE step of our algorithms, as we show in Figure 7.12a, we see a
relatively constant computation time. Note, unlike past figures, this figure is not using a
logarithmic scale. In the case of VBA, the UPDATE is the process of computing a new
sphere and embedding it into the matrix. In the case of LLS, it is adding a row to the
system of equations (7.5). For MLE it is expanding a list of known measurements.
We see that a large part of the work for VBA is done in the update portion of the
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algorithm as VBA computes a sphere and updates the corresponding grid values, which
is computationally expensive. On the other hand, LLS, QR, and MLE have minimal
work to perform the update. The somewhat downward trend of VBA is likely due to
sphere size, which is determined by distance. Smaller distances generate smaller spheres,
which are faster to compute. Because scenarios 3 and 4 end with the UAS in proximity
of the transmitter and have a longer run time (and as a result more measurements),
they likely account for the dip. In the figure we see that no large initial spike exists in
the update portion of VBA, leading us to conclude that the initial spike is part of the
APPROXIMATION step.
To account for the initial spike we looked at the difference in the output of VBA
and the other algorithms. While the other algorithms produce a single prediction, VBA
generates a probability matrix for the entire physical space. When we query VBA in
the APPROXIMATION step, we are asking for a list of coordinates with the highest
possible probability and there could be more than one candidate. The number of guesses
by algorithm is shown in Figure 7.12b. While LLS and QR stay constant at 1, VBA starts
with thousands of possible guesses, that are then refined to a handful of possibilities. This
most likely accounts for the initial spike in total prediction time, which could potentially
be optimized in future work.
We also ran VBA G50 with no re-sampling on the RPi, with an UPDATE and
APPROXIMATION computed for each measurement received. We found on average
that VBA G50 took 25 seconds with a maximum time of 250 seconds. Overall, in our
experimentation, each trial took between 5 to 10 minutes, depending on the specific
scenario. On average running VBA takes 20% of the total experiment time and meets the
constraints of a real-time system, even when running on low performance hardware.
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7.4 Conclusion
The rise in availability and sophistication of UASs has led to exciting new possibilities
for disaster response. While many existing commercial applications focus on vision-based
solutions, wireless sensing shows promise as a useful tool for locating affected individuals.
To this end, we proposed a Voxel-based approximation (VBA) algorithm for real-time
multilateral localization. Unlike other commonly used algorithms, VBA computation
time does not increase as measurements are added to the location model. Through
extensive testbed evaluation, we demonstrated that localization errors are low in all cases
when compared to unweighted Linear Least Squares and were comparable to Maximum
Likelihood Estimation. Further, VBA outperformed LLS (including the QR decomposition
variant) and MLE in computation time. While LLS, QR, and MLE have increasing costs
per measurement, VBA maintains a bounded computation time proportional to the size
of the matrix. Similarly, while the data storage requirements for LLS and MLE grow with
the data, VBA requires a fixed amount of memory based on matrix size and independent
of the size of data, which can be preallocated at initialization. These characteristics
make VBA well-suited for use on resource-constrained devices such as UASs, and in
time-constrained scenarios such as search and rescue.
We found that specifying a topography did not have a significant impact on error rate
but nonetheless saved computation time. In future work, we would like to examine the
impact more complex topographies (for example topographies including buildings) have
on performance and error. Even with infrequent transmission rates and obstruction, VBA
maintained error rates less than 35 meters, and in the most difficult case, Scenario 4B,
outperformed our implementation of MLE.
While LLS and MLE provide a single location point, VBA maintains a probability
matrix for the entire physical space and produces multiple predictions. This feature is
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likely to be useful for path planning of UASs. A UAS could get a relative search area from
the first received packet. As the UAS closes in on the search area and more packets are
received, the number of probable locations to search narrows. The UAS can investigate
multiple points in order of probability.
While VBA preformed well under the imposed constraints, the use of 802.11 2.4GHz and
RSSI are challenging for disaster response applications. Even in open space experiments,
with minimal reflection and radio interference, RSSI distance conversion (equation (7.2))
has a wide distribution of error (across our experiments a standard deviation of 10 meters).
Additionally, commercial wireless adapters provide only integer level RSSI values, which
leads to jumps in possible range estimates.
The use of 802.11 is further complicated by the effective range of consumer 2.4 GHz
WiFi devices. Even at low altitudes of 20ft, the effective horizontal range of 802.11 (from
our experiments) is approximately 50 meters, with most measurements received within
only 30 meters of the transmitter. Altitudes above 50 feet receive few to no packets. Given
a typical building is about 13 feet per floor [262], at 50ft a UAS could not clear four story
buildings. Thus the current version of VBA is well-suited to suburban residential areas,
but would need further development for metropolitan areas with taller buildings. This
suggests a need for obstacle avoidance, and also limits the field of view for applications
that also rely on a white light or thermal camera. Further, a 50 meter effective horizontal
range shows that our 10-30 meter error from our experiments does not substantially shrink
the search space.
As VBA is not tied to the underlying range estimation algorithm, VBA could be
adapted to other technologies such as 802.15.4 and LTE. While the ranging computation
would need to be modified, the constant time performance of VBA would enable real-time
localization on resource constrained hardware such as UASs. Applications could include
search and rescue, as well as network mapping, for example of IoT WSNs.
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So far in this part of the dissertation, we have explored scenarios for evaluating and
improving the physical infrastructure of wireless networks. Unfortunately, as we will
discuss in part II of this dissertation, infrastructure is only one possible hindrance to
communication. In the remaining portion of the dissertation we will cover how social and
political factors may prohibit or limit communication on computer networks, and new
ways of protecting the ability to freely communicate online.
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Chapter 8
Free Speech Online
As discussed in chapter 1, the Internet is a critical tool for communication across the globe.
As of 2019, 4.1 billion people, roughly 54 percent of the world’s population, are connected
to the Internet [1]. A substantial part of Internet activity comprises users who learn, play,
converse, and access content for work, entertainment, and intellectual growth. OSNs,
such as Facebook and Twitter, have in particular become major hubs of communication.
In June of 2017, Facebook surpassed 2 billion active users [263]. Individuals, companies,
and bots generate a massive amount of content. Every second, users worldwide post an
average of 6,000 tweets on Twitter [264] and “like” an average of 9,200 items a second on
Facebook [263]. When asked what aspects of the Internet users value, the ability to freely
speak, share, and trust were among the top concerns for users [265].
The Internet is the dominant tool for people to access and share information. As a
result, the Internet is central to free speech and dissemination in today’s world. Recognizing
the importance of online discourse, the United Nations (UN) considers that the protection
of human rights, especially free speech, should fully extend to the Internet [266, 267].
Despite the UN’s assessment, governments, corporations, and individuals often restrict
what users can say online and punish those with dissenting views. The user stated
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values of free speech, sharing ideas, and trust are under threat [7]. Around the world,
Internet freedoms are restricted [268, 269, 270, 40, 36, 39]. Even liberal democracies,
typical advocates of free speech, increasingly restrict content [33, 271, 272, 273, 274].
While the United States acted in defense of these freedoms world wide in 2010 [275],
the current United States administration campaigned, among other things, on “closing
that Internet up in some way” [272] and has eliminated net neutrality [276]. Even as
the Internet continues to expand, digital freedoms are a resource under threat. Globally,
suppression of free speech and press freedoms is on the rise [277, 32], accompanying
a rise in authoritarianism [278, 279], which threatens the foundations of functioning
democracies.
Users often turn to technological solutions to combat such threats to civil liberties.
For example, popular anonymity tools such as Tor [64] provide network level anonymity,
while person-to-person messaging tools, such as Signal [65] and WhatsApp [66], allow
private communication using end-end encryption. Nevertheless, safe public communication
remains a challenge. Individuals conversing publicly on OSNs open themselves up to legal
and physical dangers, encouraging self censorship and stifling discourse.
Reputation and trust are likewise eroded. In an era of “fake news”, users struggle
to identify which OSN accounts and posted content can be trusted [280, 281, 67, 68].
Adversaries to open discourse deploy armies of operatives masquerading as legitimate
users to sow division [69, 70]. Even trusted news outlets using OSNs can be hacked to
spread misinformation [71, 72, 73].
Existing counter-censorship tools inadequately address censorship of OSNs. Groups
seeking to broadcast their ideas to the widest possible audience prefer OSNs as the
platform for communication due to their pervasiveness. Although these groups seeks to
maintain credibility, they may wish to retain anonymity out of fear of reprisal. However,
these two requirements, credibility and anonymity, are difficult to address simultaneously.
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8.1 Outline
Our research aims to understand core issues around freedom of speech online for
communities that are particularly vulnerable to censorship, such as journalists, political
activists, and minorities and to develop technological solutions. Over four years we visited
communities in Zambia, Turkey, and Mongolia to investigate issues of free speech on the
Internet and in particular OSNs.
As summarized in the introduction, our work focused on two major issues: 1) cat-
egorizing social challenges and 2) facilitating open discourse. Chapter 9 characterizes
social challenges to free speech. It is based on work published in ACM LIMITS ’17 [63].
We identified common actors and methods of censorship as well as some technological
needs unmet by existing tools. We found that public group discourse, while maintaining
anonymity and preserving reputation on OSNs, was one such unmet need.
In Chapter 10, we expand our characterization of social challenges and show how
close partnership with stakeholders can be used to develop tools for facilitating open
discourse online. Developed around the requirements we identified, in this chapter we
present SecurePost, a novel tool for verified group-anonymity on OSNs. This tool was
developed through research and partnerships with affected individuals as a means of
balancing personal anonymity with group credibility. We present the research undertaken
for developing SecurePost, its technical contributions and operation, and an evaluation
of our work. This chapter includes work published in USENIX Workshop on Free and
Open Communications on the Internet [74] and the Journal of Internet Services and
Applications [75].
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8.2 Key Contributions
This work has progressed both the understanding of global issues surrounding freedom
of speech and provided new systems for protecting those freedoms.
• Over the course of our project, we conducted 109 interviews and surveyed 526
individuals in Lusaka, Zambia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. Part-
nering with interdisciplinary experts in computer science, communication, and media
studies, we used this data to characterize social challenges to free speech online,
particularly as it relates to OSNs.
• We documented that preserving reputation while maintaining anonymity for group
discussion on OSNs is a need that existing technologies do not adequately address.
• We developed a novel tool called SecurePost, which allows individuals to share a
single group identity while retaining individual anonymity on OSNs. SecurePost
comprises three coordinated modules: an Android application that allows group
members to post content and manage membership; a proxy server that relays posts
to social networks; and a browser extension that allows members of the public to
verify those posts. Together the modules provide group-anonymity coupled with an
ability to verifying the integrity and authenticity of posts.
• This work evaluated the use of time-synchronized hash chains for group account
sharing and provided an evaluation of why such a scheme is unsuitable for group
verification.
• We introduced an image based cryptographic signature for use on social media that
used compression resistant encoding. This process is applicable to platforms that
limit character count.
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• Finally, this work outlined practices for working with stakeholders in order to provide
culturally appropriate technological solutions using iterative design practices.
8.3 Broader Impacts
This work has already made an impact on the broader global community.
• The application has had over 400 installs and users have formed 68 groups in
multiple countries, including the USA, Mongolia, Turkey, Zambia, as well as other
countries where censorship is a problem (59 countries in total).
• Our team conducted broader Internet and security trainings with community part-
ners where we trained over 300 individuals, including in Beirut, Lebanon; Lusaka,
Zambia; and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. For the trainings, we collaborated with vulner-
able organizations and individuals, such as LGBTQ centers, HIV prevention centers,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), journalists, political activists, minority
groups, human rights groups, and university members.
• Aside from the academic venues previously stated, we presented our work at a
number of public venues, including the Internet Freedom Festival 2016 in Valencia,
Spain; After Tahrir: Egyptian Revolutionary Experiences and Future Visions 2016
in Santa Barbara, USA; and RightsCon ’16 in San Francisco, USA.
146
Chapter 9
Limits to Internet Freedoms: Being
Heard in an Increasingly
Authoritarian World
This chapter explores the growing limits to free speech based on research conducted in
Lusaka, Zambia; Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; and Istanbul, Turkey from 2014-2016. As part
of our research we reached out to diverse sets of communities to investigate Internet
Freedoms and in particular their relation to the use of OSNs. We use this research as the
basis of discussion into the limits, actors, and concerns in this space. Over the course of
our research, we formally interviewed 110 people and had informal conversations with
dozens more individuals. While our work provides only a small window into the broad set
of limits that individuals encounter in on-line access and speech, the diverse perspectives,
cultures, and struggles serve as a platform of understanding the limits to Internet freedoms
in a global context.
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9.1 Limits to Speech and Access
During our research, we sought out a diverse set of individuals, with independent and
sometimes conflicting agendas. To understand the barriers they encounter, it is helpful
to explore the competing motivations, the adversaries, and the tools they use to silence
speech and block access. We provide an overview existing tools, areas of growth, and a
discussion about some of the ethical considerations when designing free speech technology.
9.1.1 Seeking the Voices
Before understanding the limits on digital free speech and access, we identify the
groups facing these barriers. From our research across the three countries, we interviewed a
multitude of groups that struggled to access and post content on-line. These groups include:
political activists, the press, minority groups, watchdogs and NGOs, and unaffiliated
citizens.
Political Activists: Political activists are the most common targets of censorship.
Ruling politicians silence and discredit political rivals both physically and digitally. In
Turkey and Zambia the ruling parties exercise legal suppression of dissenting opinion,
shut down websites and arrest opposition leaders. Voices speaking out against the current
government are prime targets for censorship.
The Press: Journalists shared similar accounts. In Turkey, news organizations, like
Zaman [282], are physically raided and journalists are arrested for publishing content
that defies the government. In Zambia, radio stations and newspapers are likewise raided
and, in multiple reported incidents, shut down for printing, streaming, and publishing
physical and digital content. When press organizations are shut down, some reporters
continue to work as citizen journalists, publishing news on blogs and OSNs. Many face
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arrests, lawsuits, and censorship of their content. Even single tweets on topics such as
governmental corruption, lead to arrest of journalists [283].
Minority Groups : People face censorship for reasons other than speaking out
against the government. Those investigating minority issues are especially vulnerable.
Journalists reporting on Kurdish treatment in Turkey face arrests, confiscation of their
devices, and bullying. LGBTQ activists in Mongolia struggle with language censure that
prohibits posting impolite words, including sexual terminology, even when using medically
appropriate language [284]. When soliciting information about safe sex, their material is
labeled pornographic in nature and prohibited. In Zambia, we interviewed an HIV health
center that faced issues of getting past the stigma of the disease. Minority groups often
look to technology to overcome societal barriers and engage open discussion.
Watchdogs and NGOs : Watchdogs and NGOs also conveyed difficulty in reporting
factual information. In Mongolia, groups are sued for libel when reporting on corporate
environmental damage, and free press watchdogs face opposition when reporting on
government crackdown on media. In Zambia, NGOs overseeing water projects are opposed
by people unwilling to report corruption due to pressure from corporations and local
governments. As these groups rely on accurate information to function, censorship and
external interference inhibits their success.
Unaffiliated Citizens: Unaffiliated citizens are also not exempt. In Turkey, we
interviewed a gay man who was arrested and fined over a tweet [285]. Due to laws against
insulting the government of Turkey, a single tweet is enough to warrant arrest. This
discourages people from speaking out in the first place. Even if individuals do not find
themselves in violation of the law, they can become collateral in large-scale censorship
efforts. In times of social conflict, governments, like Turkey, shut down access to websites
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for all citizens [286]. Aside from government pressure, people living in Mongolia, Zambia,
and Turkey looking for information such as LGBT issues face on-line bullying and social
stigma.
9.1.2 Assessing the Adversaries
There are groups whose goals motivate them to restrict Internet freedoms. Agents
imposing these limits are adversaries of free speech and access. They include: government,
corporations, and communities.
The Government: The most dominant adversary is usually the government. Govern-
ments all over the world litigate and enforce censorship of content [36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
Governments may do so to proscribe social norms, to stifle minority opinions, to ensure
“safety”, or out of political self-interest - suppressing news that would make the government
look bad. Of the three countries in which we conducted research, the government of Turkey
most directly imposed limits on free speech. Many times in the past several years, the
Turkish government used technology to censor voices and cut off access to OSNs including
Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube [286]. Turkey also aggressively enforced laws
by policing content posted on-line, tapping phone conversations, and arresting political
dissidents. In Mongolia, our interviews identified governmental focus on filtering speech,
and banning and blocking sites based on content. In Zambia, our interviews suggested a
government that acted through arrests and lawsuits to silence opposition.
Corporations: Corporations are another critical adversary to on-line speech and access.
They bring lawsuits against journalists and individuals under libel laws, using these suits
as a deterrent from reporting on issues of corruption and environmental damage. In
particular, OSNs play a large role in imposing limits on speech. By tracking users and
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gathering personal information, large OSNs like Facebook and Twitter provide tools
for others to reveal identities of users. Reporting tools that can be used to flag posts
as improper can also be used by other adversaries to silence speech. Additionally, by
isolating users in content bubbles of like-minded users and suggested posts, users are
shielded from dissenting ideas and opinions. Even if speech makes it onto OSNs, the echo
chamber effect [287] can prevent it from ever being viewed or heard.
Communities: The last and often most influential adversary limiting free speech is a
person’s community. Individuals that post views on controversial issues can be targeted
by cyber-bullies. Journalists reporting on sensitive topics, such as on Kurdish issues in
Turkey, face constant barrage of hateful posts. In Zambia, it is difficult to voice an opinion
in an on-line forum. A user’s ethnicity, gender, and past posting record stereotypes the
user. Resulting responses from the on-line community frequently target the physical
characteristics or past political affiliation, over the content of discussion. Even in the
confines of one’s household, people encounter limits to their on-line freedoms. During a
security training for a gender-based violence center in Mongolia, we heard accounts of
how husbands and partners break into email and OSNs accounts of their wives. The goal
is to monitor communication and content access, and the result can be domestic violence.
Even when adversaries do not specifically target an individual they can force self-
censorship. The same adversary that limits on-line communication can restrict physical
media and create a conversational stigma. With an adversary in every corner, Internet
freedoms are severely limited. When people are afraid to ask questions, or do an Internet
search for fear of reprisal, they are cut off from resources that could improve their physical
and mental well-being.
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Figure 9.1: Political Cartoon by Kiss Brian Abraham commenting on the use of
technology for freedom of expression in Zambia.
9.1.3 Techniques to Limit Freedoms
Adversaries place limits on Internet freedoms through legal action, technology, threat
and violence, and control of infrastructure. These techniques allow adversaries to censor
content, track users, and log communications.
Legal Action: Governments pass laws criminalizing discussion of certain topics. Even
if no further action is taken, those laws serve as a deterrent for voicing opposing view
points. Some laws, such as those banning insult of government officials in Turkey, are
far reaching and suffice as cause for prosecuting individuals perceived as political threats.
For anything ranging from public criticism to satirical tweets, celebrities, newspapers,
activists, and unaffiliated citizens face criminal charges [288, 289].
Sometimes these lawsuits border on the absurd, such as when Dr. Bilgin Ciftci, a
Turkish physician, went to court over a meme he created, comparing Erdogan, president
of Turkey, to Gollum, a fictional character from Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings [290]. The
doctor lost his job and is facing 2 years in prison. The outcome of his court case hinges on
testimony from a panel of experts expounding on the moral character of Gollum in order
to determine whether the meme was insulting the public official. Such wide enforcement
makes even mundane opposition to the government dangerous for an individual.
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In countries with strong libel laws, like Mongolia, politicians and corporations sue
against unflattering reporting by alleging wrongful defamation of character. Using
expensive legal teams, these libel plaintiffs are able to silence opposing viewpoints,
intimidating those who may not have the monetary resources from fighting a legal
challenge. Threats of libel suits also act as a deterrent.
Unlike voiced speech, which needs to be recorded to be saved, on-line content is
tracked and archived. Even passing thoughts, formulated into late night tweets, that are
later deleted, become a matter of record and can be called into evidence at a later date.
When every word written can be used against them at a later date, individuals self-censor
themselves when posting on-line.
Technology: In addition to retroactive enforcement of laws, adversaries use technologies
for proactive censorship of content. Governments, such as Turkey, can enact broad
DNS and IP bans that block entire sections of the web, targeting news and dissenting
opinions [268]. As regimes become more restrictive they may block specific types of
network streams, such as Virtual private networks (VPNs) and Tor connections as was
seen in Turkey last December [291]. Other governments, like those in China, employ
comprehensive filtering of websites by topics and keywords [292]. Mongolia takes a more
direct approach by mandating website hosts to install a program to filter content, including
comments for slander and rude language, based on an extensive banned word list [293].
This makes access to local content on topics, such as sex, difficult.
When access is allowed, governments actively work to identify users. Internet service
providers and MNOs are often forced to register IPs and subscriber identity modules
(SIMs) to real names. This allows arrests and intimidation, even on un-named accounts
on-line. Some tracking is harder to detect. For example, some governments and individuals
have deployed IMSI catchers, which are fake cellular towers that intercept calls and texts.
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IMSI catchers can log communication and register a phone’s presence at a location, such as
a protest [294]. While, in some cases, it is possible to bypass the tracking and censorship
technologies with the use of proxy servers and VPNs, this brings other limitations that
will be discussed later in the chapter.
Infrastructure: Some limits to on-line speech manifest in a block to on-line access
itself. Areas that are rural, underdeveloped, or war-torn, may lack the infrastructure to
access the Internet in a meaningful way. This lack of infrastructure can be a byproduct
of economic disincentives, difficulty due to physical obstacles, such as terrain, weather,
and distance, or in some cases deliberate neglect. In Mongolia, towns we visited on the
railway lack Internet access due to the tough terrain, expensive upkeep due to weather,
inaccessibility, and lack of economic prospects for MNOs. The lack of incentive is typical of
rural communities, including those in Zambia and other parts of the world. As mentioned,
sometimes infrastructure neglect is deliberate as it is a way of suppressing a particular
community. In the case of the Za’atari refugee camp, Internet access was deliberately not
provided in order to discourage refugees from encroaching on the labor market of Amman
through on-line work [295].
Even when existing infrastructure is present, access to it can be rescinded. Governments
may block Internet and mobile access for a region in response to events, such as protests.
During such times, all citizens, not just members of the protest, lose access to news,
communication, as well as access to digital financial transactions. This has been the
case, among others, in Turkey, Egypt, and Syria [269, 296, 297]. Even when there is no
deliberate block, protests or natural disasters can overload mobile networks and disrupt
Internet access intermittently [298].
When infrastructure is present and functional, the cost, speed, and quality of Internet
connectivity may restrict usage to a particular socio-economic class. Additionally, upload
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and download bandwidth and costs are not always symmetrical for users. Internet service
providers regularly provide plans that allow downloads at a disproportionately faster rate
than uploads. While users may have the capacity to consume content, their ability to
voice their own ideas and culture might be limited due to upload caps. Projects that claim
to provide free access, such as Facebook’s Internet.org [299], may limit which websites
are freely available to subscribers. Limiting access to infrastructure can be profitable to
companies aiming to control consumer choice but detrimental to user freedoms.
While infrastructure limits to Internet access is comprehensibly studied by information
and communications technologies for development (ICT4D) literature, it is important to
emphasize how lack of Internet access can be used to suppress the voice of a particular
group or minority on-line. Connecting communities to the Internet amplifies their voice
both globally and domestically. Hindering connectivity intentionally or through neglect
censors a community and muffles their voice. The drawing shown in figure 9.1, by Kiss
Brian Abraham, reminds viewers that while freedom of expression through technology
is an active part of Zambian cities, those in rural Zambia lack the infrastructure to
participate.
Threats and Violence: The enforcement of laws sometimes results in physical alterca-
tions. Before going through due process in court, police may make a show of violence
when apprehending suspects. A manager was beaten by police at Komboni Radio in
Zambia, which offers both radio broadcast in Lusaka and on-line streaming, and the radio
station was temporarily shut down [300]. Government shows of force during arrest act as
a deterrent for others thinking of speaking out. Even when no probable cause exists for
arrest, police and government agents may use force to intimidate journalists or, in some
cases, seize belongings. The search and seizure of devices is a major barrier to journalists
reporting in areas with no Internet access [301]. Reporters who rely on their phones and
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laptops to store and ferry footage from conflict zones and are especially vulnerable to
seizure as a means of censorship.
Aside from government agents, violence or the threat of violence is a powerful de-
motivator on-line. Individuals who post on-line expose themselves to cyber-bullying.
Bullies attack users personally using identifying information to tailor attacks. In an
attack known as doxing, bullies find and release personal contact information, such as
phone, email, or address, thereby inviting escalation against an individual [302, 303].
When personal information is known, attacks can escalate from threats to acts of violence.
Associates and family members are likewise potential targets. Not only is this a technique
for silencing the target, but acts it as a deterrent for others.
When on-line users post or search for content, they open themselves to targeted acts
of hate. For example, searching or posting on LGBT topics can lead others to label
individuals as non-heteronormative. These labels can impact job availability, interpersonal
behavior, and trigger threats both from society at-large and at home [304]. At the gender-
based violence center in Mongolia, we heard accounts that husbands assault their wives
based on search history or OSNs posts. When inquiry leads to such grave consequences,
individuals are unlikely to take the risk and engage on-line.
There are many techniques that adversaries use to limit Internet freedoms, as we
explored in this section. The barriers go beyond technological, extending into the legal,
social, and economic. Aspects of these techniques can be countered by tools that, among
others, circumvent censorship, anonymize users, and obfuscate communication.
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9.2 Limitations of Existing Tools
While aspects of the techniques to limit speech can be circumvented by large libraries
of existing tools, these tools have limitations. In our research we sought to assess the
successes and shortcomings of these tools to understand the capabilities individuals have to
overcome limits. We found existing tools are often a poor fit for marginalized communities
and fail to overcome limits in effective communication. To tackle imposed or naturally
occurring barriers to on-line speech, users need tools from multiple technological facets.
9.2.1 Censorship Circumvention
As explored earlier, one of the direct ways that adversaries limit access to particular
content is through the censure of websites. To overcome these blocks, users use circumven-
tion tools. A common tactic is tunneling content through unblocked devices, such as proxy
servers, that sit outside the control of a censoring adversary. Users funnel their normally
blocked request via this proxy. The proxy relays requests and mirrors the responses from
the desired website. While this technique is popular in regions where governments or
corporations block content, it comes with some security drawbacks. Proxies are able to
read requests made by the user and modify the results. Free proxy services allow user
access in exchange for injecting advertisements into web pages. Users lose the ability to
trust responses as the third party advertisers can modify web pages. The proxies are
able to intercept user requests and can monitor any unencrypted user materials, such
as passwords. Un-encrypted requests and responses can still be intercepted by Internet
service providers as well as intermediate network routers. Adversaries monitoring the
network can link these activities to a particular IP address.
Similar to proxies, VPNs are used to relay network traffic from a device through
an intermediary. This can allow users to access censored content. While proxy servers
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are typically used on an application basis, VPNs can be used to project network traffic
through a remote server. Unlike proxies, the requests sent through VPNs are encrypted
along with all other traffic while en-route to the VPN server. Once at the VPN server,
unencrypted requests and responses can still be read and modified. Due to the added
computation cost of encrypting and decrypting communication, VPNs are rarely free, and
the encryption adds a processing cost to the user’s device, which narrows the accessibility
to certain socio-economic classes.
Many of the individuals we encountered in our research had heard of proxies and
VPNs. In Turkey, where active IP and DNS filtering is common, many of the users,
even those less technically proficient, had used proxies or VPNs as a tool for bypassing
censorship blocks. Few, however, knew about the benefit to anonymity these approaches
provided.
9.2.2 Anonymity
In addition to blocking content, adversaries track users for legal prosecution or as
an intimidation tactic. Tracking identities in turn promotes self-censorship by the user.
By providing a means of censorship-circumvention, proxies allow possible anonymity
between requester and the desired website. However, if requests and responses are not
encrypted, outside parties, such as governments and corporations, can still track users.
Worse, proxies themselves may keep logs of interactions and share them with adversaries,
either willingly or through subpoena. Proxies may keep lists of requested IPs, linked to
users, which can serve as a hit-list for an adversary.
VPNs are only marginally better than proxies for anonymity. While all traffic to
VPN servers is encrypted, the IPs of both the requesting device and VPN are visible
on the network. If both the requester and the VPN is within a part of the network
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monitored by an adversary, traffic analysis can link the IPs to the final destination. While
VPNs are employed by businesses, the act of using a VPN can still raise suspicion by an
adversary policing censorship circumvention. If the VPN server is compromised or legally
vulnerable to subpoena by an adversary, it may still be possible to get full access records.
Corporations, such as Netflix [305], limiting certain groups of users from accessing content
can also block VPN use.
Another popular approach to proxies, which provides better anonymity, is Tor [306].
Tor is a network of proxies that relay encrypted data. Anyone can volunteer to become a
relay of this network by running freely available software. Users connect to the network
and funnel TCP streams through an entry node in the Tor network. The stream is relayed
across multiple Tor relays. For a given stream, each Tor relay only knows the IPs of
its two neighbors. Intermediate relays do not know the IP of the original requester nor
of the destination. The packets in the stream are encrypted multiple times, like layers
in an onion, with ephemeral keys of the intermediate nodes [64]. This type of system
makes traffic analysis, linking the requester and intended destination, difficult. However,
if enough Tor nodes are compromised, then traffic analysis is possible [307]. Even if
adversaries are unable to de-anonymize traffic, downloading or using Tor is visible on the
network and can flag an individual as a person of interest. In our research, we found that
many technically proficient users knew about Tor, but that new users found the concept
confusing and suffered language barriers when attempting to install and use it themselves.
Most OSNs force users to reveal real identity. For example, Facebook, imposes a real
name policy as part of the terms of service [308, 309], while Twitter requires a phone
number to create an account. Additionally, OSNs log access, including the IP of each
request. Corporations can sell this data to other adversaries. Other websites can reuse
tracking cookies left by OSNs to identify users. Governments can requisition these user
records [310]. Using a service, such as a proxy server, VPN, or Tor can mask the accessing
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IP. However, if the account is ever accessed by a device with an IP tied to the user, that
single interaction suffices to de-anonymize the entire account. As mentioned, in addition
to monitoring censorship infractions, governments and corporations may go after users
deemed offensive or dangerous by tying words or site visits to identity.
Revealing personal identities exposes users to threats from governments and corpora-
tions as well as bullying and violence from on-line and real world communities, including
family members. When users know they are tracked, they self-censor posts and queries,
which limits both speech and access to vital information. Even when adversaries lack
the ability to identify users on IP, they can de-anonymize users based on the content
they post. While using OSNs, users frequently post identifying information. An account
using a fake name that posts a personal photo can instantly identify the individual. Less
obvious details can still allow adversaries to guess identities, for example naming a school,
age, and town of birth might be enough to uniquely identify an individual. As users
generate content they expose identifying information. A dedicated attacker can correlate
this information and call out the identity of the user. Doxing the user by an adversary
exposes them to the threats mentioned in previous sections.
Use of anonymity tools, such as proxies, coupled with meticulous discipline can help
protect users from adversaries. Unfortunately, self-censoring all identifying information
limits the content an individual is able to post and access. It is difficult to have frank
conversations about personal issues, with the worry that every word can be used to reveal
identity and expose the user to danger.
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9.2.3 Reputation
While anonymity can help individuals access information and post without retri-
bution, anonymous communication has drawbacks. Personal investment brings with it
accountability, and while those seeking genuine discourse can use anonymity to be heard,
others can use anonymity as a tool to attack. Without the reputation of the individual,
anonymous accounts can have difficulty fighting for credibility. This is especially difficult
for journalists and media outlets whose credibility is tied to reputation. During interviews
in Turkey, we repeatedly heard that journalists were unwilling to use anonymity tools as
it would strip them of credibility and prevent them from doing their job.
Nevertheless, over time, even anonymous accounts can earn credibility. Groups that
share factual information on anonymous OSNs pages or blogs can build a reputation
of credibility, tied to an assumed identity. In Turkey, an anonymous Twitter account,
going by Fuat Avni, delivered information ostensibly from within the Turkish government.
By repeatedly posting credible information, the account gained millions of followers and
became the target of a government investigation [311].
Unfortunately, anonymous groups suffer from a variety of problems. When accounts
are blocked or removed, the credibility chain is disrupted. Reestablished groups must
provide evidence of continuity or risk forfeiting established reputation. Infiltrators joining
the group or seizing the account can tarnish reputation as readers struggle to determine
what information is factual and what is planted. Loosely formed groups that span accounts
can have unclear affiliations. While the hacker group “Anonymous”, for example, has some
degree of reputation, almost any anonymous account can claim membership, muddying
the message and reputation of the group. Cryptographic signatures can validate assumed
identities, but are difficult to use in the OSNs context.
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Additionally, there is a difference between anonymity of a group and that of an
individual. A media organization may wish to retain its identity and reputation in on-line
communication while protecting individuals in that organization from prosecution. The
Zambia Watchdog used this approach, combining public and anonymous sources under a
single identity to publish critiques of the government and expose corruption [301].
9.2.4 Broad Reach
When individuals and groups manage to make it on-line, their voices are only heard
if they are able to reach a breadth of people. There are many tools that enable secure
end-to-end encrypted communications for email, messaging, and content sharing. These
tools are somewhat effective at disseminating information in a group securely but do little
to communicate with broader audiences. Individuals and groups we interviewed were
primarily interested in OSNs due to the ability to reach a large audience. Tools with
narrow audiences limit viability in many of the use cases. Speaking to an empty room
does little to share ideas.
9.2.5 Crowding Out
When a post makes it to OSNs, overcoming the many barriers, it can still be silenced.
Governments and corporations increasingly deploy bots, automated programs behaving
like users, to crowd out dissenting voices [312, 313]. In comment sections on OSNs
and news sites, automated posts can overwhelm real discussion. On sites using ranking
algorithms, bots can down-vote posts, forcing them into obscurity. Some governments,
such as Russia, go further and employ real people in “troll” farms [314, 70] to control the
direction of discussion and suppress opposing viewpoints.
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Even mechanisms enacted to protect users are frequently exploited. Reporting func-
tionality, present on most OSNs, allows users to flag posts as harassment or indecent.
This is helpful in preventing cyber-bullying. Unfortunately, adversaries use bots or trolls
to falsely report posts, generating mass complaints towards a user. Russia has been
aggressive in silencing opposing views from popular accounts by falsely flagging content
as containing violence or pornography, resulting in temporary and permanent account
bans [315]. These attacks exploit automated moderation algorithms of platforms, such
as Facebook, to temporarily or permanently ban accounts, thereby silencing dissenting
voices.
9.2.6 Technical Literacy and Language
While a wide library of tools, including those discussed, exist to overcome limits
to Internet freedoms, there is often a capacities mismatch between the developers and
users. One of the most direct issues is language. Many security tools and corresponding
instructions are only available in a small set of languages. When discussing security
in Turkey, we attempted to introduce users to Tor. We found that Orbot, an Android
application for Tor, was not available in Turkish. This was a barrier to usage as all
instructions and user interfaces required explanation and translation. No application we
examined had a Mongolian translation. While Zambia uses English as its official language,
the 73 Zambian native languages were also absent. For a quick overview of language
availability for a sampling of tools please refer to Table 9.1. Lack of instructions in a
native language limits the ability to understand and use tools effectively.
Security tools are frequently used by those in computing fields who already have
some level of technical literacy. Proper use of tools requires an understanding of the
threat, purpose of the tool, and its limitations. In our interviews we found variation in
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Table 9.1: Number of languages in which tools are available.
Tool Languages
Privacy Badger (Chrome) [316] 10
Confide (iOS and Android) [317] 15
Tor Browser [306] 16
Orbot (Android Tor App) [318] 25
Signal (iOS and Android) [65] 36
HTTPS Everywhere (Chrome) [319] 48
technical expertise. While some were proficient and, in many cases, using tools for on-line
interactions, many others were far less technically literate. Many did not understand the
mechanisms behind tracking or censorship, when they were vulnerable, or how to protect
themselves. Those working in journalism, in highly dangerous conditions may have the
interest but lack the resources to get the necessary training to overcome limits. Learning
to use tools in a non-native language compounds the issue.
Individuals working with technology are not always literate in the vulnerabilities of
their on-line activities. Users often do not worry about security and anonymity until
they become targets themselves. When training undergraduates in computer science
at Mongolian National University, the group showed little initial interest in learning
about security tools. When we showed them a live demo of intercepting complete web
pages running over HTTP on an unsecured wireless access point, the level of interest in
protecting their identity and communication increased dramatically. Simply making users
aware what aspects of their on-line activity is visible and to whom is a powerful first step
to raising interest and overcoming future limits.
Even if an ideal tool existed to overcome each technical limitation, language and digital
literacy would still hinder adoption. Access to language and technical experience may be
tied to particular groups of individuals based on access to education and socio-economic
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status. The design and translation of tools can determine who is able to overcome the
limits and speak, and who remains silent.
9.3 Discussion
The capacity to speak and be heard is a powerful force with both societal and
ethical implications. The decisions behind design, implementation, and deployment of
technologies that overcome these limits can have the power to define which groups and
ideas promulgate on the Internet. Empowering Internet speech is vital as it shines light
on injustices, empowers minorities, breaks cycles of poverty, and assists individuals to
succeed. However, the same tools empowering free speech can also be used for hate speech,
planning acts of violence, destabilizing governments and societies, or even reinforcing
socio-economic divides by favoring particular groups of individuals. The authors of the
tools play a crucial role in deciding who these tools empower.
9.3.1 Impact of Design
For a tool to overcome a limit, it has to be used. As discussed in previous sections,
even existing tools are not suitable for users who may lack the knowledge, experience,
or income to use them. From our research, we observed that proficiency in English and
technical literacy tend to favor those who are wealthier and live in large cities.
Language
When developing tools that enable Internet freedoms, the choice of languages to
support has consequences. Every country in the world has users that speak major
languages such as Mandarin, Spanish, and English, but many countries only have partial
adoption [320]. Picking a language can alienate portions of the population for which the
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language is non-dominant. Language expectation may bias toward a particular socio-
economic class [321]. People who engage in international business or higher education may
be more likely to speak a major language. Even without creating new tools, translating
existing tools to new languages can reduce the adaptation barrier for currently restricted
minorities. Selectively distributing tools can amplify a subset of voices over others.
Neglecting to translate a tool that provides freedoms for some, effectively limits freedoms
of others.
Technical Literacy
Alongside language is the expectation of technical literacy. Tools that are hard to use
and setup, or those with poorly explained limitations can alienate and even endanger
groups. While information technology professionals may have the technical understanding
to use or learn to use existing tools, the same is not true for users from all domains. From
our experiences, journalists and civil rights advocates, especially those who have little
funding for I.T. support, face difficulties setting up and using existing tools. Worse still,
groups with poor backgrounds in cyber-security may not understand the threat model
that a particular tool is designed to counter, leading to a false feeling of security.
Even if a tool is available in a language the user understands, without comprehension
of the full security context and without an intuitive design, the user may not be able
to use it effectively. Like language, the design and usability of a tool can segregate
populations. Ensuring that an application is clear to a novice extends the application’s
reach and ability to empower. Conversely, ignoring the design and ease of use of a tool
can disproportionately favor those with the education and experience to use it, or those
with the economic advantage to hire someone who can.
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Device and Platform
Choosing a platform or operating system for a security tool limits the user demographic
that a tool empowers. Requiring a Twitter account, for example, may alienate users who
would otherwise be interested in the security tool, but who lack interest in starting a
Twitter account. When applied on a global scale, alienated demographics could comprise
the majority of entire countries. In our research we found a high usage of Twitter in
Turkey, but when talking to activists in Mongolia and Zambia, we found nearly all favored
Facebook.
Likewise, the choice of operating system can segregate populations of users. This is
especially true for mobile applications that have experienced rapid growth and change.
Selecting iOS over Android can alter the types of groups who are able to use a mobile
application. The version of operating system can further subdivide groups. In Istanbul,
we found newer Android phones running the latest operating system were quite common;
however, when working in Zambia we found phones running operating systems as old as
Android 1.6. Android applications not targeting such old versions would not run. Adding
backwards compatibility to applications can increase development time, complexity, and
complicate usability testing. On the other hand, restricting operating system type or
version limits the tools to those who can afford newer devices.
It is important to note that while mobile-broadband usage in the developing world is
limited, it is the primary method for Internet access. As of 2016, 41% of the population
in the developing world had mobile-broadband subscriptions compared to 8% with fixed-
broadband subscriptions [322]. Throughout much of the developing world, mobile devices
are the primary means of accessing the Internet. Technologies that are not accessible via
mobile, segregate users for whom this is the only method of access.
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Ownership of a suitable device, like a smart phone, is still a limit. While most of the
people we talked to in the capital cities owned smart phones, in rural communities this is
not the case. In Zambia, for example, a 2015 study found only 51% of the population
actively used mobile devices and only 13.5% of those devices were smartphones [323]. While
it is impossible to tailor a software tool for communities with no hardware, these groups
should still factor in ethical considerations. As societies become reliant on technology for
protecting freedoms, those without the proper hardware fall further behind.
Connectivity and Power
Lacking access to power and Internet connectivity can be a limit to speech. Between
no access and reliable access is a gray zone in which much of the world resides [324].
In tool design, connectivity and power are commonly treated as binary, either present
or absent. In reality, Internet access can be unreliable, expensive, or incredibly slow.
Power is similarly unreliable. In rural areas, blackouts may be frequent and brown outs,
when voltage drops bellow operating norms, may be common. Applications built on
the assumption of low latency, high bandwidth, and continuous power may be unusable
for these communities. Like other design choices, the network and power requirements
of tools selects the demographic that they empower. Developers can overcome some of
these restrictions through techniques such as caching data, bundling server requests, and
minimizing local computation. Optimization of tools for resource poor environments
takes development time and adds complexity. Failure to design and test for situations of
limited resources favors those in richer conditions.
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9.3.2 Security
While technologies can overcome limits on speech and access, they can present a
danger to their users. Even if empowering users is not the priority to tool developers,
user safety should be. If a tool is poorly explained, users may not realize that they are
not protected against specific threats. For some, speech can put them in danger, leading
to incarceration, economic hardship, violence, or even death. While tools typically try to
grow a user base, advertising to users without adequately preparing them can do more
harm than good. Even experienced users may grow complacent from a feeling of security
and make mistakes that expose them to threats.
Like other tools, software focusing on Internet freedoms occasionally have bugs or
oversights that create vulnerabilities. For low-risk individuals, a vulnerability may pose
little threat. For high-risk individuals, who are under scrutiny by adversaries with high
levels of network control, a single vulnerability can suffice to identify users or provide
evidence for incarceration. Tool designers are responsible for the integrity of their tools.
Like other concerns, keeping tools up-to-date and informing users of potential problems
may be harder in particular communities. Users lacking affordable Internet access may
not keep their applications updated. Similarly, users who side-load applications due
to blocking of larger repositories may never receive application updates. These users
might be exposed to vulnerabilities for which their software was never patched. Alternate
delivery systems, as well as resource-aware update sizes can help protect these users.
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9.3.3 Ethical Concerns
Misuse for Harm
Some worry that agents seeking to do harm will misuse tools intended for Internet
freedoms. Encryption tools enabling human rights activists to talk without fear can be
used by terrorist groups to coordinate attacks. Tools allowing circumvention of censorship
for tasks such as gaining knowledge about safe-sex practices can be used to access bomb-
making instructions. Further, free speech entails the possibility of hate speech. Anonymity
tools can protect the identity of activists, but also of cyber-bullies. When working on these
technologies, there is an ethical concern that in the course of empowering communities,
they would cause collateral harm.
One possible justification goes as follows. While marginalized groups are silenced,
those seeking to cause harm, like terrorists, have the funding and expertise to build
comparable tools for themselves or enlist others to do it for them. Even if researchers
did not build these particular tools, bad actors would still have the capabilities to do
harm. If developers stopped building encrypted communication applications that keep
individuals safe from oppression, terrorists could still build the same type of application
for themselves.
Anyone suspicious of this justification might instead suggest that concerns of freedom,
especially of vulnerable populations, typically trumps concerns of safety. Fear of wrongdo-
ers intentionally corrupting tools for malice should not come in the way of protecting the
oppressed or empowering the marginalized. Designing tools that are resilient to misuse is
not always possible. Sometimes it is possible, however, to mitigate the potential harm.
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Suppressing Speech of Others
Even when tools make it to intended audiences they can still be abused. When
interviewing marginalized groups about the types of capabilities they would like to have
on-line, some desired tools to silence or attack those that speak negatively against them.
If the point of access and speech is an exchange of ideas, not all communities, even those
silenced themselves, are initially interested in allowing others to talk. Developers can be
mindful of this ethical concern, and focus on technologies that empower speech without
suppressing the speech of others.
Interfering with Other Nations
Another ethical concern is the right to interfere in other societies and cultures. Often
technologies are developed in first-world nations, but the technologies can be used
anywhere. This may explicitly or implicitly bias development and usage towards groups
similar to the developers. To empower speech, developers may target marginalized groups
on foreign soil and not have personal stake in the ramification. Sovereign governments,
sometimes put there by democratic vote, may actively impose the limits that technology
aims to overcome. The counter argument is that free-speech and Internet access are
human rights. Most democratic governments, as well as the UN [266, 267], recognize this.
Just as we have duties to recognize and prevent other human rights violations, we have
an ethical responsibility to support freedom of speech and access across national lines.
The marginalized may not have the access or resources to help themselves.
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9.4 Conclusions
Indicators point to a world that is becoming increasingly authoritarian. The precious
resource of Internet freedoms is actively and intentionally limited by governments, corpo-
rations and communities. If, as a society, we place value in the rights of individuals to
seek information and share their concerns and experiences, then overcoming those limits
is a growing challenge. While technology can help tear down these barriers, it sometimes
leads to externalities in the form of undesirable consequences.
When developing technologies supporting Internet freedoms, the design of applications
has profound ethical implications. There is a balance between satisfying a human right and
exposing others to danger. Empowering the speech of one group could mean suppressing
speech of another. Tool developers can mitigate these risks while broadening access.
Developers often build from personal experiences, targeting users of their country and
background, but the impact of their decisions often reaches far beyond the confines of
their society. Successful tools are not confined to a single country or demographic. The
Internet, as well as the ecosystem of tools that use it, is global and pervasive. Factoring
in the experiences of users across the world, such as language, technical knowledge, and
resource availability, can have profound impacts on peoples lives.
While a large library of security tools exists, there are under-served areas. Problems,
such as maintaining reputation while preserving anonymity, the crowding out of voices
using bots and trolls, and communicating despite network interruption continue to be
areas of growth. Even existing technologies are often limited in their use due to the
technical knowledge gap and language requirements associated with using them. As the
Internet continues to grow and mature and new applications as well as censorship tools
become available, so too will the need for new technologies to counter them. The next
chapter explores ways of facilitating open discourse in the presence of adversaries.
172
Limits to Internet Freedoms: Being Heard in an Increasingly Authoritarian World Chapter 9
Acknowledgment
This work was done in collaboration Lisa Parks and Elizabeth Belding. I would also
like to thank all the other people who have helped with this work. Many thanks to
members of our team including Danny Iland, Miriam Metzger, Hannah Goodwin, Kristin
Hocevar, Lisa Han, Ariel Hasell, and Rahul Mukherjee for conducting interviews and
surveys as well as providing analysis. Finally thanks to our many overseas partners for
the hospitality, patience, and many hours of work. This work was funded by the DRL.
173
Chapter 10
A User-Driven Application for
Anonymous and Verified Online,
Public Group Discourse
Chapter 9 provided characterization for problems that groups and individuals may face
when attempting to openly communicate online, including some of the limitations that
existing tools exhibit. This chapter extends the characterization offered by ethnographic
interviews with survey-based research to identify common unmet needs in Lusaka, Zambia;
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; and Istanbul, Turkey. The chapter then proceeds to show how
we fuse social and technological research to design a novel tool that satisfies these needs.
While our work focuses on specific communities, not populations of countries as a whole,
we believe examining the needs of communities particularly vulnerable to censorship
provides a lens through which to understand some challenges to overcoming censorship
more broadly. The ethics and permissibility of censorship is outside the scope of this
work.
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We begin this chapter by presenting the methodology behind both the social and
technical aspects of our work in Section 10.1. In Section 10.2, we present the results
of our survey analysis that serves as a basis for understanding people’s uses of social
media and their censorship concerns. We next explore some of these issues more closely,
concentrating on findings from interviews and journalistic accounts in Section 10.3. Based
on the social analysis we present our software solution, SecurePost, in Section 10.5. We
then evaluate SecurePost using anonymous in-app surveys and usage statistics in Section
10.6. Finally, we summarize and draw implications from our work in Section 10.7.
10.1 Methodology
To investigate the role of the Internet and OSNs in free speech, we sought out
communities vulnerable to censorship. Between 2013 and 2016, we visited three regions:
Lusaka, Zambia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. These three regions
have diverse geopolitical contexts, different levels of socio-economic development and
dissimilar cultural and historical backgrounds. In each region we focused on communities
particularly vulnerable to censorship. We sought to understand the needs and challenges
of these specific communities as a cross-section of global issues surrounding Internet
censorship, particularly focusing on free speech on OSNs.
By combining social science and technological research, we developed a software tool
that fulfills previously unmet needs to aid at-risk communities. In our work we involved
participants in the iterative development of a technological solution that is well-suited to
their use-case. Given the diversity of the three selected regions, we believe our solution
would be applicable to other communities with similar needs, more broadly bolstering
freedom of speech online.
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Because there is extensive documentation of censorship in China [325, 326, 327, 328,
329] and the Middle East [330, 331, 332], we chose to focus on countries less studied at
the time of data collection: Zambia, Turkey, and Mongolia. This enabled us to examine a
broader scope of communities in terms of freedom of speech and censorship. Our goal is
to use experiences with these three target communities as a lens to understand global
issues surrounding censorship on OSNs and the Internet overall, and to facilitate the
development of tools for protecting free speech.
When we first planned our work, Turkey was beginning to increase its censorship efforts,
enabling our team to observe responses to increasingly visible and common censorship
practices. Like Turkey, Zambia also experienced an increase in government censorship
during the course of our study. By contrast, censorship in Mongolia was relatively static
and less widespread [333]. Our team identified collaborators in these countries through
previously existing contacts.
Our interdisciplinary team consisted of experts from computer science, communication,
and media studies, from departments spanning across physical science, social science, and
the humanities. Over the course of our project, we conducted 109 interviews and surveyed
526 individuals. We used a combination of ethnographic analysis of the interviews and
descriptive statistics on the survey data to understand Internet access patterns, identify
barriers to free speech, and assess shortcomings of existing tools that assist groups and
individuals in communicating safely. We obtained IRB approval prior to conducting our
fieldwork.
We used snowball sampling to recruit respondents for the surveys and in-depth
interviews. We calculated descriptive statistics (frequencies) for all variables of interest,
including socio-demographics. We compared participants in three countries using chi-
square tests for categorical variables and Fisher’s exact test for dichotomous variables.
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Table 10.1: Demographics of survey respondents from the three sampled countries.
Zambia Turkey Mongolia All
Survey Question % (#) % (#) % (#) % (#)
Gender
Male 50% (52) 52% (81) 40% (100) 46% (233)
Female 50% (51) 48% (74) 60% (151) 54% (276)
Age
Under 20 21% (22) 7% (10) 13% (27) 13% (59)
20-39 71% (74) 78% (120) 74% (162) 75% (356)
40 or more 8% (8) 15% (23) 13% (27) 12% (58)
Education
Less than primary school 1% (1) 0% (0) 1% (2) 1% (3)
Primary School 1% (1) 1% (2) 2% (5) 2% (8)
Secondary School 37% (39) 31% (48) 31% (77) 32% (164)
Higher Education / University 61% (64) 68% (106) 66% (163) 65% (333)
Total # Surveyed (106) (166) (254) (526)
Dates Surveyed Dec 7-18 Dec 7-19 Jun 16-Jul 4
2013 2014 2015
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10.1.1 Survey
The survey based research aimed to better understand use of information and com-
munication technology in our three target communities and to gauge the opinions of
members of our sample on issues of Internet freedom, censorship, and media trust. When
interpreting the data, it is important to note that convenience sampling was used for
the respondents, so these data may not accurately represent either the population of the
respective countries as a whole or residents of the surveyed cities.
The demographics of survey respondents are provided in detail in Table 10.1. The
gender of all survey respondents is roughly equally split between male and female, with
slightly more female respondents overall. Across the three countries, we note the high
prevalence of responses from individuals with university education and those between the
ages of 20-39. This is likely due to our affiliations with universities and organizations,
such as LGBTQ centers, with university aged staff. We note that because our focus was
on studying communities vulnerable to censorship, the demographics and responses are
not necessarily representative of the full populations of these countries.
Zambia
The Zambian survey was distributed in the capital city of Lusaka, using the Open
Data Kit survey software on Nexus tablets between December 7 and 18, 2013. Open Data
Kit allowed us to securely store encrypted versions of the survey response data without
the need for Internet access. The total number of completed surveys was 106.
The convenience sample consisted primarily of individuals who work in media-related
fields (e.g., radio stations, newspapers, news websites, blogs, and technology). The
research team also recruited respondents from a media institute and a computer lab and
technology hub where people can learn computer skills (e.g., game design and coding). The
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surveys were also distributed at ConnectForum, a technology conference for women hosted
jointly by the government and local companies. The women attending the conference
were individuals who either worked at technology companies or aspired to work in the
field of Internet communication technologies.
Participants in our sample were highly educated, with 98% of participants completing
secondary school or higher, compared to the overall Zambian population where about 26%
of females and 44% of males have only completed secondary school [334]. The sample
was of a higher income level than average for Zambia and contained fewer unemployed.
Students, journalists, and people working in the banking industry and in IT were also
overrepresented. However, the sample did reflect the population in terms of age, religion,
and ethnicity with the exception that it contained more Europeans. This is likely due to
conducting the study in Lusaka, which has a higher number of expatriate workers [335]
than in other areas of the country.
Turkey
The Turkish survey was distributed in Istanbul using both a paper survey and an
Internet-based interface between December 7 and 19, 2014. Using this combination of
in-person (paper and pencil) and mediated (online) administration helped researchers
reach the largest possible sample with the resources available to the survey team for this
part of the project. The total number of completed surveys was 166.
The sample consisted primarily of young people, including students and people working
in media-related fields. The gender of survey respondents was relatively balanced. However,
many survey respondents were of a lower income level and significantly higher education
level than the general population in Turkey [336]. This is likely because of the number of
undergraduate and graduate university students in the sample. Furthermore, the majority
of respondents indicated they were not affiliated with the most powerful political party in
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Istanbul at the time the survey was administrated (AKP), suggesting that the sample
may be more representative of political minority opinions on the topic of Internet freedom
than the average Turkish population. The research team relied on academic contacts at a
University in Istanbul to recruit respondents.
Mongolia
The Mongolian survey was distributed in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s capital, using
paper surveys in the Mongolian language between June 16 and July 4, 2015. Surveys
were administered primarily by Mongolian undergraduate students who attend Mongolia
National University (MNU), a project partner. These students were supervised by MNU
professors. The total number of completed surveys was 254.
The sample consisted primarily of young people, including students and others who
were relatively highly educated. In 2011 64.2% of the population of Ulaanbaatar was
under 35 years old, suggesting that the number of younger respondents to the survey
is somewhat representative of demographic trends in Ulaanbaatar [337]. The sample
included slightly more female than male respondents. The survey was administered
by Mongolian undergraduate students, who had greater access to individuals of similar
characteristics, such as education level.
10.1.2 Interviews
Ethnographic interviews provided a qualitative dimension to our research on the
underlying issues associated with Internet and OSN free speech and censorship experiences.
We engaged in both in-depth interviews and informal conversations with a wide range of
individuals and organizations, including journalists, political activists, ethnic minorities,
law makers, educators, LGBTQ center employees, gender-based violence center employees,
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government watchdogs, and others affected by censorship.
We reviewed contextual data such as political histories and news media reports about
online censorship concerns in each country and identified key concerns and individuals.
We then consulted with local partners, who were affiliated with universities and NGOs, to
develop lists of potential informants. Working with our partners, we reached out to and
scheduled interviews with many of these informants. We also used the snowball method
to expand our informant lists while in each country.
We conducted more than 35 interviews in each country. Sometimes these interviews
were with individuals and sometimes with small focus groups. In total we interviewed
more than 150 people across the three countries. Theoretical saturation was reached when
we encountered informants identifying the same or similar censorship agents, concerns,
sites, and sources. We conducted some interviews in English and worked with translators
to conduct others. Since many of our informants have been on the front lines of free
speech struggles, we anonymized their identities and securely stored all interview data.
We used grounded theory [338] to analyze our interview data and extrapolated
informants’ censorship concerns and tactical responses to them based on our close analysis
of the transcribed interview data.
10.1.3 Application Development
Based on qualitative and quantitative data, we identified previously unmet challenges
to the use of online social networks for these target communities. We then built a software
solution, called SecurePost [339], which addresses these challenges by enabling new ways
for balancing anonymity and trust in OSNs.
We developed software in parallel to our field visits, and conducted user testing of
prototypes while in the field. During each visit partners were able to try our most recent
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prototypes and provide feedback. In this manner we received iterative feedback from our
partners that helped us refine our application and further understand the requirements
of these communities. We evaluated our software using a pair of optional anonymous
surveys administered through the SecurePost application.
10.2 Survey and Interview Results
From the survey data we evaluated how vulnerable populations use and access the
Internet, and in particular OSNs. We present the survey results and provide discussion
supported by the ethnographic interviews. Note that an anonymity agreement in our IRB
precludes us from making direct quotes of the interviews. For our analysis, we examined
popular OSN platforms and the types of activities users engage in when using social media.
We then looked at the difficulties that people experience when accessing the Internet and
OSNs, including access disruptions and censorship. Finally, we compared how free users
felt when using the Internet and the types of behaviors they engaged in when faced with
censorship.
10.2.1 Internet and Online Social Network Usage
As the basis of planning a technical solution, we examined usage modality and
preferred platforms. We asked respondents about their Internet and OSN usage, including
frequency of usage and their preference of social network. We summarize the key findings
in Table 10.2.
Across all three countries, the majority of respondents stated they use the Internet
every day or more (with Mongolia to a lesser extent than the other countries). For all
respondents, 94% stated they use the Internet at least once a week, indicating a high
utilization of the Internet in these communities.
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Table 10.2: Internet and Online Social Network Usage
Zambia Turkey Mongolia All
Survey Question % (#) % (#) % (#) % (#)
Use Internet
Less than once a week (or never) 2% (2) 1% (2) 11% (27) 6% (31)
Once a week 4% (4) 1% (1) 8% (19) 5% (24)
2-3 times a week 13% (14) 5% (9) 31% (77) 19% (100)
Every day or more 81% (85) 93% (154) 50% (125) 70% (364)
Devices Used to Access Inter-
net
Can select multiple
Desktop 26% (27) 48% (79) 49% (121) 44% (227)
Laptop 80% (85) 80% (132) 53% (131) 67% (348)
E-reader/Tablet 17% (18) 31% (52) 14% (35) 20% (105)
Smart Phone 74% (78) 84% (140) 72% (177) 76% (395)
Basic/Feature Phone 13% (14) 1% (1) 14% (34) 9% (49)
Social Network Use
Never 4% (4) 0% (0) 0% (0) 1% (4)
Less than once a week 1% (1) 1% (2) 5% (11) 3% (14)
Once a week 4% (4) 1% (1) 7% (17) 4% (22)
2-3 times a week 9% (9) 8% (13) 29% (70) 18% (92)
Every day or more 83% (86) 90% (150) 60% (145) 74% (381)
All Social Networks Used
Can select multiple
Facebook 91% (96) 87% (145) 97% (237) 93% (478)
Twitter 52% (55) 76% (126) 34% (82) 51% (263)
Google+ 52% (55) 57% (95) 58% (143) 57% (293)
Instagram 3% (3) 72% (119) 35% (86) 40% (208)
LinkedIn 34% (36) 31% (51) 7% (16) 20% (103)
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Further, the majority of users stated they use OSNs every day or more. Facebook,
Twitter, and Google+ were used by the largest number of respondents (it is unclear
how many people differentiated Google+ from Google search and other Google services;
interviewees did not report significant usage of, or interest in, the Google+ OSN). Other
OSNs included YouTube and WhatsApp, and to a lesser frequency Viber, Snapchat,
Vimeo, WeChat, Tumbler, Pintrest, and Vine.
The number of users stating they use OSNs daily slightly out-paces the number of
Internet users. When looking at individual responses, the same respondents claim higher
OSN usage than total Internet usage. This is likely because some users perceive mobile
applications and OSNs as something separate from web browsing as a whole.
The results from these communities fit into global trends for Internet and OSN usage.
As of 2017, the International Telecommunication Union estimated 3.6 billion people,
roughly 47% of the world’s population, use the Internet [340]. Young people are at
the forefront of adoption with 70% of people between 15 and 24 years old online [341].
Globally, online social networks are some of the most visited websites [342]. As of October
2017, Facebook had over 2 billion active users (1.3 billion daily), while Twitter had
over 328 million active users [343]. These statistics highlight the importance of OSNs as
communication platforms when confronting censorship.
We asked respondents what device they used to access the Internet. The most used
devices were smart phones and then laptops. Globally, as of 2017, it is estimated that
58% of the world’s population had a mobile-broadband subscription, while only 13%
had fixed broadband subscriptions [341]. Further, the annual growth rate of global
mobile broadband subscriptions (20%) is out-pacing that of fixed broadband subscriptions
(9%) [341]. These statistics highlight the current and future needs for mobile-device-based
solutions in both the cases of our target countries, and in the larger global context.
184
A User-Driven Application for Anonymous and Verified Online, Public Group Discourse Chapter 10
In order to identify a suitable operating system for development, we asked responders
about their device model and operating system. In 2013, survey responses from Zambia
indicated that Blackberry was the most popular type of phone (n=33, 34%), followed by
Android (n=24, 25%). Nokia phones were next in popularity (n=20, 21%), followed by the
iPhone (n=10, 10%). Since then, Android has become dominant in Zambia, accounting
for close to 50% of the market share [344]. This is in line with anecdotal evidence from
respondents during our return visit in 2016. Responses from the 2015 Mongolia survey
indicated that Android was dominant (n=140, 59.8%), followed by iOS (n=76, 28.6%).
Relatively few people had other operating systems, including Blackberry (n=10, 4.3%).
We did not collect data on device model and operating systems for participants in
Turkey. According to Stat Counter, a website that tracks browser and mobile OS usage
worldwide, as of September 2017 Android accounted for 80% of the mobile operating
market share in Turkey, followed by iOS with 18%, while all other operating systems
accounted for less then 2% of the market share [345].
These trends are reflected globally. As of end of May 2017, Android made up 86% of
the global market share [346]. Android’s popularity, especially in the developing world,
may be due to the availability of cheap phones, from a variety of manufacturers running
the Android OS, saturating markets in Africa and the Middle East [347]. Many of these
phones run older versions of the Android OS, have limited storage and computational
power, and do not receive software upgrades. Nonetheless, when developing tools that
work in the developing world, Android applications allow access to a large population.
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Figure 10.1: Type of users activities on OSNs. Respondents could pick any number of
activities. The left part of the chart represents activities that consumed content and
on the right activities that generated content.
10.2.2 Activities on Online Social Networks
Respondents engage in a wide variety of activities in online social networks. In
particular, respondents most commonly consumed content about their hobbies and
entertainment, things happening in their community and the world, as well as information
about their friends and family. Respondents most commonly produce content such as
photos and information about hobbies and entertainment. A full breakdown is shown in
Figure 10.1.
In Turkey and Mongolia, we also asked about the frequency of information consumption
and generation. Respondents in Turkey indicated that they most frequently share, post,
or send information about things happening in the community and around the world, as
well as hobbies, news, photos. Content was less frequently shared or consumed on topics
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such as religion, products, and health.
In Mongolia, respondents indicated that they most frequently share and post infor-
mation about hobbies or entertainment, as well as friends and family, education, photos,
news, health, and work. Content was less frequently shared or consumed on topics such
as religion, laws and politics, and things happening around the world.
Some activities in which users engage, such as posting about religion, health, and
politics, have some relevant topics of discourse that could endanger the user. We explore
this in Section 10.3.
10.2.3 Internet Disruption
In the survey, we examined the frequency and perceived reason for disruptions that
respondents experienced in attempting to use the Internet and OSNs. A summary of
our results is presented in Table 10.3. Across the three countries, 78% of respondents
reported at least sometimes experiencing disruption to their activity, most commonly in
Zambia (96%).
In Zambia and Mongolia, power outage was reported as a major reason for disruptions.
This was less of a problem in Turkey, which has better infrastructure. In all three countries,
particularly in Zambia, poor network reliability was a major reason for access disruptions.
Government or other censorship which was not frequently cited as a common cause of
disruptions in Zambia (7%), was reported more common in Mongolia (19%), and was
cited as a major cause of disruptions in Turkey (44%).
Such temporary disruptions emphasize the need for tools that are tolerant to networking
delays when fetching and delivering content. Permanent disruptions, like those imposed
by government censorship, require circumvention tools to bypass those blocks.
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Table 10.3: Disruption of Internet and OSN Usage
Zambia Turkey Mongolia All
Survey Question % (#) % (#) % (#) % (#)
Frequency of Internet Disrup-
tion
Almost Never 4% (4) 25% (41) 27% (68) 22% (113)
Sometimes 42% (44) 48% (79) 61% (152) 53% (275)
Often 25% (26) 19% (31) 10% (25) 16% (82)
Very Often 29% (30) 8% (13) 2% (5) 9% (48)
Reason for Internet Disruption
Can select multiple
Power outage or electrical prob-
lems
48% (51) 15% (24) 51% (128) 39% (203)
Unpaid fees for Internet service 29% (31) 7% (11) 32% (80) 23% (122)
Poor network connection or ser-
vice
91% (96) 68% (112) 44% (110) 61% (318)
Government or other censorship 7% (7) 44% (73) 19% (47) 24% (127)
Unknown Reason 3% (3) 15% (25) 10% (25) 10% (53)
Other Reason 5% (5) 5% (8) 8% (20) 6% (33)
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10.2.4 Censorship
In addition to investigating how and for what purposes respondents use OSNs, we
investigated how their use is impacted by censorship. We summarize these results in
Table 10.4.
Across all three countries, only 11% described feeling “very free” to express themselves
on the Internet and OSNs. The majority (53%) felt only “a little free” or “not free at
all”. In Turkey especially, 37% of responders said they did not at all feel free to express
themselves on OSNs.
When asked how often users modify their behavior to protect against government
or other monitors seeing things that they post in OSNs, respondents in Mongolia and
Zambia demonstrated no statistically significant differences from each other. In those
two countries, the majority of users (64% in Zambia, 56% in Mongolia) reported at least
sometimes modifying behavior in OSNs (p=0.225). On the other hand, in Turkey, 88%
of users reported never or almost never modifying behavior, a statistically significant
difference when examining all three countries (p=0.000). This is interesting because out
of the three countries, Turkey has a higher incidence of government censorship [333], and
- as observed earlier - more users reported feeling not free.
When asked about methods users took in modifying behavior, Mongolia, Zambia, and
Turkey had no statistically significant differences for most strategies. About a quarter
used secure connections (p=0.554), a few hid their names (8%, p=0.166), and some
avoided using the Internet or OSNs entirely (8%, p=0.119). For self-censorship, however,
respondents in Turkey again differed in behavior. While the majority of users in Zambia
(77%) and Mongolia (67%) self-censored what they posted online (p=0.893), users in
Turkey (59%) reported significantly less self-censorship (p=0.0076).
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Table 10.4: User Behavior and Perceived Freedom on OSNs
Zambia Turkey Mongolia All
Survey Question % (#) % (#) % (#) % (#)
How ‘Free’ Users Feel on Inter-
net & OSNs
Not free at all 32% (34) 37% (60) 19% (47) 27% (141)
A little free 19% (20) 21% (34) 31% (78) 26% (132)
Somewhat Free 40% (42) 30% (48) 38% (96) 36% (186)
Very Free 9% (9) 12% (20) 12% (29) 11% (58)
How Often Users Modified Be-
havior
Never 19% (18) 71% (114) 12% (29) 32% (161)
Almost never 18% (17) 17% (28) 32% (79) 25% (124)
Sometimes 47% (46) 9% (15) 34% (83) 29% (144)
Often 11% (11) 1% (2) 11% (26) 8% (39)
Very often 5% (5) 1% (2) 12% (30) 7% (37)
How Users Modified Behavior
Can select multiple
Limit/censor what to post 77% (82) 59% (98) 67% (164) 66% (344)
Use a secure connection 25% (26) 20% (33) 24% (59) 23% (118)
Do not use a real name 4% (4) 8% (14) 10% (24) 8% (42)
Avoid Internet or Social Network 3% (3) 8% (14) 9% (22) 8% (39)
A possible explanation for these behaviors comes from our interviews. In Turkey,
many of the journalists and activists we interviewed conveyed a sense of obstinance to
censorship efforts. Those we interviewed emphasized the importance of exercising free
speech and were willing to continue to do so, even after arrest. And, as noted earlier,
a proportionately larger number of our survey respondents in Turkey were members of
political opposition groups.
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10.3 Categorizing Barriers to Free Speech
As we observed in the previous section, while most respondents do not feel free to
express themselves on OSNs, very few (8% across all three countries) reported posting
anonymously. Despite this, in the ethnographic interviews, respondents repeatedly
brought up issues concerning anonymity, as well as the ways anonymity impacts trust. To
understand how a tool could address these concerns, we focused on four central elements:
(1) The negative consequences of the use of real-world identity. (2) Difficulties individuals
experienced in retaining anonymity. (3) The impact of anonymity on reputation. (4)
Problems with retaining reputation and trust in spite of active censorship. (5) Additional
methods adversaries use to limit free speech. We use this discussion as the basis of our
software based solution.
10.3.1 Using Real-World Identity on Social Media
Authoritarian governments pass strict laws curtailing free speech. In Turkey, for
example, following a 2005 restructure of the Turkish penal code, Turkey passed Article
301, which prohibits the “denigration of the Turkish nation,” and Article 216, which bans
“inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples” [348]. These laws have been used to target
journalists, artists, and unaffiliated individuals for criticizing government, policy, and
religion in any medium [288, 349]. Zambia likewise recently saw multiple arrests including
an opposition leader [350] as well as an engineering student critical of the president [351],
on the grounds of defaming Facebook posts. Globally, 27% of all Internet users live in
countries where individuals have been arrested for posting, sharing, or liking a post on
social media [352].
Libel laws are also a weapon that companies, organizations, and wealthy individuals
can use to curtail freedom. These adversaries sue for defamation or insult - wrongfully
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in many cases - in response to stories on OSNs and other media [353]. Expensive legal
fees and threat of financial ruin silences those who do not have the monetary resources to
defend themselves. This creates a chilling effect on free speech [354].
This is especially a problem in Mongolia where libel laws are frequently used as a way to
silence the press [355]. In Mongolia, the burden of proof for libel rests with the defendant
and libel constitutes a criminal charge. Journalists reporting on topics such as corporate
corruption must prove their reporting is true and accurate and evidence not containing
original copies and notarized documents may be thrown out as inadmissible [356]. During
the Mongolian interviews, self-censorship due to threat of a libel lawsuit was a frequent
topic of concern. In 2015, after our visit, multiple individuals were arrested in separate
cases over posts on Twitter [357].
Revealing identity and personal details can make an individual a target by members of
their physical or online community. Expressing views or interests that go against societal
norms can impact job availability and interpersonal relations [304].
From our interviews, we heard how journalists reporting on topics opposing dominant
political identities, such as on Kurdish issues in Turkey, face constant barrage of hateful
posts. In Zambia, we heard how elements of a user’s identity, such as ethnicity, gender,
and past posting record, stereotypes the user to the point of overshadowing the discussion
of substantive content.
Threats may extend into an individual’s home. When interviewing members of a
gender-based violence prevention center in Mongolia, we heard stories of threats coming
from a person’s own family. Family members of some of these women would monitor
posts and private messages on social media and punish perceived affronts with physical
violence.
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10.3.2 Balancing Reputation and Anonymity on OSNs
With so many threats and such serious consequences, many users self-censor their
online posts. Yet, as we observed in Section 10.2, some users still remain adamant about
speaking their minds, putting them in potential jeopardy. While some post anonymously
or use fake aliases, relatively few reported doing so in our surveys. In part, this may be
due to the difficulty of being anonymous online. Major social networks, like Facebook,
impose a real name policy as part of their terms of service [308, 309]. Other sites, like
Twitter, may require identifying information, such as a phone number to create or verify
an account.
Even if information is not provided by the user, OSNs still log the IP address of the
requests. This information can be subpoenaed by governments [310, 358]. Requiring all
users to use anonymity services like VPNs or Tor [64] for each post is unrealistic, since
groups can be composed of posters with varying technological expertise, and a single
mistake can be costly.
If adversaries lack the ability to identify users based on IP, they can still de-anonymize
users based on the content they post. Users of social media regularly post identifying
information. An account posting a personal photo can identify an individual. Other
information posted by a user can inadvertently allow adversaries to guess identities. For
example, revealing details about education, past residences, and events might be enough
to uniquely identify an individual. A dedicated attacker could use information exposed
by the account over a period of time to establish identity, exposing the user to threat.
Adversaries will dox users, publishing identifying information, which may escalate digital
conflict to physical confrontation [359, 360]. Even if meticulous discipline is followed,
self-censoring all identifying information limits an individual’s ability to communicate
about their personal experience.
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10.3.3 Impact of Anonymity on Reputation
Hiding identity likewise has an impact on trust of the posted content. Readers of
social media use the reputation of an account to gauge trustworthiness of the content.
The reputation of and past experience with an organization, such as a newspaper, leads
readers to believe in the content of that account and differentiate it from fake news
promulgated by bad actors. The reputation of a source and the identity and history of
the author are the first things fact checkers and librarians recommend that readers check
when evaluating if a story is fake [361, 362].
In the case of the Zambia watchdog (ZWD) online news service, we interviewed
journalists who said they maintained anonymous blogs to avoid government intervention
when discussing sensitive topics. Others we talked to in Zambia noted that the lack of
real-world identities by ZWD journalists and lack of a physical address for the organization
weakened accountability and verification of content. Respondents said this led ZWD to
lose credibility among some of its readers [301].
Increasingly, hostile governments and other adversaries use fake accounts to orchestrate
attacks. Governments, like Russia, hire paid trolls to carry out legitimate sounding
discourse online [281, 70, 314, 69]. They automate attacks using bots to generate a
massive number of messages that flood OSNs [312, 313], and set up anonymous sybils,
which are fake accounts posing as legitimate users [363], as vessels for these agents. These
accounts post spam [364] and fake-news [365] in coordinated attacks to steer conversation
and drown out competing ideas. Users attempting genuine discourse, especially those
using anonymous accounts that are hard to distinguish from the attackers, can get lost in
the noise [280]. Our interview pool included victims of these false reporting attacks, who
reported their accounts being banned due to third party reports.
Journalists and public figures whose careers are tied to reputation may find it difficult
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to utilize the protections offered by anonymity in light of the need to build and maintain
a reputation that garners trust with readers. For example, a lawyer and LGBTQ activist
who was politically active against Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an was arrested,
convicted, and fined over a tweet [285] criticizing the president. Subsequently, he was
arrested again for unrelated charges, including membership to HDPIstanbul, a WhatsApp
group belonging to the Peoples’ Democratic Party [366, 367]. Despite harassment by the
Turkish government, he continues to actively use social media and maintains his real
name and identity online.
From our interviews, after facing legal jeopardy, some reported adopting anonymity
in order to maintain jobs unrelated to their online activities. However, several journalists
and activists stated that, despite past and future threats, it is important to publicly stand
up using their real names and identities as an act of opposition, personal pride, as well as
to garner trust.
10.3.4 Maintaining Reputation After Censorship
An additional dimension to online identity and the decision to practice anonymity
is the ability for governments and individuals to censor content on OSNs. Governments
may block entire websites [268] or ask OSNs to censor a particular account or post. For
example, Twitter maintains an entire system for withholding posts that are censored in a
particular country [368].
Aside from legal requests, governments and groups exploit weaknesses in mechanisms
built to protect users. Most OSNs have a reporting functionality that users can employ to
report cyber-bullying and flag content that may not be appropriate, such as pornography,
for a particular communication channel, such as a university’s homepage on Facebook.
Free speech adversaries exploit these reporting tools to falsely flag dissenting opinions.
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Governments and other adversaries deploy bots and trolls to report posts. This usually
leads to an automatic account ban, and may take a long time for OSNs to rectify. Russia,
for example, deploys trolls to censor popular accounts by reporting content as threatening
violence or containing pornographic material [315].
In our interviews, people reported similar instances, where their account would be
banned after crowds of users repeatedly mis-flagged content. This led to repeatedly creating
new accounts. When legitimate OSN accounts (anonymous or not) are compromised and
users switch to new accounts, the trust of the readers may be imperiled. New accounts
have to demonstrate continuity with previous ownership, and re-establish readership.
This can be even more challenging for anonymous accounts that can’t rely on real-world
identify to demonstrate continuity. Adversaries can take this opportunity to impersonate
accounts to confuse readers and further degrade trust.
10.3.5 Geographical Censorship
In some instances, instead of targeting web sites or individuals, governments or
organizations censor entire geographical areas by restricting all Internet access. In some
areas access is restricted permanently, such as in the Za’atari refugee camp, where access
was not provided in order to discourage refugees from encroaching on the local labor
market [295]. Other times access can be cut off in response to events such as protests,
which is frequently the case in Turkey - especially in Kurdish regions [269, 296, 297, 369].
From our interviews, citizen journalists in Kurdish areas of Turkey reported encounter-
ing these types of tactics [370]. When reporting in areas where Internet is severed, they
record content and store it on their device for later publication. However they expressed
concerns that sometimes their device will be seized and searched. Similar reports emerged
during our interviews of journalists in Zambia as well [301]. Much like the case of access
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disruption due to electricity, this scenario is a notable consideration for the design of
technology to protect freedom of speech.
10.4 Outlining Requirements for a New Tool
The quantitative survey results complemented with the qualitative interviews, global
statistics and journalistic reports, provide an outline to understand and address some of
the threats and needs of users when protecting freedom of speech online.
OSNs Highly Utilized: From Section 10.2 we saw that the Internet, and in particular
OSNs, are heavily utilized by our partner communities. OSNs are used daily for posting
and consuming content on a variety of activities. However, the majority of users report
feeling only ”a little free” or ”not free at all” when using them and, consequently, users
modify their behavior. This results in some self-censorship of content, limiting what
they discuss on these platforms to reduce the threat of legal and physical harm from
governments, corporations, and sometimes even family members.
Smart Phones Are a Primary Mode of Access: In these communities, smart
phones are the dominant way for individuals to access the Internet and OSNs, with this
trend continuing to increase globally. When designing tools for this type of community,
support for smart phones running Android (the most used OS type) gives widest user
coverage. For our own technological solution, in the context of limited developer resources,
we chose Android phones as the primary platform for developing and deploying our tool.
Given the popularity of Facebook and Twitter (which shares similar text based posting
behaviors with Facebook), and based on feedback from our local partners, we elected to
support these two platforms for our work.
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Backwards Compatibility: Given the wide abundance of older devices - especially
in Zambia and Mongolia, we sought to develop a tool that was backwards compatible
with older operating systems. This puts restrictions on the types of both native and
external APIs that developers can utilize during development. Often developers target
newer versions due to limitations of older software and hardware. For example, while
some of our respondents used devices running Android 2.x, Signal [65] limits its support
to Android 4.0 and above.
Network Disruption: Respondents reported disruptions to power, communication,
and instances of government restrictions on Internet access to geographic areas. Tools
catering to people who may live in areas where network and power are unreliable have to
account these limitations. Applications should limit power and data consumption and
provide a user experience that does not rely on continuous connectivity. In our tool we
implemented local caching of content that was tolerant of network delay.
Confiscation and Search: Due to temporary or permanent lack of Internet connec-
tivity, as we discuss in Section 10.3.5, journalists sometimes ferry information back to
Internet connected sites. During this time devices could be seized, which suggests a need
for local data encryption.
Anonymity Protection: As discussed in Section 10.3, we observed that when groups
use social media to spread news and ideas, there is a tension between anonymity and trust.
While other tools, such as WhatsApp[66] and Signal [65], address aspects of individual
security and private group communications, there are still unmet needs in public group
communication in the presence of censorship. Users that reveal real-world identities
open themselves to both legal and physical threats. However, users face many technical
challenges when staying anonymous on OSNs.
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Reputation Preservation: Users also find it difficult to retain reputations and trust,
especially when posting anonymously. Individual anonymous users may find it difficult
to build trust, competing with armies of bots, trolls and sybils. Groups find it difficult
to maintain reputation after hacking, infiltration or censorship. There is a need for new
tools to address ways of preserving reputation while maintaining anonymity for group
discussion on OSNs.
Appropriateness to Intended Users: Lastly, a security tool has to ultimately be
usable to the intended population. This extends to both the behaviors of individuals and
the local culture where it will be used. A technical solution that works well in one context
(for example tested and developed in a western University) might not be suitable for
applications in other contexts. In the next section we discuss how our team addressed the
aforementioned requirements, including instances where iterative feedback from partner
communities steered the technological design of the application to suit local needs.
10.5 SecurePost: Verified Group-Anonymity
To address the constraints outlined in the previous section we developed an application
called SecurePost, that allows individuals to share a single group identity while retaining
individual anonymity on OSNs. SecurePost is comprised of three coordinated modules: an
Android application that allows group members to post content and manage membership;
a proxy server that relays posts to social networks; and a browser extension that allows
members of the public to verify those posts. Together the modules provide group-
anonymity coupled with an ability to verifying the integrity and authenticity of posts.
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Using SecurePost, group members can make posts to shared OSN accounts, while
masking their individual identity. The connection is routed through the companion proxy
server, hiding the IP address from the OSN platform, which may cooperate with a hostile
government. The identity of a poster is likewise hidden from other group members, giving
plausible deniability for any given post. For members of the public looking at the posts
on social media, it appears as if posts from an account have a single author with no way
of identifying individual posters or a group’s membership roster. In this manner, a group
is able to build a social media presence while retaining anonymity of its members.
Because OSN accounts can be seized or infiltrated, SecurePost provides tools to verify
that content is genuine and unmodified. SecurePost allows groups to attach cryptographic
signatures to every post in order to verify the authenticity and integrity of messages. A
companion browser extension allows anyone, even readers not part of the group, to verify
posts directly on the social network web page. Using the extension, readers can know if a
signed post came from a trusted member of the group and if its text has been modified,
even if the OSN account has been compromised.
In the event that a group has been compromised, SecurePost allows dedicated ad-
ministrators to retain membership control. If administrators see erroneous posts coming
from the group, they are able to reset membership, expelling all other members, and
invalidating past posts. This allows group leaders to protect the group in the event of
infiltration as well as warn readers, protecting the group’s reputation.
Together group-anonymity with a layer of verification provides a mechanism for groups
to balance personal anonymity with building a trusted group identity.
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Figure 10.2: Group Overview. Figure 10.3: Invite Wizard.
10.5.1 The Mobile Application
At the center of SecurePost is the mobile application. Through the application, users
are able to form groups, manage membership, as well as make and view posts to social
media. As mentioned in the previous sections, due to resource constraints, we developed
our application exclusively for Android, as it is the most common mobile operating
system. Mindful of the prevalence of cheaper devices in the developing world running
older operating system versions, we support Android API level 10. This makes our
application backwards compatible with devices running Android 2.3.3 and above. As of
October 2017, this accounts for 99.9% of Android devices registered with Google [371].
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Forming a SecurePost Group
Each SecurePost group is tied to a corresponding OSN account. Currently SecurePost
supports Facebook and Twitter, but its modular design can be extended to include any
similar platform. SecurePost allows users to take part in multiple groups, without the
need to switch accounts. Figure 10.2 shows the group overview screen of the application,
where the user is a member of three groups.
To set up a SecurePost group, users require a corresponding OSN account on the
platform of their choice. They can either use an established account (such as a Twitter
handle for a newspaper) or set up an anonymous account. The application presents
the platform specific API based login web page to the user. After a user logs on, the
OSN platforms returns an access token. This is a common design pattern used by other
social media applications. The access token is forwarded to the proxy server (discussed in
Section 10.5.2) and discarded by the application.
The group creator is granted administrative rights to the group, and can post, invite
others, and manage the group. As this initial step requires direct contact with the social
media platform, to avoid associating an IP address to the user, we recommend that
this step is done through an anonymity service such as Tor [64]. Other than this initial
creation step, all application traffic is routed via the proxy server. Notably the user name
and password are only needed during this initial group creation process. Inviting new
members does not require the sharing of login credentials (a method of sharing social
media accounts frequently cited by interviewees).
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Figure 10.4: Process Flow of Visual Invitation Scheme. Step 1: generate ephemeral
asymmetric key pair. Step 2: ephemeral public key sent as QR code. Step 3: ephemeral
public key encrypts group credentials. Step 4: send encrypted invite as QR code. Step
5: ephemeral private key decrypts group credentials.
Group Membership
Instead of relying on password sharing, SecurePost uses public key cryptography to
authorize users. When creating an account, the app generates two asymmetric 2048
bit RSA key pairs. The app stores the private keys, and transmits the public keys to
the proxy server. One key pair grants posting credentials while the other pair grants
administrative credentials.
These two keys signify two classes of users: administrators (holding both posting and
administrative keys) and posters (holding only the posting key). Anyone with a private
key to the group can transfer a copy of that key via the application to grant access at the
same privilege level or lower. In other words, an administrator can recruit administrators
and posters while posters can only recruit other posters.
The complexity of the key exchange is hidden from the user via a graphical user
interface (shown in figure 10.3). The application provides a number of methods of
recruitment: Face-to-Face credential exchange, a sharable token, and a link.
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Face-to-Face Visual Recruitment: When in close geographic proximity, SecurePost
offers a secure key exchange via visual scanning of QR codes, as shown in Figure 10.4.
The exchange happens in two steps between a recruit (someone who wants to join the
group) and an existing group member:
1. The Recruit initiates join process by visually showing an existing group member
a join request containing a QR code.
(a) The recruit seeking to join the group generates a 2048 bit RSA ephemeral
key pair (EP PUB & EP PRV).
(b) The recruit shows EP PUB in the form of a QR code (QR PUB) to the
existing group member.
(c) The existing member scans QR PUB and extracts EP PUB.
2. The existing group member responds by sharing encrypted group credentials
with the recruit in the form of a QR code.
(a) The existing group member takes the group credentials of a desired privilege
level (CRED) - i.e. the group’s private keys - and encrypts them using EP PUB
as EN CRED.
(b) The existing member then displays EN CRED back in the form of a new
QR code (QR INVITE) to the recruit.
(c) The recruit scans QR INVITE and extracts EN CRED.
(d) The recruit decrypts EN CRED using EP PRV.
(e) The recruit now has CRED and is part of the group.
(f) Both the recruit and existing member discard the ephemeral keys EP PUB
and EP PRV as they are no longer needed.
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Once the recruit possesses the private keys, they are a part of the group: they can
authenticate with the proxy and are ready to post. By using a two step process, an
adversary visually observing the exchange would be unable to decrypt the group credentials
without the recruit’s ephemeral private key.
Alternative Recruitment: When physical proximity is not possible or unsafe, Secure-
Post allows alternate recruitment strategies via the use of an invite code or link. These
strategies allow users to transmit keys via secure communication channels established
outside the application.
For these strategies the existing group members use the graphical interface to initiate
recruitment. The application encodes the the corresponding private keys into an invite
code or link. The group member can then manually copy this code or use the Android
share intent to paste it into a secure application of their choice, for example an end-end
encrypted messaging client. The recruit pastes this code into their SecurePost application
(or clicks the link) which decodes the private keys, granting group membership. However,
if this link or code is intercepted an adversary may be let into the group.
This option gives group members more flexibility but also more responsibility. We
added this option in response to user testing, as users wanted a way to asynchronously
invite users without physical access. Note that in both recruitment schemes the group
members retain custody of the group’s private keys. The proxy server only has access to
the public keys.
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Group Administration
Authentication of group membership is verified by the proxy server using the adminis-
trative and posting public keys. These key are unique to the group and not the user. This
approach intentionally omits a user registry. From the perspective of the proxy server and
OSN platforms, each group appears as a single entity. The number and identities of group
members is only known out of band through social interaction and is not retrievable from
any part of the system.
As any group member can invite others, by compartmentalizing recruitment history
from other group members, it is possible to hide the full membership roster from any
single group member. In this manner, groups can enlist confidential contributers.
This structure imposes limitations on group administration. As there is no user registry
or unique identifier, SecurePost lacks the ability to rescind membership to an individual
user. Instead, if the group is compromised, an administrator must reset membership
entirely. In this process the administrator performing the reset generates new key-pairs
and transmits the public keys to the server (much like the initial process of group creation).
All prior members are expelled (including other administrators) and have to be re-invited
- this time hopefully with a higher level of scrutiny. In addition past posts are invalidated;
they continue to remain on social media but are no longer marked as verified by the
browser extension.
Social Media Posts
Once users join a group they are able to post directly to the associated OSN account.
To members of the public (and other group members) it appears as if all a group’s posts
come from a single entity.
In addition to providing anonymity, SecurePost also offers verification for posts. Before
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Figure 10.5: View of an Individual Group. Figure 10.6: Setting a Self-destruct Password.
transmission, each post is signed using the posting key of the group using SHA-256. This
signature can then be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the post. The
application automatically verifies and displays posts from other group members as shown
in Figure 10.5. The general public can verify the posts on OSNs via the use of the browser
extension described in Section 10.5.3. To handle situations where connectivity is disrupted
- such as power failure or regional government censorship - posts are stored locally and
forwarded to the proxy server when Internet connectivity is reestablished.
Several other algorithms have been proposed to provide group anonymity. Ring
signature cryptography schemes, as proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [372],
provide a similar group anonymity guarantee. Signed messages can be authenticated as
being authored by the owner of one the public keys, but it is not possible to determine
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which one.
However, the ring signature verification process requires the public keys of all group
members. This is problematic for both design and implementation reasons in the context
of SecurePost. Ring signatures used publicly in this application would leak metadata
about the group membership. Specifically, an adversary could always determine the
number of members, and could monitor the public key set for changes to determine when
members join the group. Additionally, the amount of data that would need to be encoded
into the account’s profile image for the plugin verification to work would scale linearly
with group size, potentially placing a cap on group size.
Group signatures, as proposed by Chaum and van Heyst [373], are similar to ring
signatures, except they would allow the group owner to de-anonymize posts by members
using the group owner’s secret key. This would potentially resolve the problem of ’bad
actors’ joining the group, by allowing the group owner to identify and expel users who
post content that the group owners do not agree with. This would allow the group
administrator to identify and expel posters of problematic content from the group without
completely purging group membership. However, this kind of cryptosystem reduces the
strength of deniability, since there exists a person who can prove that a particular group
member wrote the post. This puts the group owner at risk from external actors, who
may be motivated to threaten or harm the group owner if they do not de-anonymize a
particular post author.
Multimedia Posts: Initially, we only planned to support posting and verification of
text. However, in our interviews, respondents stressed the importance of posting images
as well as audio and video. Respondents found multimedia content, such as images
of police impropriety, is an effective tool for reader motivation. This was particularly
important to respondents in areas where Internet connectivity is disrupted and risk of
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device confiscation is high. In this case, users wanted to store images in an encrypted
manner and queue them for posting when connectivity is available.
As a response we added the ability for users to post images. Unfortunately, as of
now, SecurePost does not allow the verification of validity and authenticity for the posted
images as OSNs compress and alter images prior to display. Thus the bitwise verification
system we use for text post does not translate to multimedia posts. In the current
implementation images are marked as unverifiable. Verification of images as well as
support for other multimedia content are future work.
Secure Storage
The application works even without continuous Internet access. Previous posts are
cached, and new posts are stored locally and transmitted when Internet connectivity is
reestablished. As devices can be searched, lost, stolen, or confiscated, all user data are
encrypted. In scenarios where a region temporarily or permanently lacks Internet access,
users can utilize SecurePost to prepare and ferry posts for delivery when they re-establish
connectivity.
Previous posts, group memberships, keys, and other identifying information are stored
using SQLCipher [374] (an encrypted database for Android). When the application is
first launched, users choose an application-wide password for unlocking the app. This
is needed each time the app is started in order to decrypt the database. While running,
the application displays a persistent notification reminding the user that the database is
unlocked. Dismissing this notification rapidly locks the database and closes the application.
The application password is unique to the device and not shared with the proxy
server. In the event of password loss, the data are not recoverable. Users who forget the
password are offered the option to wipe the data, allowing them to start over. This does
unfortunately erase a user’s group memberships as credentials are all locally stored.
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Our application is tailored to populations that often use cheaper devices running
older operating systems. Older devices lack support for modern features such as full
disk encryption or a secure enclave [375]. Our application-level encryption is done
independently of any operating system-level encryption that the device may support. It
can be used in conjunction with other security methods, and adds a layer of security for
older devices. If the phone is confiscated by an adversary, the adversary would need to
perform a costly attack to decrypt data, which would still not expose group membership.
Option to Self-Destruct: To handle the case of device confiscation, raised as a concern
in the interviews, SecurePost implements an optional “self-destruct” password. This is set
up in addition to the regular application password and is shown in Figure 10.6. The self
destruct password can be revealed if the user is under duress. Entering the password is
visually presented as an incorrect password attempt while in reality it irretrievably wipes
the content of the application.
Matching Cryptographic Design With Needs
Our current invitation process is a reflection of feedback from our partners. In the
initial designs of SecurePost, we envisioned scenarios where users could form short-term
groups at physical gatherings such as protests.
In this initial design users shared a secret pass phrase to join a group. Anyone with
the pass phrase could post. Administration was only possible by the owner of the OSN
account using the OSN account username and password. When a user joined a group,
the app generated a time-synchronized hash chain using the pass phrase as a seed. To
post, the group member signed the post using the hash from the current time slot which
was verified by the proxy server. Using the browser extension, anyone from the public
could verify any past post by using the signature of the most recent one. As time passed
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the hash chain shrank until it expired, at which point the group was dissolved.
Initially we were optimistic about this solution as it allowed an easy way for groups
to spontaneously form. However through interviews and user testing we were forced to
reconsider our approach. Users explained the importance of long-lasting groups that build
trust and credibility over time. Despite short lived activities like protests, once users
bonded together, they disliked the idea of auto-expiring membership. When recounting
Gezi park protests in Istanbul, protesters noted the importance of continuing to grow
activist groups after the event.
Sharing a long password also proved a usability challenge. We required users to come
up with and share a long password or phrase, independent of the OSN account and unique
for each group. Users had a hard time remembering passwords and resorted to using
simple easy to guess passwords. The situation was complicated further by having an
application password, a self-destruct password and the possibility of adding multiple
groups.
Lastly, as mentioned, the hash chain approach used posts from the latest time block
to validate posts from previous time blocks. This meant that : (1) the most recent post
could not be validated and (2) posts in the current time block could not be validated. In
testing, users stressed that the most recent post is often the most important as it is the
most timely, and were confused why there was no mechanism for validation.
From this feedback we settled on the key based approach described in detail earlier in
this section. The major design change is described here to highlight the importance of
understanding the user community in system design. Through the course of this project,
our team was able to move from preconceived understanding of the technical needs of
users to a tailored approach through social analysis and iterative user testing.
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10.5.2 The Proxy Server
The Android application communicates with a companion proxy server. Aside from
the initial group creation (that uses the native social media platform authorization API)
all content flows through this proxy. The proxy keeps group-level state and masks the
individual user’s IP address from the OSNs.
As discussed in Section 10.5.1, when groups are first created through the SecurePost
application, the OSN platform issues an access token that the app forwards to the
proxy. The app also creates and forwards the group’s public posting key and the public
administrative key. The proxy stores the OSN access token and uses it to make posts and
change banner and profile images. The proxy also stores the public keys and uses them
to verify posting and administrative rights. If the group is reset by the administrator
through the application, the keys are updated but the OSN access token remains consistent.
Notably the proxy does not ever receive the private keys for the group.
Since OSNs log the IP addresses of users, they may be compelled by governments to
identify users and produce access logs. The proxy masks individual users’ IP addresses.
The proxy itself does not log IP addresses or keep any individual user metrics. Because the
server may become compromised, it does not store private keys for groups. Adversaries
who gain access to the proxy would be able to make posts using the OSN access token
but not sign them. Any posts made by adversaries using the OSN access token from the
proxy server would lack signatures and show up as invalid. The OSN access token could
still be rescinded by a group member with the login information to the OSN account.
The server consists of a standalone Java application running Jetty utilizing a MongoDB
No-SQL database for storage. Interaction with the application is implemented through a
JSON REST API running over HTTPS. If the proxy needs to be scaled, multiple instances
of the proxy can be spun up synchronizing via the MongoDB.
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Currently, we run an instance of the proxy on Amazon Web Services. By default,
users of the SecurePost application utilize this instance. As users may want to audit the
source code and run their own instance, the project is open source and we allow easy
configuration of the application to point to a different proxy server instance.
Unlike OSN platforms that have financial incentive to cooperate with adversaries,
anyone can run a SecurePost proxy on any machine of their choosing. While some may
choose to run it in a data center (possibly in another country outside the jurisdiction of
their government) others may choose to do so on anonymous machines. This flexibility
allows a particular group to retain control of their security and the point of failure.
If a proxy is blocked, the posts made by the group will still be visible and verifiable
for the general population. There would be a brief disruption in posting content for group
members, but as the group administrators have full access to the app and proxy, they
could migrate to a new IP or new machine to bypass this block. Further, as we elaborate
in Section 10.5.3, as long as the verification protocol is not altered, the same browser
extension can run irrespective of the back-end proxy with no reconfiguration.
10.5.3 The Browser Extension
SecurePost is designed to be used to disseminate information to the public. Posts
made from the application are posted directly to social media. The browser extension
allows any member of the public, irrespective of group membership to verify any post
made with SecurePost. Currently the browser extension is implemented as a cross-browser
extension and is compatible with Chrome, Firefox, and Opera. It runs independent of the
proxy server, and uses only the contents of the OSN web page to verify posts.
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(a) Unmodified Twitter Feed. (b) Using the Browser Extension.
Figure 10.7: Example of a Twitter feed using the optional verification feature of
SecurePost. In the unmodified feed (left) each post has an associated signature image.
Using the browser plugin (right) The signature image is automatically hidden and
posts are highlighted to show validity. Mousing over the image in the top right corner
of a post shows the user the reason that the post was marked.
Post Signature
The application automatically generates signatures for each post using the private
posting key for the group. If the SecurePost group enables the option to use verification,
the proxy appends an image containing the cryptographic signature when posting to the
OSN, as shown by Figure 10.7a. As OSNs compress images, typically as JPGs, we use a
compression resistant encoding for the image based signature. The signature is encoded
as a series of monochromatic 3x3 pixel squares aligned to the row/column boundaries that
match the JPG encoding algorithm. The encoded signature presents to the user similar
to TV “snow” at the bottom of an image that informs the reader how to verify the post.
The browser extension processes this banner, decoding the signature back to binary.
To verify the signature, the extension requires the posting public key. This key is encoded
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by the proxy, in the same manner as the signature, into the profile image on Twitter and
the cover image on Facebook. This occurs when the group is first created and whenever
the images are changed. The public posting key is likewise decoded by the browser and,
with the aid of the signature, is used to verify authenticity and integrity of the post.
Notably this technique does not require co-operation with the social media platform
or the proxy server. The same extension can verify messages from multiple groups which
may be using different proxy servers provided they use the encoding protocol for message
signatures. This removes the need for non group members to access the proxy, reducing
the risk of traffic analysis by an entity with a sufficient view of the network. Additionally
this approach reduces the server load on the proxy as the number of readers requiring
verification would likely be magnitudes greater then content creators.
Verifying Posts
When installed, the extension automatically verifies posts when on a supported OSN
web page. The extension first determines whether the account uses SecurePost by reading
a pixel pattern encoded in the corner of the profile image, and if so goes on to validate
the posts in the feed. The extension uses a mix of color and symbols to inform the user of
the validity of a post, as shown in Figure 10.7b. It also hides the signature images from
the user to improve the user experience.
Posts made directly to social media, without the use of the SecurePost app, do not
have access to the private posting key and are marked as unverified. Similarly, as discussed
earlier, multimedia posts, made through the app are not able to be verified. As the
signature is based on the content of the post, copying another post’s signature image is
insufficient to falsely validate a post. Users are graphically presented with the reason that
a post is not valid or not able to be validated by hovering over an icon in the corner of
the post.
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Figure 10.8: Original text-based signature. Original experimental text-based signature
using CJK Unified Ideographs.
If somehow an adversary took full control of the OSN account and set up a new
SecurePost group, they could change the public key and make new posts that are
verifiable. However all previous posts (that readers trusted) will show up as no longer
verified to any member of the public using the browser. There is no way for them to create
new verified posts that use the previous signing key. This would be a strong indicator to
the public that there was a serious problem and perhaps a change of ownership has taken
place.
Design process for image-based signatures
The ability to verify posts is one of the key facets of our work. As our partners
wanted both Twitter and Facebook support, we needed a solution that was sensitive to
the character limits of these OSNs, which at the time, was 140 characters on Twitter.
In our initial design, we experimented with text-based signatures using 21-bit CJK
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Unified Ideographs. This character set has high bit-density per character, which allowed
us to maximize bit count while minimizing the number of characters. An example of this
approach is shown in Figure 10.8.
While doing user testing and interviews in Mongolia, participants expressed that this
approach was unsuitable due to local cultural norms. In Mongolia there are strong tensions
with China, and social ramifications for perceived affinity for one of its neighbors. By
using characters associated with China or Korea, even if the characters did not correspond
to actual or Korean text, users exposed themselves to perceptions of siding with these
countries. This was particularly problematic for groups already marginalized.
In response to this social constraint, we moved to an image-based signatures which
fits within cultural norms while still satisfying character limits. This change in design
highlights the value in understanding the social context for which software is developed.
10.6 Usage and Evaluation
SecurePost is freely available on the Google Play Store. The browser extension, which
allows users to verify posts, is available on the Google Chrome Web Store for free. Our
app is available in 7 languages: Arabic, English, French, Mongolian, Russian, Spanish,
Turkish. All modules, including the Android application, proxy server, and browser
extension are open source and available through BitBucket and on our website [339].
10.6.1 Satisfying Design Requirements
As OSNs are highly utilized by our partner communities, we focused our work on
the two highly utilized social networks: Twitter and Facebook. Since smart phones are
the primary method of Internet access, our technical solution was designed to work with
Android smart phones, while providing backwards compatibility for older devices.
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In our work we identified public group communication that protected anonymity while
preserving reputation as an unmet need for our partner communities. We address the
need for anonymity by allowing groups to share a single OSN account while maintaining
individual anonymity. By sharing access keys, there is no group roster. IPs are kept
hidden from OSNs via the use of a proxy that groups can retain full ownership and control
over.
To maintain reputation we provide a method of verifying post authenticity with the
use of cryptographic signatures. Members of the public can verify that a post came from
a group using a companion browser. Posts that are modified are no longer verified, and
accounts that are seized or hacked are unable to post verifiable posts. If a group is ever
compromised administrators can reset membership and invalidate past posts to signal to
readers that there is a problem and they should re-evaluate the truthfulness of current
posts. In this manner groups can build reputation, and signal if that reputation might be
compromised.
In future work we are interested in exploring ways of migrating groups between OSN
accounts using the same signature keys and proxy servers. This would allow groups to
switch to a new OSN account in light of censorship while preserving reputation, and
could allow verification of identity across services. We are also exploring ideas of tiers of
user class so that posts from a designated core group of users can retain verification after
group reset.
As participants, such as journalists, expressed a need to report from areas with
periodic or permanent network disruption, SecurePost maintains a local cache of posts.
Users can view past posts without connectivity, and compose posts that are delivered
when connectivity is re-established. In this manner users can ferry information from
disconnected geographic regions.
As storing content locally leaves users vulnerable to device confiscation and search,
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Figure 10.9: SecurePost application installation by country as of October 2017.
SecurePost encrypts all data using an application-wide password. In the event that a
user is under duress they can provide a false password that wipes the application data
including posting keys.
While designing the application we received iterative feedback from participants that
tailored design decisions to be appropriate for our intended users. As outlined in the
previous section we modified our initial approaches to fit cultural norms (such as switching
from CJK text-based signatures) and fit with user social behavior (such as abandoning
the initial hash-chain approach).
10.6.2 Usage Survey
As anonymity is at the core of the design philosophy, SecurePost does not collect usage
data beyond that which is necessary for functionality of the app and server, as well as
basic install statistics collected by the Google Play Store. Based on data from the Google
Play Store, as of October 2017, we have had over 400 installs of our application. As we
show in Figure 10.9, our users reside not only the countries we were explicitly targeting:
USA, Mongolia, Turkey, Zambia, but in other countries where censorship is a problem (59
countries in total). SecurePost users have so far formed 68 groups and made 336 posts.
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Table 10.5: Results of initial demographic survey. Collected by when application is first run.
Survey Question % (#)
Gender
Male 62% (95)
Female 35% (54)
Other 3% (4)
Age
≤ 20 years old 42% (67)
21-30 years old 49% (79)
31-40 years old 6% (9)
41-50 years old 2% (3)
≥ 51 years old 1% (1)
Education
Primary school 1% (2)
Secondary school / High school 12% (18)
Higher education or university 87% (130)
Preferred Language
Arabic 2% (1)
English 90% (43)
Spanish 8% (4)
Application/OS Language
Arabic 0.3% (1)
English 95% (314)
Spanish 2% (8)
French 1% (3)
Russian 0.3% (1)
Turkish 0.6% (2)
Total # Surveyed (329)
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When the application is first run, users are given the option to provide optional
demographic information. The data to date are summarized in Table 10.5. As of October
2017, we received 329 responses. From this survey, we found the majority (62%) of
users identified as male. Most were 30 years old or younger (91%) and had some higher
education (87%). Because we led user studies and presented our application at universities
and organizations where college-age students are likely to work, we expected our users to
fall into this demographic. In developing countries, younger generations and men are also
more likely to use the Internet as a whole [341].
For language, few respondents (15% of total responses) stated a preferred language.
Those that did largely preferred English, the dominant language in Zambia and the United
States, which makes up a large portion of all installs.
Our survey also automatically registered the language to which the application was
currently set. The application language is a match-up between operating system defaults
and the seven supported languages of the application. Languages not supported by the
application would be reported as the next likely language, usually English. The exact
implementation varies by Android version and is detailed in [376]. In this metric, English
is again the dominant language (95%), suggesting that our translations are not heavily
utilized.
After using the application for three days, users were asked if they would take an
optional survey based on their experiences using SecurePost. This follow-up survey is also
available through an in-app menu. A subset of the survey questions is summarized in
Table 10.6. A total of 22 users have so far completed this survey, which is a small sample.
We are working to increase the response rate by re-offering the survey.
Responses to the follow-up survey indicate that the majority of respondents found
SecurePost to be at least somewhat useful (73%). When asked to what extent they thought
that using SecurePost has improved their confidence in using online social networks, most
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Table 10.6: Results of follow-up survey. Collected by application after three days of use.
Survey Question % (#)
How useful is SecurePost to user
Not useful at all 4% (1)
A little useful 23% (5)
Somewhat useful 41% (9)
Very Useful 32% (7)
SecurePost Improved confidence with OSNs
Not improved confidence 9% (2)
Improved confidence a little 41% (9)
Improved confidence somewhat 45% (10)
Improved confidence a lot 5% (1)
Feel Freer on OSNs
A lot less free 4% (1)
A little less free 9% (2)
Equally as free 4% (1)
A little more free 50% (11)
A lot more free 23% (5)
Total # Surveyed (22)
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said it improved their confidence a little, somewhat, or a lot (91%). When asked to
what extent users feel freer in their ability to express themselves on Twitter and/or
Facebook without concerns about surveillance or security of the messages sent when using
SecurePost, most said they feel freer to some extent (73%).
10.7 Conclusion
Our research seeks to understand and address barriers to free speech on the Internet
for vulnerable communities. While there are many significant differences across these
diverse communities, we observed particular patterns in free speech challenges among
Internet and OSN users across these contexts. Social research revealed user concerns
ranging from account disruptions to online credibility issues to equipment seizures. We
built a novel tool to address such challenges in partnership with affected communities.
SecurePost allows users greater control of anonymity through group-based communi-
cation on OSNs. Through verified group anonymity, users build trust and reputation as a
collective, without exposing the identities of individuals. By allowing communities to set
up their own instances of the SecurePost proxy server, users do not have to trust OSNs
to protect IPs and identities of individual members.
Using SecurePost, an administrator can share OSN accounts without sharing the
account passwords and hence maintain control of the account. If the account is seized
or hacked, the browser extension can still identify fraudulent or edited posts using the
cryptographic signature.
We developed SecurePost to support the most popular OSN platforms (Facebook
and Twitter) and device types (Android smart phone), providing compatibility for older
devices lacking some of the security features (e.g. encrypted storage) of newer phones.
The application also provides a means of storing messages for later delivery to counter
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network disruption due to power loss or government censure. Because the project is
open source and designed for modularity, other similar platforms and systems can be
incorporated in the future.
Like other anonymity applications, individual users can still be revealed by posting
personal information in the contents of a message. Given time and access to the file
structure of the device, it is also possible for the encrypted storage to be decrypted, for
example via a brute force attack. Additionally, adversaries with a sufficient view of the
network may still implement de-anonymization through timing analysis. We hope to
address these vulnerabilities in future work.
A frequent concern for the development of security applications is the potential misuse
by ill-meaning organizations, like terrorist cells. Because the data are all posted publicly,
our app does not expand the capabilities of malevolent secret communication. While our
tool allows users to remain anonymous, it does not prevent OSNs from censoring accounts
or content. We leave the decision of what constitutes a danger to the OSN.
Because all elements of our software are open source, communities do not have to
trust us (the developers) or OSNs to protect the identities of individual members. They
can audit and improve the code, and can set up their own instances of the SecurePost
proxy server that is isolated from developers.
Finally, our work provides insight into community collaborations. By partnering with
locals and understanding social context, specific needs, and user behaviors, we were able
to come up with a novel method of adding verification to non-cooperative online social
networks.
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Future of Wireless Communication
Computer science researchers strive to design technologies that tackle existing social
challenges and that extrapolate into the future to develop solutions for emerging problems.
Our work comes at a critical time in our society, when social inequality and natural
and political crises are on the rise. The co-occurring major natural and political crises
that frequently intersected with our work motivated the research presented thus far.
To conclude this dissertation in this chapter, we explore this additional context and
motivation, as well as examine emerging communication technologies and how our work
integrates with the broader vision of future wireless connectivity.
11.1 A Disruptive Future
11.1.1 Natural Crises
The majority of this research was conducted in California, which has seen a rise in
natural crises in the last decade. During our research, California experienced the wettest
winter in a century [377], causing landslides and flooding that damaged infrastructure,
including major transportation arteries (such as the primary freeway leading to our
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(a) Sherpa Fire. (b) Whittier Fire.
Figure 11.1: Photos of recent California wildfires.
University) and the Oroville dam [378]. At the other extreme, dry summers fueled brutal
wildfire seasons, including the 2016 Sherpa fire (Figure 11.1a), the 2017 Whittier Fire
(Figure 11.1b), the 2017 Tubbs fire in Sonoma (the second most damaging wildfire recorded
in California history [379]), the 2017 Thomas fire in Ventura and Santa Barbara (the
second largest fire recorded in the state’s history [380]), the 2018 Camp fire (the most
damaging wildfire recorded in California history [379]) and the 2018 Mendocino Complex
Fire (the largest fire recorded in the state’s history [381]). Note that these record setting
events all occurred in the last few years.
Elsewhere in the world, similar trends of record breaking natural disasters resulted
in numerous deaths and damage to infrastructure. In 2017, a heavy monsoon season
caused flooding in India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, killing over a thousand people and
impacting tens of millions [382]. In the Atlantic, three devastating hurricanes (Harvey,
Maria, and Irma) impacted countries in and around the Gulf of Mexico, including the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the United States. In Houston, for example, an estimated
136,000 structures (10 % of total structures) were flooded [383]. From 2019 through 2020,
Australia and Brazil have experienced the largest wildfire season on record with millions
of hectacres burned [384, 385].
The impact of these disasters lasts from months to years [28] and results in mas-
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sive ecological damage, mass migration, and threatens the economic stability of these
regions [29, 386, 387]. Natural disasters damage otherwise well provisioned networks when
critically needed. In addition to directly threatening human lives, natural disasters cripple
communication infrastructure. Fueled by climate change, such disasters are increasing in
frequency and intensity [30, 31]. With increases in severity come concomitant increases in
the number of affected individuals. For example, 160 countries have more than one-fourth
of their total population in areas at relatively high mortality risk from one or more
hazards [388].
Wireless networks of the future will need to be resilient to these emerging natural
crises and must be designed accordingly. Disaster response and recovery requires rapid
assessment of the changing network conditions. The work in this dissertation further
expands capabilities by proposing systems of automated network quality assessment and
systems for locating disconnected wireless devices. Our work paves the way for passive
evaluation of networks without relying on cooperation from MNOs, allowing independent
assessment when time and resources are limited.
11.1.2 Political Crises
In addition to an increase natural disasters, civil freedoms are declining globally [32].
Despite the UN’s assessment that the protection of free speech should fully extend to the
Internet [266, 267], governments, corporations, and individuals often restrict what users
can say online and punish those with dissenting views. The last decade experienced a sharp
rise in censorship, Internet surveillance, targeted disinformation, and cyberbullying [33].
Adversaries to open discourse deploy armies of operatives masquerading as legitimate users
to post “fake news”, eroding reputation and trust of content [67, 68, 69, 70, 280, 281].
Our work came at particularly critical time for Turkey. During our research, Turkey
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(a) Women’s March. (b) March For Science.
Figure 11.2: Photos of recent protests in Santa Barbara, California.
experienced a steep change in freedoms co-occurring with a massive protest in 2013 at
Gezi Park [60], and an attempted coup in 2016 [61]. The Turkish government responded
by purging academics, blocking access to networks, and deploying a massive censorship
campaign [62, 269, 369, 389]. Recently, censorship has been utilized in a number of other
countries as response to political conflict [36, 37, 38, 39, 40]. In some cases this took the
form of total Internet access disruptions in Bangladesh, Indian province of Kashmir, and
Myanmar [34, 35, 390]. In other cases, governments limit Internet access for particular
types of content [284].
Our research progressed both the understanding of global issues surrounding freedom
of speech and provided new systems for protecting those freedoms. We collaborated with
interdisciplinary experts and community partners to characterize social challenges to free
speech online across three different regions. To address unmet needs, we introduced a
novel system of verified group anonymity, which allows users to build trust and reputation
as a collective, without exposing the identities of individuals.
As in the case of a natural disaster [164], large protests, such as the 2017 Women’s
March (Figure 11.2a) and the March for Science (Figure 11.2b), can overwhelm previously
well provisioned cellular networks [391]. Our work provides methods of analyzing network
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load without cooperation from MNOs.
11.1.3 The Digital Divide
As of 2019, only 54 percent of the world’s population had Internet access [1]. In the
United States, the richest country by GDP, one third of the population lacks broadband
access. Rural Americans are 12% less likely than their urban counterparts to have access
to home broadband [392]. As more of our society becomes reliant on Internet connectivity,
those without access can fall behind. For example, in the U.S., 17% of surveyed teens said
they often or sometimes were unable to complete a homework assignment because they
do not have reliable access to a computer or internet connection [393]. The digital divide
can amplify existing societal disparities, such as participation in arts and culture [394],
health literacy [395], and even transportation [396]. Rural and tribal communities are
particularly likely to lack access [3, 4].
As we have previously discussed, LTE is often used for mobile broadband to connect
rural communities and bridge the digital divide. The assessment of such networks, both
in terms of coverage and performance, remains a significant challenge due to the overly
optimistic reports of availability and failures to account for quality and usability. Our
work on passive assessment of coverage and load fills this gap.
Our work engaged communities both locally and globally. We have applied our work
for LTE and TVWS assessment to advise network planners of tribal communities in
southern California and New Mexico (Figure 11.3a). Further, in conducting research on
freedom of speech online, we provided insight into the needs of developing communities in
Zambia, Turkey and Mongolia, including the Ger District of Ulaanbaatar shown in Figure
11.3b. Inequality, natural disasters, and political crises are just three of the emerging
problems of the next century to which computer networks will need to respond [76, 77].
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(a) Santa Clara Pueblo, New Mexico, USA (b) Ger District, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Figure 11.3: Photos of rural partner communities.
11.2 Technologies for the Future
Governments and companies are already preparing for these new realities. In the
United States, the FCC released the Wireless Resiliency Cooperative Framework, which
has been signed by all the top MNOs, including Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile.
The framework expresses ”voluntary industry commitment to promote resilient wireless
communications and situational awareness during disasters” [397]. Technology giants are
developing technologies to handle these emergent threats. Our work provides valuable
insights into deficiencies of existing technologies, as well as tools and techniques that will
remain relevant for the next generation of communication standards.
11.2.1 LTE Networks
In fact, MNOs made notable improvements in disaster preparation in recent years.
When a violent weather event is predictable, cellular companies have a variety of tools at
their disposal: they deploy and top-off fuel powered backup generators; they place Cell on
Wheels (COWs), Cell on Light Trucks (CoLTs), Cell Repeaters on Wheels (CROWs), at
strategic locations where outages are anticipated; and they increase staffing at emergency
command centers, among others [398]. While these strategies prove helpful for anticipated
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natural disasters, unanticipated natural disasters (such as wildfires), disasters where
impact is hard to forecast (such as the path of a hurricane), or disasters that become
worse than predicted (such as the extensive flooding seen in Hurricane Harvey) can make
these solutions unfeasible. For instance, fires and flood waters can prevent the placement
of COWs, CoLTs, and other emergency machinery in needed locations. Once placed, they
cannot easily be moved or refueled. Our work investigates rapidly evaluating coverage
and overload, which can inform the decision making process of where and when to deploy
COWs, CoLTs, and CROWs.
11.2.2 Aerial Applications
UASs are increasingly proposed for rapidly extending wireless connectivity [399].
UASs offer a wide variety of connectivity options, limited primarily by payload weight
constraints. For instance, as mentioned earlier, MNOs already employ UASs for visually
inspecting equipment after natural disasters [156]. The rapidly changing topography of an
aerial wireless network, which can provide a backhaul link from the UAS to the Internet,
offers both challenges and opportunities for connectivity innovation and optimizing
performance [400]. In the simplest case, the UAS could serve as a cellular relay, patching
connectivity holes between operational base stations and users [401, 402, 403, 404, 96,
405] or between COWs and users. UASs can even be perched for rapidly deployable
infrastructure [103, 104, 105]. Our work paves the way for detecting and automatic aerial
patching of coverage gaps and supplementing cellular capacity in the event of overload.
11.2.3 TV White Spaces
When cellular base stations are unavailable, non-operational, or overloaded, TVWS
links provide a promising option for backhaul connectivity. TVWS links are characterized
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by long transmission ranges and good propagation and penetration properties, making
them ideally suited for extending connectivity in difficult-to-reach areas. UASs equipped
with lightweight TVWS radios have already been used for spectrum monitoring [102],
and cities, such as Oxford, UK are exploring their use for flood monitoring [406]. In
cases where TVWS links are impractical or unavailable, DTN literature offers a variety
of solutions for delayed communication [407]. Our work has covered a portion of this
space via the use of UASs for rapid frequency scans of incumbent transmitters. This work
parallels the LTE coverage assessment in chapter 3 and uses low cost SDRs on aerial
platform for frequency sensing and coverage mapping. This work has already helped
tribal communities plan networks in California and New Mexico.
11.2.4 5G Cellular
At the time of writing this dissertation, 5G cellular networks dominate the discussion
on future networks. Fifth generation cellular technology promises a connectivity panacea
with a dense grid of intelligent wireless devices that will deliver “multi-Gbps peak rates,
ultra-low latency, massive capacity, and more uniform user experience” [408]. According
to Verizon, “users will know it as one of the fastest, most robust technologies the world
has ever seen. That means quicker downloads, outstanding network reliability and a
spectacular impact on how we live, work and play.” [409] Despite the intense optimism
about these networks, the proposed approaches to 5G networks pose many of the same
types of problems as existing cellular technologies. Further, the focus on increasing
network throughput leads to complications that can hamper rural roll-out and operations
post crises.
As with all prior cellular technologies, build outs will occur first in urban areas.
According to [410], urban centers, such as Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, Atlanta, and
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Washington DC already have some areas of 5G coverage. Deployment within a handful
of suburban cities, such as Panama City and Sioux Falls, is on the horizon. These
selected regions have a common set of characteristics on which 5G technology depends:
contemporaneous end-to-end connectivity, economic gain from infrastructure deployment,
and high speed backbone links (either pre-existing, or easily deployed).
For rural regions, there are few to no announcements of upcoming coverage. Indeed,
rural and tribal regions in the United States currently have the lowest cellular coverage
and Internet availability, lagging far behind urban and suburbans centers. While only 10%
of Americans lack broadband access, that number increases to 39% in rural areas [411].
According to the 2018 FCC Broadband Report, broadband adoption rates on tribal
lands is only 32.6%, and, while LTE deployment in urban areas of the U.S. has seen
impressive growth in the last three years, deployment on tribal lands remains flat [142].
This coverage gap is largely due to economics. With their sparser population densities
and wider geographic areas, rural cellular and Internet coverage is more expensive to
deploy and offers significantly lower return on investment. As a result, we observe a
rural/urban digital divide across the U.S., as well as in many other developed regions of
the world [4, 3, 412]. This divide is occasionally narrowed through government subsidies,
such as the E-Rate program [413, 144, 414, 415, 141], but so far this has resulted in only
pockets of coverage in most rural and tribal communities.
To achieve top 5G data rates and ultra-low latencies, 5G radios will need to be densely
deployed and have fiber backhaul. While most urban areas are already well-equipped
to provide both the fiber backhaul and the infrastructural support needed to physically
place 5G radios (i.e. light poles with electrical power supplies), these resources are rarely
available in rural areas, and completely unavailable in the density needed to achieve
multi-Gbps, ultra-low latency connectivity to rural homes and work places. For example,
in the 5G Rural First project headed by Cisco and the UK Government’s Department for
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Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport, the pilot network in northern Scotland used a fiber
backhaul to an urban center in Glasgow hundreds of miles away [416]. As we discussed in
chapter 1, fiber and other wired solutions are a persistent existing challenge for many
rural communities, including tribal land, and those in the developing world. A cellular
solution that requires fiber connectivity is unlikely to reach these communities in the
foreseeable future.
Because 5G radio deployments are anticipated to be ultra-dense in urban areas, it is
likely that these networks will operate over mmWave links, which are needed to achieve
the ultra-high data rates. These mmWave links only cover a couple hundred meters
per base station. However, because of the large geographic spans with lower population
densities that need coverage in rural areas, current plans for 5G usage in these spaces tend
toward “low-band” communication in the 600-900MHz frequency range, or the “sub-6
mid-bands” in the 3.5-6 GHz range. These bands have better propagation properties, at
the expense of lower data rates and greater latencies. Hence, while rural regions may
benefit from the architectural features of 5G such as network function virtualization, they
are unlikely to receive the massive boosts in data rates and reductions in latencies that
urban regions will experience and that are the hallmark of 5G connectivity.
Despite these limitations, there are many types of challenged networks that could
vastly benefit from both the 5G architecture and superior broadband capabilities. As an
example, rural regions typically lack state-of-the-art hospitals, and often lack medical
specialists. As a result, tele-medicine and remote health care can be critical in these areas.
Current tele-health applications leverage remote video consultation, and remote surgery
via high speed ultra-reliable networks is on the horizon. Residents of rural regions stand
to benefit the most from these advanced applications, and need the infrastructure to
support them. As a second example, first responders to natural disasters (e.g., wildfires,
hurricanes, earthquakes and tornadoes) have critical multi-modal connectivity needs,
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ranging from real-time voice to ultra-low latency video, for instance from surveillance
UASs [202, 200, 201, 417, 418, 419, 420].
As we have seen repeatedly in this dissertation, natural disasters can damage or down
cellular towers, as well as electrical grids [164, 24, 26, 25, 421, 422]. In such cases, rural
regions are particularly susceptible, as they tend to have fewer pathways (often only one)
between the community and the Internet [144, 414, 423, 424]. Further, as wildfires become
increasingly frequent and unpredictable, first responders and fire fighters often must gather
in remote, offline locations, yet could still benefit from the same real-time applications
that require at least local connectivity (e.g. UAS surveillance video). Ironically, in exactly
the moments during and after a disaster, where connectivity is most needed, connectivity
is typically unavailable. If a fiber optic cable or related equipment is damaged, in proposed
5G networks, all local access will be severed. In the worst cases, the lack of connectivity
can make the difference between life and death [425, 426, 427, 383].
As a result, the roll-out of 5G is unlikely to change the needs or capabilities of the
communities in challenged regions in the near future. The research presented in this
thesis will continue to be applicable to 5G enabled communities. For example, given the
wider range of frequencies utilized by 5G networks with a heterogeneity in range and
speed, the need for accurate and rapid coverage mapping grows. In the 5G landscape, the
wide discrepancy in frequency characteristics (such as permeability of surfaces) will be
even harder to model, making the previous binary coverage MNO self-reporting strategies
employed by regulators even more ineffective. An area covered by lower throughput
“low-band” frequencies may for example have no coverage of high throughput mmWave.
Likewise, 5G’s capabilities to enable IoT applications is projected to spur the growth of
WSNs. When 5G connectivity is disrupted, DTN data delivery approaches, like those
outlined in this dissertation, will remain necessary.
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11.3 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we presented research into critical contemporary challenges for the
use of wireless networks. Our work covers widely deployed standards across the wireless
ecosystem. We develop new tools to improve network assessment and to provide robust and
reliable network communication. Our work tackles issues, including the measurement of
rural network coverage, assessment of network under crisis conditions, aerial connectivity,
disaster applications, and censorship. By incorporating new technological breakthroughs,
such as UASs and SDRs, we introduced novel methods and systems for these challenged
networks. As we discussed in this chapter, our insights are applicable to many of the
emerging wireless communication technologies.
We have evaluated how technologies and standards function in difficult environments,
such as those lacking end-end Internet connectivity, overloaded, resource constrained, and
operating in three dimensional space. Through this lens, we demonstrated how to optimize
networks to serve marginalized communities, outside of first world urban cities, and make
our networks more resilient to natural and political crisis that threaten communication.
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